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第一章
公共财货理论的谬误
与安防生产

时值1849年，古典自由主义仍然是统治性的意识形态力量，“经济学家”和“社会学家”被一般人视为反义，一位著名比利时经济学家，古斯塔夫·德·莫利纳里写道：

“假如政治经济学有一种确凿真理，那就是：对所有商品而言，不管它们满足消费者的需求是弹性还是非弹性，维持劳动力及贸易自由都最符合消费者利益，因为劳动力及贸易自由注定永久导致价格的最大降幅。还有：无论对哪一种商品而言，消费者利益都将胜过生产者利益。眼下，在贯彻这些原理时，就会得出这种极端结论：要使安防生产满足消费者利益，仍然要服从自由竞争规律。由此推导出：任何政府无权阻止其他政府与之竞争，或要求安防消费者唯一向它取得这种商品^[1]。”

1 Fallacies of the Public
Goods Theory and the
Production of Security

In 1849, at a time when classical liberalism was still the dominant ideological force and “economist” and “socialist” were generally considered antonyms, Gustave de Molinari, a renowned Belgian economist, wrote,

If there is one well-established truth in political economy, it is this: That in all cases, of all commodities that serve to provide for the tangible or intangible need of the consumer, it is in the consumer's best interest that labor and trade remain free, because the freedom of labor and trade have as their necessary and permanent result the maximum reduction of price. And this: That the interest of the consumer of any commodity whatsoever should always prevail over the interests of the producer. Now, in pursuing these principles, one arrives at this rigorous conclusion: That the production of security should in the interest of consumers of this intangible commodity remain subject to the law of free competition. Whence it follows: That no government should have the right to prevent another government from going into competition with it, or require consumers of security to come exclusively to it for this

他对以上整个论辩的评述是：“要么以上是符合逻辑及真实的，要么经济科学所依赖的这些原理是无效的【2】。”

要摆脱这个（对于所有社会学家而言）不幸结论，表面上唯一之计，就是证明由于某些特殊原因，上述经济学推理不适用于某些特殊财货。所谓公共财货理论家，想要证明这些财货的存在【3】。然而，我将证明其实没有这样的特殊商品或特殊理由，尤其是安防生产绝不构成与房屋、奶酪、保险及其他财货、服务生产不一样的问题。尽管追随者众多，公共财货理论的推理华而不实，漏洞百出，且不合逻辑，执于流行偏见和假说，而无分毫科学价值【4】。

那么，社会经济学家如何才能避免莫利纳里这样的结论？自莫利纳里时代以来，对适用不同经济分析方法的财货是否存在，肯定的答案越来越多。事实上，时下要找到一本经济学教材，在其中不强调私人财货（总体承认资本主义生产秩

commodity.1

He comments on this whole argument by saying, “Either this is logical and true, or else the principles on which economic science is based are invalid.”2

There is apparently only one way out of this unpleasant (for all socialists, that is) conclusion: to argue that there are particular goods to which for some special reasons the above economic reasoning does not apply. It is this that the so-called public goods theorists are determined to prove.3 However, I will demonstrate that in fact no such special goods or special reasons exist, and that the production of security in particular does not pose a problem any different from that of the production of any other good or service, be it houses, cheese, or insurance. In spite of its many followers, the whole public goods theory is faulty, flashy reasoning, riddled with internal inconsistencies, non sequiturs, appealing to and playing on popular prejudices and assumed beliefs, but with no scientific merit whatsoever.4

What, then, does the escape route that socialist economists have found in order to avoid drawing Molinari’s conclusion look like? Since Molinari’s time it has become more common to answer yes to the question of whether there are goods to which different sorts of economic analyses apply. As a matter of fact, it is almost impossible to find a single

序的经济优越性)与公共财货(总体否认该秩序的经济优越性)差别的重要性^{【5】},已经不大可能。关于特定财货或服务(包括安防)的所谓特殊性,是因为享用者不限于那些为其生产实际付费的人。不付费者甚至也能从这些财货或服务中获益。这种财货被称为公共财货或公共服务(与实际付费者排他性获利的私人财货或私人服务相对)。因为这个特点,有人主张,市场无法生产公共财货,或至少无法足够多或足够好地生产公共财货,因此补足性政府活动就是必要的^{【6】}。

【1】 德·莫利纳里《安防服务的生产》J. 休斯顿·麦卡洛克译(纽约:自由至上研究中心,非定期论文丛No. 2, 1977年)第3页。

【2】 同上,第4页。

【3】 公共财货学者的种种分析方法,参阅詹姆斯·M. 布坎南与戈登·塔洛克《同意的计算》(安阿伯:密歇根大学出版社,1962年);詹姆斯·M. 布坎南《公共财政》(伊利诺斯州霍姆伍德:理查德·欧文,1970年);

contemporary economics textbook that does not stress the vital importance of the distinction between private goods, for which the truth of the economic superiority of a capitalist order of production is generally admitted, and public goods, for which it is generally denied.⁵ Certain goods or services (including security) are said to be special because their enjoyment cannot be restricted to those who have actually financed their production. Rather, people who do not participate in financing them also draw benefits from them. Such goods are called public goods or services (as opposed to private goods or services, which exclusively benefit those people who actually pay for them). Because of this special feature of public goods, it is argued, markets cannot produce them, or at least not insufficient quantity or quality; hence, compensatory state action is required.⁶

¹Gustave de Molinari, *The Production of Security*, trans. J. Huston McCulloch (New York: Center for Libertarian Studies, Occasional Paper Series No. 2, 1977), p. 3.

²*Ibid.*, p. 4.

³For various approaches of public goods theorists, see James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962); James M. Buchanan, *The Public Finances* (Homewood, Ill.: Richard Irwin, 1970); *idem*, *The Limits of*

戈登·塔洛克《私人需求，公共手段》（纽约：基础书局，1970年）；曼瑟尔·奥尔森《集体行动的逻辑》（剑桥，马萨诸塞州：哈佛大学出版社，1965）；威廉·J·鲍莫尔《福利经济学与政府理论》（剑桥：哈佛大学出版社，1952年）。

【4】以下参阅穆瑞·N. 罗斯巴德《人、经济与国家》（洛杉矶：纳什，1970年）第883页后、“中立税收的神话”《加图学报》（1981年）；瓦特·布拉克“自由市场运输：非国有化道路”《自由至上学报》3，no. 2（1979年）、“公共财货及外部性：论道路”《自由至上学报》7，no. 1（1983年）。

【5】参阅如鲍莫尔及艾伦·S. 布林德《经济学、原理和政策》（纽约：赫考特·布雷斯·乔瓦诺维奇，1979年）第31章。

【6】公共财货的另一常用标准是“非竞争性消费”。一般而言，两个标准似乎一致：若不能排除搭便车者，则非竞争性消费就是可能的；若能排除搭便车者，则消费就成为竞争性的。然而，就像公共财货学者所说的，两者不完全一致。可以想象，若排除“搭便车者”为可能，接纳“搭便车者”也许不会产生任何额外费用（允许“搭便车者”的边际成本为零），额外允许“搭便车

Liberty（Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975）；Gordon Tullock, *Private Wants, Public Means*（New York: Basic Books, 1970）；Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*（Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965）；William J. Baumol, *Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State*（Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952）。

4See on the following, Murray N. Rothbard, *Man, Economy, and State*（Los Angeles: Nash, 1970），pp. 883ff.; idem, “The Myth of Neutral Taxation,” *Cato Journal*（1981）；Walter Block, “Free Market Transportation: Denationalizing the Roads,” *Journal of Libertarian Studies* 3, no. 2（1979）；idem, “Public Goods and Externalities: The Case of Roads,” *Journal of Libertarian Studies* 7, no. 1（1983）。

5See for instance, William J. Baumol and Alan S. Blinder, *Economics, Principles and Policy*（New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1979），chap. 31.

6Another frequently used criterion for public goods is that of “nonrivalrous consumption.” Generally, both criteria seem to coincide: When free riders cannot be excluded, nonrivalrous consumption is possible; and when they can be excluded, consumption becomes rivalrous, or so it seems. However, as public goods theorists argue, this coincidence is not perfect. It is, they say, conceivable that while the exclusion of free riders might be possible, their inclusion might not be

者”消费该商品，不必然导致他人可获商品消费的减少。这一财货同样也应是公共财货。既然在自由市场当中通行的是排除，并且该财货无法被人人用于非竞争性消费，而这本应可以——尽管这不需要任何额外成本——根据国家主义及社会主义者的逻辑，这将证明市场失灵，也即消费未达到最优水平。因此政府可以接管对此类财货的供给(举例说，一家电影院可能只有半座客满，所以额外允许免费观众是“无代价”的，让他们观看电影同样不影响付费观众；因此电影院作为公共财货是合适的，然而因为影院业主会有排除之举，而非任凭搭便车者享受“无代价”的放映，国有化电影院从而时机成熟)。关于以非竞争消费定义公共财货的无数谬误见注释 12 及 17。

对所谓公共财货，不同作者所举例子千差万别。对同一财货或服务，各作者分类往往五花八

connected with any additional cost (the marginal cost of admitting free riders is zero, that is), and that the consumption of the good in question by the additionally admitted free rider will not necessarily lead to a subtraction in the consumption of the good available to others. Such a good would be a public good, too. And since exclusion would be practiced on the free market and the good would not become available for nonrivalrous consumption to everyone it otherwise could—even though this would require no additional costs—this, according to statist-socialist logic, would prove a market failure, i.e., a suboptimal level of consumption. Hence the state would have to take over the provision of such goods. (A movie theater, for instance, might be only half full, so it might be “costless” to admit additional viewers free of charge, and their watching the movie also might not affect the paying viewers; hence the movie would qualify as a public good. Since, however, the owner of the theater would be engaging in exclusion, instead of letting free riders enjoy a “costless” performance, movie theaters would be ripe for nationalization.) On the numerous fallacies involved in defining public goods in terms of nonrivalrous consumption see notes 12 and 17 below.

The examples given by different authors of alleged public goods vary widely. Authors often classify the same good or service differently,

门,且一种特定财货的分类,几乎不能免于非议,这清楚预示着整个界分的虚无本质^{【7】}。而某些公认的公共财货,如阻止邻屋起火的消防队,未出资的邻居也从我的消防队那里获益;或者警察在我的财产附近巡逻,将潜藏的窃贼从未出资的邻居那里吓走;或是灯塔,对经济学家尤为亲切的一例^{【8】},它给船只指引航道,尽管船主不曾为灯塔建造及维护掏一文钱。

在继续介绍及严格考察公共财货理论前,先要了解:对帮助决定什么该由私人生产,什么该由政府或由政府协助提供,私人财货与公共财货的界分到底有多大作用。即使极端肤浅的分析,也不得不指出,使用上述矛盾概念,而非采用理性答案,将使人陷入泥潭。尽管政府提供的某些财货及服务,至少初看也许真有资格作为公共财货,然而这些实际由政府生产的财货及服务中,有多少借公共财货之名以行却决非显然。铁路、邮政、电讯、街道,等等,似乎都是限于实际付

leaving almost no classification of a particular good undisputed, which clearly foreshadows the illusory character of the whole distinction.⁷ Nonetheless, some examples that enjoy particularly popular status as public goods are the fire brigade that stops a neighbor's house from catching fire, thereby letting him profit from my fire brigade, even though he did not contribute anything to financing it; or the police that, by walking around my property scare away potential burglars from my neighbor's property as well, even if he did not help finance the patrols; or the lighthouse, an example particularly dear to economists,⁸ that helps a ship find its way even though the ship's owner did not contribute a penny to its construction or upkeep.

Before continuing with the presentation and critical examination of the theory of public goods, I will investigate how useful the distinction between private and public goods is in helping decide what should be produced privately and what should be provided by the state or with state help. Even the most superficial analysis could not fail to point out that using the alleged criterion of inexcludability, rather than presenting a sensible solution, would get one into deep trouble. While at least at first glance it seems that some of the state provided goods and services might indeed qualify as public goods, it certainly is not obvious how many of the goods and services that are actually produced by states could come

费者利用的财货，因此好像都是私人财货。对于“安防”这种多维度财货，若从许多方面考虑，情况也是如此：一切可保物品都有资格作为私人财货。尽管这还不够。就像政府提供的不少财货属于私人财货，而许多私人生产财货看似属于公共财货。我精心打理的玫瑰花圃，显然会让邻居获益——他们流连美景却不曾援手。同理，我对于自己财产的种种改良，也会增进邻居财产的价值。甚至那些吝于投钱给街头音乐家的人，也能从欣赏演奏中获得享受。那些在公车上不曾帮过我的旅伴，也陶醉于我的体香剂中。每个曾经遇见我但不曾资助过我的人，都从我使自己讨人喜悦的改善中获益。现在，所有这些财货——玫瑰花圃、财产改良、街头音乐、体香剂、个人改善——既然它们看似明显具备公共财货的性质，那么就非得由政府提供？或非得在政府协助下提供？

under the heading of public goods. Railroads, postal services, telephone, streets, and the like seem to be goods whose usage can be restricted to the persons who actually finance them, and hence appear to be private goods. And the same seems to be the case regarding many aspects of the multidimensional good “security”: everything for which insurance could be taken out would have to qualify as a private good. Yet this does not suffice. Just as many state-provided goods appear to be private goods, so many privately produced goods seem to fit in the category of a public good. Clearly my neighbors would profit from my well kept rose garden—they could enjoy the sight of it without ever helping me garden. The same is true of all kinds of improvements that I could make on my property that would enhance the value of neighboring property as well. Even those people who do not throw money in his hat can profit from a street musician’s performance. Those fellow passengers on the bus who did not help me buy it profit from my deodorant. And everyone who ever meets me would profit from my efforts, undertaken without their financial support, to turn myself into a most lovable person. Now, do all these goods—rose gardens, property improvements, street music, deodorants, personal improvements—since they clearly seem to possess the characteristics of public goods, then have to be provided by the state or with state assistance?

【7】关于这个主题参阅布拉克《公共财货及外部性》

【8】参阅例如布坎南《公共财政》第23页；保罗·萨缪尔森《经济学》（纽约：麦格劳·希尔，1976年）第166页。

上述私人生产公共财货的案例表明，公共财货理论家关于公共财货不能由私人生产，非要由政府干预的论调有严重错误。显然公共财货可由市场提供。此外，历史证据表明，政府目前提供的所谓公共财货，实际上一度由私人企业家提供，甚至如今不在这一国度，就在另一地域还是如此。例如，邮政服务曾几何时，各地几乎都由私人提供；街道曾由私人资助并且偶尔仍然如此；甚至受人喜爱的灯塔，其实也是私人企业的成果^[9]；私家警力、侦探以及仲裁人不曾绝迹；援助老弱、病困和孤寡是私人慈善组织的传统责任。也就是说，这些物品不能由纯粹市场提供的说法，被经验屡屡证伪。除此外，用公共财货及私人财货的界分法，决定该将什么、不该将什么留给市场，可谓困难丛生。例如，假定所谓公共财货对他人没有正效应，却有负效应，或对某些人有正效应，而对其他人有负效应，那该怎么办？倘若邻居家由于我的消防队躲过一劫，而邻

7On this subject Walter Block, "Public Goods and Externalities."

8See for instance Buchanan, *The Public Finances*, p. 23; Paul Samuelson, *Economics* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1976), p. 166.

As these examples of privately produced public goods indicate, there is something seriously wrong with the thesis of public goods theorists that public goods cannot be produced privately, but instead require state intervention. Clearly they can be provided by markets. Furthermore, historical evidence shows us that all of the so-called public goods that states now provide have at some time in the past actually been provided by private entrepreneurs or even today are so provided in one country or another. For example, the postal service was once private almost everywhere; streets were privately financed and still are sometimes; even the beloved lighthouses were originally the result of private enterprise; private police forces, detectives, and arbitrators exist; and help for the sick, the poor, the elderly, orphans, and widows has been a traditional concern of private charity organizations. To say, then, that such things cannot be produced by a pure market system is falsified by experience a hundredfold. Apart from this, other difficulties arise when the public-private goods distinction is used to decide what and what not to leave to the market. For instance, what if the production of so-called public goods did not have positive but had negative consequences for

居原本希望（也许因为他买了超额保险）宅子付之一炬；或者邻居厌恶玫瑰，或者旅伴感觉体香剂气味恼人，又当如何？并且，技术变化会改变给定物品的特性。例如，随着有线电视的发展，从前（看似）公共性质的财货现在变成私人性质的。并且财产法的变动——对于改变一件财货的公共（私人）特性亦有同样效果。例如灯塔，只有当海域是公共（而非私人）所有的，它才是公共财货。倘若海域得以成为私人财产，就像在纯资本主义社会秩序当中可能发生的情况，那么，灯塔只在有限海域内闪耀，排除不付费者享受灯塔服务，就显然具有可能。

【9】见罗纳德·科斯“经济学中的灯塔”，《法与经济学学报》17（1974年）。

姑且将以上多少有些肤浅的讨论搁置一旁，让我们更加透彻审视私人财货和公共财货的界分，就会发现这个界分的完全虚幻。对如何分类一件给定财货，分歧如此之多的原因，从本质上

other people, or if the consequences were positive for some and negative for others? What if the neighbor whose house was saved from burning by my fire brigade had wished (perhaps because he was overinsured) that it had burned down; or my neighbors hate roses, or my fellow passengers find the scent of my deodorant disgusting? In addition, changes in the technology can change the character of a given good. For example, with the development of cable TV a good that was formerly (seemingly) public has become private. And changes in the laws of property—of the appropriation of property—can have the very same effect of changing the public-private character of a good. The lighthouse, for instance, is a public good only insofar as the sea is publicly (not privately) owned. But if it were permitted to acquire pieces of the ocean as private property, as it would be in a purely capitalist social order, then as the lighthouse shines over only a limited territory, it would clearly become possible to exclude nonpayers from the enjoyment of its services.

9See Ronald Coase, “The Lighthouse in Economics,” *Journal of Law and Economics* 17 (1974).

Leaving this somewhat sketchy level of discussion and looking into the distinction between private and public goods more thoroughly, we discover that the distinction turns out to be completely illusory. A clear-cut dichotomy between private and public goods does not exist, and

说，乃不存在私人财货与公共财货的判然两分法。所有财货或多或少是私人性质的或公共性质的，且其公共（私人）程度，通常随着人们的评价，以及人口组成的变化而变化。为认识到它们不会被一劳永逸地纳入彼范畴或此范畴，只须牢记使某物成为财货的因素是什么。某物要成为财货，就必须被人认为是稀缺的。除非至少一人主观评价它是稀缺的，任何物才能成为财货。可是，当财货不能自己成为财货时——即物理和化学分析，不能将某物确认为经济财货——显然没有固定、客观的标准，将财货归类为私人的或公共的。它们就其本身而言不是私人性质或公共性质的。它们的私人性质或公共性质取决于，将它们视为财货的人是寡还是多；当这些评价变化，并由一人至无数人，财货的私人程度或公共程度也随之变化。甚至看似完全私人之物，如我本人寓所内饰或内衣颜色，一旦别人开始在乎它们，就因此成为公共财货^{【10】}。而看似为公共财货的，如我本人房子外观或外套颜色，当别人不在乎它们时，就成为绝对的私人财货。并且，每样财货可以一而再地改变特性；它甚至可以从一件公共

this is essentially why there can be so many disagreements on how to classify a given good. All goods are more or less private or public and can—and constantly do—change with respect to their degree of privateness/publicness as people’s values and evaluations change, and as changes occur in the composition of the population. In order to recognize that they never fall, once and for all, into either one or the other category, one must only recall what makes something a good. For something to be a good it must be recognized and treated as scarce by someone. Something is not a good as such, that is to say; goods are goods only in the eyes of the beholder. Nothing is a good unless at least one person subjectively evaluates it as such. But then, when goods are never goods-as-such—when no physico-chemical analysis can identify something as an economic good—there is clearly no fixed, objective criterion for classifying goods as either private or public. They can never be private or public goods as such. Their private or public character depends on how few or how many people consider them to be goods, with the degree to which they are private or public changing as these evaluations change and range from one to infinity. Even seemingly completely private things like the interior of my apartment or the color of my underwear can thus become public goods as soon as somebody else starts caring about them.¹⁰ And seemingly public goods, like the exterior

或私人财货，转换为一件公共或私人祸害，反之亦然。倘若如此，根据财货是私人的或公共的，无论如何都不能作出任何决定^{【11】}。凭此做出决定，实际意味着，对于每件财货而言，都必须直接向每个人了解，他恰好是在乎还是不在乎这件财货——是正效应还是负效应，以及大致的程度——从而决定谁从中受益，谁应该付费（谁又能知道他们是否吐露真话？）也就有必要一直监控这些评价的一切变化，结果对生产任何东西都无法作出明确决定。荒诞理论的后果，是我们所有人死去许久了^{【12】}。

【10】参阅《公共财货和外部性》当中布拉克所举袜子作为公共财货案例。

【11】此处为免误解，每个生产商及每个作出共同决定的生产商协会，任何时候，都根据财货是私人的或公共的评价，决定生产或不生产一件财货。实际上，在市场

of my house or the color of my overalls, can become extremely private goods as soon as other people stop caring about them. Moreover, every good can change its characteristics again and again; it can even turn from a public or private good to a public or private bad or evil and vice versa, depending solely on the changes in this caring or uncaring. If this is so, then no decision whatsoever can be based on the classification of goods as private or public.¹¹ In fact, to do so it would become necessary to ask virtually every individual with respect to every single good whether or not he happened to care about it—positively or negatively and perhaps to what extent—in order to determine who might profit from what and who should therefore participate in the good’s financing. (And how could one know if they were telling the truth?) It would also become necessary to monitor all changes in such evaluations continuously, with the result that no definite decision could ever be made regarding the production of anything, and as a consequence of a nonsensical theory all of us would be long dead.¹²

10See, for instance, the ironic case that Block makes for socks being public goods in “Public Goods and Externalities.”

11To avoid any misunderstanding here, every single producer and every association of producers making joint decisions can, at any time, decide whether or not to produce a good based on an evaluation of the

经济框架中，人们频繁决定是否以私人方式生产公共财货。凭着对一件财货私人程度或公共程度的评价，作出是否忽视自由市场运作结果的决定，全都是不可能的。

【12】实际上，私人财货及公共财货界分的引入，乃退回前主观主义的经济学时代。从主观主义经济学视角，不存在可被客观归类为私人性质或公共性质的财货。这就是对于公共财货的第二种建议标准——允许非竞争性消费（见前面的注解6）——失败的原由。如，任何外部观察者如何才能决定，额外允许一名不交费的搭便车者是否导致别人对一件财货消费的减少？显然他无法客观做到。实际上，假如允许更多人进入剧院或道路，某个人欣赏一部电影或在一条道路上驾车的乐趣可能大减。再次，要一探究竟是否如此，就不得不向每一个人了解——也许不是每个人都同意（然后呢？）。此外，即使那些允许非竞争性消费的财货，也非**自由财货**，因此，额外允许搭便车者的结果是“拥堵”终会发生，因此不得不向每个人了解合适的“边际”。此外，取决于允许谁免费，我的消费也许受到影响或不受影响，所以也必须向我本人了解这一点。最后，每个人也许会随着

privateness or publicness of the good. In fact, decisions on whether or not to produce public goods privately are constantly made within the framework of a market economy. What is impossible is to decide whether or not to ignore the outcome of the operation of a free market based on the assessment of the degree of privateness or publicness of a good.

In fact, then, the introduction of the distinction between private and public goods is a relapse into the pre-subjectivist era of economics. From the point of view of subjectivist economics, no good exists that can be categorized objectively as private or public. This is essentially why the second proposed criterion for public goods—permitting nonrivalrous consumption (see note 6 above)—breaks down too. For how could any outside observer determine whether or not the admittance of an additional free rider at no charge would not indeed lead to a subtraction in the consumption of a good to others? Clearly there is no way that he could objectively do so. In fact, it might well be that one's enjoyment of a movie or of driving on a road would be considerably reduced if more people were allowed in the theater or on the road. Again, to find out whether or not this is the case one would have to ask every individual—and not everyone might agree (what then?). Furthermore, since even a good that allows nonrivalrous consumption is not a free

时间在这些问题上改变观点。要根据非竞争性标准以及非排他性标准（参阅后面的注释 17）决定一件财货是否适合政府（而非私人）生产，因此同样是不可能的。

但即令一个人决心忽视这些困难，且为便于讨论，愿意承认私人财货与公共财货的界分，这个论辩的假定也无法得到证明。它根本提供不了为什么公共财货——假若它们作为一类独立财货范畴而存在——应被生产的理由，也提供不了为什么它们应由政府而非私人企业生产的理由。引入前述概念界分的公共财货理论，从本质上要说的是：某些人对公共财货的生产及资助毫无贡献，公共财货对这些人的正效应，证明了它们是符合需要的。但显然，因为不是所有获益者都付费以使这些财货有可能生产，这些财货在自由竞

good, as a consequence of admitting additional free riders “crowding” would eventually occur, and hence everyone would have to be asked about the appropriate “margin.” In addition, my consumption may or may not be affected depending on who it is that is admitted free of charge, so I would have to be asked about this, too. And finally, everyone might change his opinion on all of these questions over time. It is thus in the same way impossible to decide whether or not a good is a candidate for state (rather than private) production based on the criterion of nonrivalrous consumption as on that of nonexcludability (see also note 17 below) .

But even if one were to ignore all these difficulties and were willing to admit, for the sake of argument that the private-public good distinction does hold water, the argument would not prove what it is supposed to. It neither provides conclusive reasons why public goods—assuming that they exist as a separate category of goods—should be produced at all, nor why the state rather than private enterprises should produce them. This is what the theory of public goods essentially says, having introduced the aforementioned conceptual distinction: The positive effects of public goods for people who do not contribute anything to their production or financing proves that these goods are desirable. But evidently they would not be produced, or at least not in sufficient quantity

争市场中将不被生产,或至少不被足够多或足够好地生产。为了生产这些财货(它们明显是符合需要的,要不然不会被生产),政府必须投入对它们的生产支持中。这类几乎可在每本经济学教材中找到(诺贝尔奖得主也不例外)^{【13】}的理由,居于两方面完全不成立。

【13】见萨缪尔森《公共开支纯理论》,《经济学和统计学评论》(1954年)、《经济学》第8章;米尔顿·弗里德曼《资本主义和自由》(芝加哥:芝大出版社,1962年)第2章;哈耶克《法律、立法和自由》(芝加哥:芝大出版社,1979年)第3卷第14章。

首先,谁要得出公共财货必须由政府提供,否则不被生产的结论,就必须在其推理中夹带一个规范。另外,从特定财货由于某些特性不会被生产的陈述出发,谁都无法得出这些财货应该被生产的结论。但通过一个规范去正当化他们的推论,公共财货理论家就明显脱离了经济学作为价值中立科学的疆界。相反他们进入道德或伦理学领域,因此有人会期望获得作为认知学科的伦理

and quality, in a free, competitive market, since not all of those who would profit from their production would also contribute financially to make the production possible. In order to produce these goods (which are evidently desirable, but would not be produced otherwise), the state must jump in and assist in their production. This sort of reasoning, which can be found in almost every textbook on economics (Nobel laureates not excluded) 13 is completely fallacious on two counts.

13See Paul Samuelson, "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure," *Review of Economics and Statistics* (1954); idem, *Economics*, chap. 8; Milton Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), chap. 2; F.A. Hayek, *Law, Legislation and Liberty* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1979), vol. 3, chap. 14.

For one thing, to come to the conclusion that the state has to provide public goods that otherwise would not be produced, one must smuggle a norm into one's chain of reasoning. Otherwise, from the statement that because of some special characteristics they have, certain goods would not be produced, one could never reach the conclusion that these goods *should* be produced. But with a norm required to justify their conclusion, the public goods theorists clearly have left the bounds of economics as a positive, *wertfrei* science. Instead they have moved into the realm of

学理论,以便他们合法行事并且有理有据地得出结论。但几乎可以肯定,在公共财货理论文献中,没有一处可以发现哪怕有点像是伦理学认知理论的东西^{【14】}。因此从一开始就可以说,公共财货理论家完全滥用了他们作为价值中立经济学家的声望,正如他们自己的文字所表明的,对于伦理问题的主张而言,他们根本没有任何权威。也许,他们无意中找到某些正确的东西,虽然不用一套高深的道德理论来支持它?“政府必须提供公共财货”这个结论所必要的规范,一旦被清晰表达出来,就立即表明自身与真实差距甚远。实现以上结论的必要规范如下:每当一个人多少可以证明,虽然一件特定财货或服务的生产对别人有正效应,但除非某些人对它解囊相助,它根本得不到生产,或得不到特定数量或质量的生产,那么在政府的直接或间接协助下,针对这些人的侵犯性暴力就是允许的,并且可以向他们强制摊派必要的财力负担。毋须太多评论,就可表明实现这一规则将产生的混乱,因为这就如同说,无论何人何时喜欢就可以攻击他人。此外,正如我在别处详加证明的^{【15】},这个规范无

morals or ethics, and hence one would expect to be offered a theory of ethics as a cognitive discipline in order for them to do legitimately what they are doing and to justifiably derive their conclusion. But it can hardly be stressed enough that nowhere in public goods theory literature can anything that even faintly resembles such a cognitive theory of ethics be found.14 Thus it must be stated at the outset, that public goods theorists are misusing whatever prestige they might have as positive economists for pronouncements on matters on which, as their own writings indicate, they have no authority whatsoever. Perhaps, though, they have stumbled on something correct by accident, without having supported it with an elaborate moral theory? It becomes apparent that nothing could be further from the truth as soon as one explicitly formulates the norm that would be needed to arrive at the conclusion that the state has to assist in the provision of public goods. The norm required to reach the above conclusion is this: whenever one can somehow prove that the production of a particular good or service has a positive effect on someone else but would not be produced at all or would not be produced in a definite quantity or quality unless certain people participated in its financing, then the use of aggressive violence against these persons is allowed, either directly or indirectly with the help of the state, and these persons may be forced to share in the necessary financial burden. It does not need

法被正当化为一个合理规范。要这样论辩，实际上任何要支持或反对什么的论辩，无论所持立场是道德的还是非道德的、是经验分析的还是逻辑分析的，其所必须预设的前提，是每一个人作为物理独立决策个体的整全性得到保证，而这正与以上规范实际所说的相反。只有当人人免于他人的物理侵犯，首先才能言说，然后才能针对所说表示同意与否。互不侵犯原理因此是论辩及可能一致同意的必要前提，因此能够凭借先验推理手段，作为正当规范得到论辩性辩护。

【14】近年来的经济学，尤其是芝加哥学派，已经愈来愈多地关注财产权的分析。哈罗德·德姆塞茨“财产权的交换和执行”，《法与经济学报》7（1964年）；同作者，“通往一个财产权理论”，《美国经济评论》（1967年）；科斯《社会成本问题》，《法与经济学报》3（1960年）；阿门·阿尔钦《经济力量在起作用》（印第安纳波利斯：自由基金，1977年）第二部分；里查德·波

much comment to show that chaos would result from implementing this rule, as it amounts to saying that anyone can attack anyone else whenever he feels like it. Moreover, as I have demonstrated in detail elsewhere¹⁵this norm could never be justified as a fair norm. To argue so, in fact to argue at all, in favor of or against anything, be it a moral, nonmoral, empirical, or logico-analytical position, it must be presupposed that contrary to what the norm actually says, each individual's integrity as a physically independent decision-making unit is assured. For only if everyone is free from physical aggression by everyone else could anything first be said and then agreement or disagreement on anything possibly be reached. The principle of nonaggression is thus the necessary precondition for argumentation and possible agreement and hence can be argumentatively defended as a just norm by means of apriori reasoning.

14Economists in recent years, particularly the Chicago School, have been increasingly concerned with the analysis of property rights. Harold Demsetz, "The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights," *Journal of Law and Economics* 7 (1964); idem, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," *American Economic Review* (1967); Ronald Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," *Journal of Law and Economics* 3 (1960); Armen Alchian, *Economic Forces at Work* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund,

斯纳《法的经济分析》（波士顿：布朗，1977年）。然而这些分析和伦理学没有任何关系。正相反，它们代表着用关注经济效率的努力来替代合理道德原理的建立（对这些努力的批评参阅罗斯巴德《自由的伦理》（大西洋高地，新泽西：人文出版社，1982年），第26章；布拉克“科斯和德姆塞茨论私有财产权”，《自由至上学报》1, no. 2（1977年）；德沃金“财富是一种价值吗”《法律学报》9（1980年）；罗斯巴德“效率的神话”，选自马里奥·里佐编《时间、不确定性和非均衡》。最后，所有的效率论证都是不相干的，因为绝无武断之法，可以测量、权衡及加总源于给定财产权分配的个人效用或负效用。因此任何以所谓“社会福利”最大化的名义，对某种特定财产权分配制度的建议，都是伪科学的哄骗。具体参阅罗斯巴德《重建效用与福利经济学》（纽约：自由主义研究中心，不定期论文集 no. 3, 1977年）；同时参阅莱昂内尔·罗宾斯“经济学与政治经济”《美国经济评论》（1981年）。布坎南与塔洛克追随克努特·魏克塞尔（《财政理论研究》（耶拿：古斯塔夫·费雪，1896年），反复推荐作为经济政策指引的“全体一致原理”，同样不应与恰当的伦理学原理混淆。根据这一原理，只有被认为一致同意的政策变动才应被

1977), part 2; Richard Posner, *Economic Analysis of the Law* (Boston: Brown, 1977). Such analyses, however, have nothing to do with ethics. On the contrary, they represent attempts to substitute economic efficiency considerations for the establishment of justifiable ethical principles [on the critique of such endeavors see Murray N. Rothbard, *The Ethics of Liberty* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1982), chap. 26; Walter Block, “Coase and Demsetz on Private Property Rights,” *Journal of Libertarian Studies* 1, no. 2 (1977); Ronald Dworkin, “Is Wealth a Value,” *Journal of Legal Studies* 9 (1980); Murray N. Rothbard, “The Myth of Efficiency,” in Mario Rizzo, ed., *Time Uncertainty and Disequilibrium* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1979). Ultimately, all efficiency arguments are irrelevant because there simply exists nonarbitrary way of measuring, weighing, and aggregating individual utilities or disutilities that result from some given allocation of property rights. Hence any attempt to recommend some particular system of assigning property rights in terms of its alleged maximization of “social welfare” is pseudo-scientific humbug. See in particular, Murray N. Rothbard, *Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics* (New York: Center for Libertarian Studies, Occasional Paper Series No. 3, 1977); also Lionel Robbins, “Economics and Political Economy,” *American Economic Review* (1981). The “Unanimity Principle” which

实施——这当然动听；但接着，变一种说法，假如对任何变动的建议达不成一致同意，它也就决定着现状应被保留——这就不太吸引人，因为这意味着关于财产权分配的任何既定现状都必定是合法的，要么以此为出发点，要么继续维持现状。然而，公共选择理论家对这个大胆宣称所必要的财产权规范理论没有给出根据。因此，全体一致原理最终缺乏伦理基础。实际上，因为它将合法化任何可想而知的现状，布坎南拥趸挚爱的原理作为道德标准同样是完全荒谬的。关于这点另阅罗斯巴德《自由的伦理》第 26 章、“中立税收的神话”第 549 页后。布坎南和塔洛克在魏克塞尔的再次指引下，将全体一致原理实际降格为一种“相对”一致或“准”一致，则这个原理无论还剩什么，都被弃而不用。

Buchanan and Tullock, following Knut Wicksell (*Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen*, Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1896), have repeatedly proposed as a guide for economic policy is also not to be confused with an ethical principle proper. According to this principle only such policy changes should be enacted which can find unanimous consent—and that surely sounds attractive; but then, *mutatis mutandis*, it also determines that the status quo be preserved if there is less than unanimous agreement on any proposal of change—and that sounds far less attractive, because it implies that any given, present state of affairs regarding the allocation of property rights must be legitimate either as a point of departure or as a to-be-continued-state. However, the public choice theorists offer no justification in terms of a normative theory of property rights for this daring claim as would be required. Hence, the unanimity principle is ultimately without ethical foundation. In fact, because it would legitimize any conceivable status quo, the Buchananites' most favored principle is no less than outrightly absurd as a moral criterion. See on this also Rothbard, *The Ethics of Liberty* chap. 26; idem, “The Myth of Neutral Taxation,” pp. 549f. Whatever might still be left for the unanimity principle, Buchanan and Tullock, following the lead of Wicksell again, then give away by reducing it in effect to one of “relative” or “quasi” unanimity.

【15】霍普“从自由放任经济学到自由至上伦理”，见布拉克与卢埃林·H. 小罗克维尔编《人、经济与自由：纪念罗斯巴德论文集》（阿拉巴马州奥本：路德维希·冯·米塞斯学院，1988年）第8章之后。

但公共财货理论之坍塌，不仅因为它隐含的错误道德推理。甚至于上述论辩中所包含的功利主义和经济学推理，也是极端错误的。按照公共财货理论，或许公共财货有的确比没有好，尽管不该忘记，这种必要性的先验理由并不存在（恰于此就将终结公共财货理论家的推理）。因为明显可能，并已知的确存在这般痛恨政府行为的无政府主义者，他们宁可完全不要由政府提供所谓公共财货^{【16】}。即令以上论辩已作巨大让步，无论如何，从公共财货是符合需要的陈述，跳跃到它们应该由政府提供的陈述，根本无法令人信服，因为这决非个人面对的选择。为资助据说值得拥有的公共财货，金钱或其他资源必须从可能的替代性用途中抽走，因此，唯一相关及恰当的问题是，这些可能投入金钱的替代性用途（也即一度必要的私人财货现在无处可买，由于代之把

15Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “From the Economics of Laissez Faire to the Ethics of Libertarianism,” in Walter Block and Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr., eds., *Man, Economy, and Liberty: Essays in Honor of Murray N. Rothbard* (Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1988); *infra* chap. 8.

But the public goods theory breaks down not only because of the faulty moral reasoning implied in it. Even the utilitarian, economic reasoning contained in the above argument is blatantly wrong. As the public goods theory states, it might well be that it would be better to have the public goods than not to have them, though it should not be forgotten that no a priori reason exists that this must be so of necessity (which would then end the public goods theorists’ reasoning right here). For it is clearly possible, and indeed known to be a fact, that anarchists exist who so greatly abhor state action that they would prefer not having the so-called public goods at all to having them provided by the state.¹⁶ In any case, even if the argument is conceded so far, to leap from the statement that the public goods are desirable to the statement that they should therefore be provided by the state is anything but conclusive, as this is by no means the choice with which one is confronted. Since money or other resources must be withdrawn from possible alternative uses to finance the supposedly desirable public goods, the only relevant

钱花到公共财货上)，是否因为比公共财货更加紧迫而更有价值。这个问题的答案是十分明显的。按照消费者评价，公共财货的价值无论实际水平多高，相对与之竞争的私人财货价值要低，因为只要将选择权留给消费者（不强迫他们选择替代品），他们明显愿意把钱花到别处（否则任何暴力都无必要）。这无疑证明了，用于公共财货的这些资源是被浪费的，因为它们提供给消费者的财货或服务顶多只是次要的。简而言之，即令假定公共财货可以与既存私人财货判然区分，即令假定给定公共财货也许是有益的，公共财货仍然要与私人财货竞争。要知道对公共财货的需要是否更为紧迫以及紧迫到何种程度，或换言之，公共财货的生产在多大程度上，是否以更迫切需要之私人财货的停产或减产为代价，唯一之计，就是一切都由自由竞争私人企业所提供。因此，与公共财货理论家的结论相反，逻辑让人不得不接受，从消费者观点出发，只有纯市场制度才能保障公共财货生产决定的合理性。同样，也唯有在纯资本主义秩序下，才能保证生产多少公共财货决定（假设它完全应被生产）的合理性^[17]。

and appropriate question is whether or not these alternative uses to which the money could be put (that is, the private goods which could have been acquired but now cannot be bought because the money is being spent on public goods instead) are more valuable—more urgent—than the public goods. And the answer to this question is perfectly clear. In terms of consumer evaluations, however high its absolute level might be, the value of the public goods is relatively lower than that of the competing private goods because if one had left the choice to the consumers (and had not forced one alternative upon them), they evidently would have preferred spending their money differently (otherwise no force would have been necessary). This proves beyond any doubt that these sources used for the provision of public goods are wasted because they provide consumers with goods or services that at best are only of secondary importance. In short, even if one assumed that public goods that can be distinguished clearly from private goods existed, and even if it were granted that a given public good might be useful, public goods would still compete with private goods. And there is only one method for finding out whether or not they are more urgently desired and to what extent, or *mutatis mutandis*, if, and to what extent, their production would take place at the expense of the nonproduction or reduced production of more urgently needed private goods: by having

除非以真正奥威尔特色的语义革命为条件,才能得出不一样的结果。唯有当一个人决心将某个人的“不”解释成实际上意味着“是”,“不买什么”实际上意味着“不买之人愿意买它而非不买”,“强制”实际上意味着“自由”,“没有契约”实际上意味着“订立契约”,等等,公共财货理论家的观点才能获得“证明”^{【18】}。但然后,当他们口中振振有词时,我们怎样才能相信他们实际想说的,是看上去所说的,而非恰恰相反,或毫无确定意涵,而纯粹是信口胡说?我们对此无能为力。就公共财货空想家所想努力证明的,存在所谓市场失败是由于公共财货得不到生产或在数量上或质量上“得不到充分”生产而言,罗斯巴德的评论从而是完全正确的。他写道:

everything provided by freely competing private enterprises. Hence, contrary to the conclusion arrived at by the public goods theorists, logic forces one to accept the result that only a pure market system can safeguard the rationality, from the point of view of the consumers, of a decision to produce a public good. And only under a pure capitalist order could it be ensured that the decision about how much of a public good to produce (provided it should be produced at all) would be rational as well.¹⁷ No less than a semantic revolution of truly Orwellian dimensions would be required to come up with a different result. Only if one were willing to interpret someone's "no" as really meaning "yes," the "nonbuying of something" as meaning that it is really "preferred over that which the nonbuying person does instead of nonbuying," of "force" really meaning "freedom," of "noncontracting" really meaning "making a contract" and so on, could the public goods theorists' point be "proven."¹⁸ But how then could we be sure that they really mean what they seem to mean when they say what they say, and do not rather mean the exact opposite, or do not mean anything with a definite content at all, but are simply babbling? We could not. Murray N. Rothbard is thus completely right when he comments on the endeavors of the public goods ideologues to prove the existence of so-called market failures due to the nonproduction or a quantitatively or qualitatively "deficient"

“这种观点完全误解了这种方式，即经济学宣称自由市场行动从来是最优的。这个最优，不是从经济学家个人的伦理立场出发，而是从所有参与者自由自愿的行动以及满足消费者自由表达需求的立场出发。因此政府干预必然且总是偏离最优^{【19】}。”

【16】罗斯巴德关于这个论辩的评论见“中立税收的神话”第 533 页。附带说，唯一一个无政府主义者的存在，也会使得帕累托最优这个从经济学上合理化政府行动的标准失效。

【17】本质相同之推理，既可应用于推翻建基于非排他性标准定义的公共财货所谓独特性之上的社会主义-国家主义理论，也可应用于此类财货根据非竞争性消费标准定义的情形（见前面的注释 6 及 12）。首先，从允许非竞争性消费的财货，在自由市场上不会被提供给尽可能多消费者的事实陈述，到得出它们应如此被提供的规范陈述，这个理论面临着毫无二致的问题，即要求一个正当伦理。其次，这个功利主义推理也错的离谱。如公共财货理论家那样推理出，排除搭便车者享用（本允许

production of public goods. He writes,

[s]uch a view completely misconceives the way in which economic science asserts that free-market action is ever optimal. It is optimal, not from the standpoint of the personal ethical views of an economist, but from the standpoint of free, voluntary actions of all participants and in satisfying the freely expressed needs of the consumers. Government interference, therefore, will necessarily and always move away from such an optimum. 19

16 See on this argument Rothbard, “The Myth of Neutral Taxation,” p. 533. Incidentally, the existence of one single anarchist also invalidates all references to Pareto optimality as a criterion for economically legitimate state action.

17 Essentially the same reasoning that leads one to reject the socialist-statist theory built on the allegedly unique character of public goods as defined by the criterion of nonexcludability, also applies when, instead, such goods are defined by means of the criterion of nonrivalrous consumption (see notes 6 and 12 above). For one thing, in order to derive the normative statement that they *should* be so offered from the statement of fact that goods that allow nonrivalrous consumption *would not* be offered on the free market to as many consumers as could be, this theory would face exactly the same problem of requiring a justifiable

零边际成本非竞争性消费) 财货的自由市场通行作法, 将表明社会福利的次优水平, 且随之要求补足性政府行动, 在两个相关方面是错的。第一, 成本是一个主观概念, 无法由任何外部观测者客观计量。因此, 可以无代价地容许额外搭便车者是完全难以承认的。事实上, 假如允许更多不付费的消费者, 这样做的主观成本真的为零, 所述财货的私人所有者-生产者, 自己就会这样允许。假如他不这样做, 这表明了对他来说成本非零。理由也许是, 他相信此举将会降低其他消费者的满意度, 并且倾向于压低他的商品价格; 或也许他不喜欢未受邀请的搭便车者, 例如, 要将我空间尚未填满的客厅, 交给不请自来的客人用于非竞争消费, 我会反对这种建议。因为在任何情况下, 无论何种理由, 都无法假定成本为零, 那么当特定财货未被免费分配时, 就说这是市场失灵, 那是荒谬绝伦的。另一方面, 实际上福利损失是无可避免的, 假如某人接受公共财货理论家的建议, 让这些所谓允许非竞争消费的财货由政府免费提供。除了决定如何满足这个标准的不可能完成任务, 不依赖于自愿消费者购买的政府, 同样首先要面临理性决定提供多少公共财货的无解难题。显然, 即使是公共财货, 也不是自由财货, 而在某种利用水平上就会遭遇“拥堵”,

ethics. Moreover, the utilitarian reasoning is blatantly wrong, too. To reason, as the public goods theorists do, that the free-market practice of excluding free riders from the enjoyment of goods that would permit nonrivalrous consumption at zero marginal costs would indicate a suboptimal level of social welfare and hence would require compensatory state action is faulty on two related counts. First, cost is a subjective category and can never be objectively measured by any outside observer. Hence, to say that additional free riders could be admitted at no cost is totally inadmissible. In fact, if the subjective costs of admitting more consumers at no charge were indeed zero, the private owner-producer of the good in question would do so. If he does not do so, this reveals that the costs for him are *not* zero. The reason may be his belief that to do so would reduce the satisfaction available to the other consumers and so would tend to depress the price for his product; or it may simply be his dislike for uninvited free riders as, for instance, when I object to the proposal that I turn over my less-than capacity-filled living room to various self-inviting guests for nonrivalrous consumption. In any case, since for whatever reason the cost cannot be assumed to be zero, it is then fallacious to speak of a market failure when certain goods are not handed out free of charge. On the other hand, welfare losses would indeed become unavoidable if one accepted the public goods theorists'

因此,对于政府而言决无止点,因为在任何供应水平上,依然有不得被排除的使用者,以及随着愈来愈多供应可以搭便车的使用者。但即使这个问题被奇迹般地克服掉,对于免费分配的用于非竞争消费的(必定不断膨胀的)公共财货,其生产及运营成本在任何情况下都不得不由税收支付。于是,消费者享受免费午餐本来就属被迫,这一点无疑再次证明从消费者观点出发,这些公共财货与消费者现在不复取得的竞争性私有财货相比,在价值上是劣等的。

【18】奥威尔式模棱两可之辞的最佳现代拥趸是布坎南与塔洛克(参阅前面注释3的引用文献)。他们声称政府是由“宪法契约”建立的,在这个契约中,人人“概念性同意”服从政府的压制性权力,理解其他人也同样

recommendation of letting goods that allegedly allow for nonrivalrous consumption to be provided free of charge by the state. Besides the insurmountable task of determining what fulfills this criterion, the state, independent of voluntary consumer purchases as it is, would first off face the equally insoluble problem of rationally determining *how much* of the public good to provide. Clearly, since even public goods are not free goods but are subject to “crowding” at some level of use, there is no stopping point for the state, because at any level of supply there would still be users who would have to be excluded and who, with a larger supply, could enjoy a free ride. But even if this problem could be solved miraculously, in any case the (necessarily inflated) cost of production and operation of the public goods distributed free of charge for nonrivalrous consumption would have to be paid for by taxes. And this then, i.e., the fact that consumers would have been coerced into enjoying their free rides, again proves beyond any doubt that these public goods, too, are of inferior value from the point of view of consumers to the competing private goods that they now no longer can acquire.

18The most prominent modern champions of Orwellian double talk are Buchanan and Tullock (see their works cited in note 3 above). They claim that government is founded by a “constitutional contract” in which everyone “conceptually agrees” to submit to the coercive powers of

服从它。因此政府虽然看起来是强制的，其实是自愿的。对这一古怪论辩有几种明显反驳。首先，完全没有经验证据表明这个论辩，即相关每个人都自愿接受宪法。更别扭的是，所有人自愿强制自己的这个思想，也是完全不可思议的。因为假如自愿接受强制是自愿的，那么撤回对这个宪法的臣服就必定可能，并且政府将只是一个自愿参加的俱乐部。然而，假如谁都没有“无视政府权利”——谁都没有这种权利，当然是政府相较俱乐部的显著特征——那么声称一个人接受政府的强制是自愿的，在逻辑上也难以服人。再者，即令这一切皆为可能，宪法契约也仍然不能声称，除了宪法的最初签订者以外，可以限制任何人。

布坎南和塔洛克是如何得出这种荒谬思想的？通过玩语义上的把戏。对于前奥威尔式表述中的“难以置信”和“不同意”而言，现在是“概念上可能”及“概念上同意”。这种跳跃式推理类型的最有效速成练习，参阅坎南“一个契约论者对无政府主义的观点”、“宪

government with the understanding that everyone else is subject to it too. Hence government is only *seemingly* coercive but *really* voluntary. There are several evident objections to this curious argument. First, there is no empirical evidence whatsoever for the contention that any constitution has ever been voluntarily accepted by everyone concerned. Worse, the very idea of all people voluntarily coercing themselves is simply inconceivable, much in the same way as it is inconceivable to deny the law of contradiction. For if the voluntarily accepted coercion is voluntary, then it would have to be possible to revoke one's subjection to the constitution, and the state would be no more than a voluntarily joined club. If, however, one does not have the "right to ignore the state"—and that one does not have this right is, of course, the characteristic mark of a state as compared to a club—then it would be logically inadmissible to claim that one's acceptance of state coercion is voluntary. Furthermore, even if all this were possible, the constitutional contract could still not claim to bind anyone except the original signers of the constitution.

How can Buchanan and Tullock come up with such absurd ideas? By a semantic trick. What was "inconceivable" and "no agreement" in pre-Orwellian talk is for them "conceptually possible" and a "conceptual agreement." For a most instructive short exercise in this sort of reasoning in leaps and bounds, see James Buchanan, "A Contractarian Perspective

法契约中的自由”(学院站：德州农工大学出版社，1977年)。这里我们了解到（第17页），即使接受每时55英里限速也可能是自愿的（布坎南不十分肯定），因为这最终依赖于我们所有人概念上同意宪法，并且布坎南算不上一个国家主义者，而实际上是无政府主义者（第11页）。

【19】罗斯巴德《人、经济与国家》第887页。

坦率说，市场失灵的所谓论辩的确是明显荒谬的。剥掉他们技术行话的伪装，它们的全部证明只是：市场不完美，由于它以受稀缺条件约束的互不侵犯原理为特征，这样只有假定允许侵犯才能生产的特定财货或服务，将得不到生产。此言不假，没有市场理论家敢于否认。然而，关键在于，无论从道德还是经济角度，这种市场的“不完美”是可以得到辩护的，而公共财货理论家宣扬的所谓市场“完美”却不可辩护^{【20】}。诚然，终结政府提供公共财货的现行作法，意味着既存社会结构和财富分配将有所变化。这样的调整对某些人来说必定难以接受。事实上，这正是私有化政府功能遭遇广泛公众抵制的原由，尽管从长期来看，这一政策会增加全体社会财富。然而，

on Anarchy,” in idem, *Freedom in Constitutional Contract* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977) . Here we learn (p. 17) that even the acceptance of the 55 mph speed limit is possibly voluntary (Buchanan is not quite sure) since it ultimately rests on all of us conceptually agreeing on the constitution, and that Buchanan is not really a statist, but in truth an anarchist (p. 11) .

19Rothbard, *Man, Economy, and State*, p. 887.

Indeed, the arguments supposedly proving market failures are nothing short of patently absurd. Stripped of their disguise of technical jargon all they prove is this: A market is not perfect, as it is characterized by the nonaggression principle imposed on conditions marked by scarcity, and so certain goods or services that could only be produced and provided if aggression were allowed will not be produced. True enough, but no market theorist would ever dare deny this. Yet, and this is decisive, this “imperfection” of the market can be defended, morally as well as economically, whereas the supposed “perfections” of markets propagated by the public goods theorists cannot.²⁰ It is also true that a termination of the state’s current practice of providing public goods would imply some change in the existing social structure and the distribution of wealth. Such a reshuffling would certainly imply hardship for some people. As a matter of fact, this is precisely why there is

决不可将这一事实当成市场失败的有效证明。假若有人曾获准击打别人的头，现在不许他继续这么做，他必定感到难受。但谁都难以接受，维持过去的（击打）规矩是一个有效理由。他受到伤害，但伤害他意味着，用一种消费者人人平等决定该生产什么、生产多少的社会秩序，替代那种某些消费者有权决定在哪些方面，其他消费者不得以正当取得与支配手段，自愿购买所需之物的制度。无疑，从作为自愿消费者的全体消费者观点来看，这样一种替代是更可取的。

借助逻辑推理力，莫利纳里的结论必定得到接受，即为了消费者利益，所有财货和服务必须由市场提供^[21]。不仅那些使特别修正资本主义经济优越性这个一般命题成为必要的、泾渭分明的财货范畴是错的；而且即令真的存在这些范畴，也找不出任何特殊理由，回答所谓特殊公共财货，既然它们总与私人财货竞争，为什么不也

widespread public resistance to a policy of privatizing state functions, even though in the long run overall social wealth would be enhanced by this very policy. Surely, however, this fact cannot be accepted as a valid argument demonstrating the failure of markets. If a man has been allowed to hit other people on the head and is now not permitted to continue with this practice, he is certainly hurt. But one would hardly accept that as a valid excuse for upholding the old (hitting) rules. He is harmed, but harming him means substituting a social order in which every consumer has an equal right to determine what and how much of anything is produced, for a system in which some consumers have the right to determine in what respect other consumers are not allowed to buy voluntarily what they want with the means justly acquired by them and at their disposal. Certainly, such a substitution would be preferable from the point of view of all consumers as voluntary consumers.

By force of logical reasoning, one must accept Molinari's conclusion that for the sake of consumers, all goods and services be provided by markets.²¹ It is not only false that clearly distinguishable categories of goods exist, which would render special amendments to the general thesis of capitalism's economic superiority necessary; even if they did exist, no special reason could be found why these supposedly special public goods should not also be produced by private enterprises,

该一样由私人企业来生产。实际上，不管公共财货理论家如何宣传，对于愈来愈多所谓公共财货而言，市场相较政府的高效率不断成为现实。面对日常经验，几乎任何认真研究过这些问题的人，不会否认今天的市场可以比政府更有效率地，也即更讨消费者欢心地，提供邮递、铁路、电力、电信、教育、货币、道路等等。然而对于某个特定部门，人们羞于接受逻辑力的推论：安防生产。因此，在第一章余下部分，我将集中解释这个特别领域中资本主义经济的优越性——这种优越性目前已有逻辑理由，可一旦在分析中加入某些经验材料，并且将其单独作为一个问题来分析，将更有说服力。

【20】每当一个人不得不评估约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯如下有关政府干预主义论辩的有效性，都首先要牢记这一点（“自由放任主义的终结”载于《凯恩斯作品集》，伦敦：麦克米伦，1972年，第9卷第291页）：

“政府最重要的‘任务’与私人已在着手处理的事务无关，而与那些超出个人活动范围之外的职能有关，

since they invariably stand in competition with private goods. In fact, in spite of all the propaganda from the public goods theorists, the greater efficiency of markets as compared with the state is increasingly realized with respect to more and more of the alleged public goods. Confronted daily with experience, hardly anyone seriously studying these matters could deny that nowadays markets could produce postal services, railroads, electricity, telephone, education, money, roads and so on more effectively than the state, i.e., more to the liking of consumers. Yet people generally shy away from accepting in one particular sector what logic forces upon them: in the production of security. Hence, for the rest of this chapter I will turn my attention to explaining the superior functioning of a capitalist economy in this particular area—a superiority whose logical case has already been made by now, but which shall be rendered more persuasive once some empirical material is added to the analysis and it is studied as a problem in its own right.²²

*20This, first of all, should be kept in mind whenever one has to assess the validity of statist-interventionist arguments such as the following, by John Maynard Keynes (“The End of Laissez Faire,” in idem, *Collected Writings*, London: Macmillan, 1972, vol. IX, p. 291) :*

The most important Agenda of the state relates not to those activities which private individuals are already fulfilling but to those

与那些如果不由政府来作出决定就无人问津的事务有关,对政府来说重要的不是去越俎代庖做那些个人已经在做的事。也不在于它是否做得更好或更差,而是去做那些目前根本无人去做的事情。”

这个推理不仅看上去是哄骗,且的确如此。

【21】某些自由至上小政府主义者反对说,市场的存在是以承认及落实法律共同体为前提条件。(参阅例如约翰·霍斯珀斯《自由至上主义》(洛杉矶:纳什,1971年);蒂伯·马汉《人权与人的自由》(芝加哥:尼尔森-霍尔,1975年)。眼下这无疑正确,市场是以承认及实施其运作背后的那些规则作为前提条件的。但由此无法推导出,这个任务必须由一个垄断性机构来保障。实际上,一门共同语言或符号体系也同样被当成是市场的前提条件;然而因此政府必须保障语言规则的遵守,则这种结论难以令人信服。那么,与语言体系相仿,市场行为规则自发形成,并能被自利这只“看不见的手”所实施。不遵守语言的普遍规则,人们就无法获得沟通的便利,不遵守行为的普遍规则,人们就无法从基于劳动分工交换经济所产生的更高生产力中获益。此外,正如前述,市场运作背后的互不侵犯原理,不依赖于任何

functions which fall outside the sphere of the individual, to those decisions which are made by no one if the state does not make them. The important thing for government is not to do things which individuals are doing already and to do them a little better or a little worse: but to do those things which are not done at all.

This reasoning not only appears phony, it truly is.

21Some libertarian minarchists object that the existence of a market presupposes the recognition and enforcement of a common body of law, and hence a government as a monopolistic judge and enforcement agency. (See, for example, John Hospers, *Libertarianism* [Los Angeles: Nash, 1971]; Tibor Machan, *Human Rights and Human Liberties* [Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1975].) Now it is certainly correct that a market presupposes the recognition and enforcement of those rules that underlie its operation. But from this it does not follow that this task must be entrusted to a monopolistic agency. In fact, a common language or sign system is also presupposed by the market; but one would hardly think it convincing to conclude that hence the government must ensure the observance of the rules of language. Like the system of language, then, the rules of market behavior emerge spontaneously and can be enforced by the “invisible hand” of self-interest. Without the observance of common rules of speech, people could not reap the advantages that

政府，其正当性可得到先验辩护。并且，正如本章总结将讨论的，正是司法竞争及执法竞争制度，产生了尽可能精心设计及颁布——包含可设想的最大程度一致——行为规则的压力，而这些规则当然正是先验推理所确立的、作为论辩及论辩性同意的逻辑必然前提。

【22】附带说，使人接受安防由私人企业生产，从经济角度乃满足消费者最佳之选的同样逻辑，也使人在道德—理想主义立场的限度内，放弃古典自由主义的政治理论，并且接受通往自由至上主义理论，或私有制无政府主义渺小但却具有决定性的一步。古典自由主义，以米塞斯为其 20 世纪的最重要代表，倡导以互不侵犯原理为基石的社会制度。这也是自由至上主义所支持的。但古典自由主义接着要将这一原理交付执行的，却是一个垄断机构（政府）——这个组织完全不依赖于它各项服

communication offers, and without the observance of common rules of conduct, people could not enjoy the benefits of the higher productivity of an exchange economy based on the division of labor. In addition, as I indicated above, independent of any government the nonaggression principle underlying the operation of markets can be defended a priori as just. Moreover, as I will argue in the conclusion of this chapter, it is precisely a competitive system of law-administration and law-enforcement that generates the greatest possible pressure to elaborate and enact rules of conduct that incorporate the highest degree of *consensus* conceivable. And of course the very rules that do just this are those that a priori reasoning establishes as the logically necessary presupposition of argumentation and argumentative agreement.

22Incidentally, the same logic that would force one to accept the idea of the production of security by private business as economically the best solution to the problem of consumer satisfaction also forces one, so far as moral-ideological positions are concerned, to abandon the political theory of classical liberalism and take the small but nevertheless decisive step (from there) to the theory of libertarianism, or private property anarchism. Classical liberalism, with Ludwig von Mises as its foremost representative in the twentieth century, advocates a social system based on the nonaggression principle. And this is also what libertarianism

务消费者的自愿性和契约性支持,相反它有权单方面决定自己的收入,也即在从事安保生产领域的业务中,向顾客强征税收。此刻,无论这听起来多么似是而非,其前后矛盾是显而易见的。要么互不侵犯原理有效,在这种情况下,政府作为特权垄断者是不道德的;要么建立在侵犯之上、运用强制力及非契约手段获得资源的业务有效,后一个理论必须推翻前一个。要同时满足两者绝无可能,除非某个人可以提供比互不侵犯原理和政府侵犯暴力权更基本的原理,从而使得在各自有效领域各受限制的两者,皆可从这个原理中获得逻辑推导。然而,古典自由主义不提供任何这样的原理,也无力这样做,因为,论辩支持任何东西,要以一个人有权免于侵犯为先决条件。鉴于不默认其为有效,则互不侵犯原理就无法被论辩性抗辩为道德有效的这个事实,一个人依靠逻辑力,必然要放弃古典自由主义,转而接受它更激进的后裔:自由至上主义,即纯资本主义哲学。它要求安防生产同样也由私人企业来承担。

advocates. But classical liberalism then wants to have this principle enforced by a monopolistic agency (the government, the state) —an organization, that is, which is not exclusively dependent on voluntary, contractual support by the consumers of its respective services, but instead has the right to unilaterally determine its own income, i.e., the taxes to be imposed on consumers in order to do its job in the area of security production. Now, however plausible this might sound, it should be clear that it is inconsistent. Either the principle of nonaggression is valid, in which case the state as a privileged monopolist is immoral, or business built on and around aggression—the use of force and of noncontractual means of acquiring resources—is valid, in which case one must toss out the first theory. It is impossible to sustain both contentions and not to be inconsistent unless, of course, one could provide a principle that is more fundamental than both the nonaggression principle and the states’ right to aggressive violence and from which both, with the respective limitations regarding the domains in which they are valid, can be logically derived. However, liberalism never provided any such principle, nor will it ever be able to do so, since, to argue in favor of anything presupposes one’s right to be free of aggression. Given the fact then that the principle of nonaggression cannot be argumentatively contested as morally valid without implicitly acknowledging its validity,

非垄断性、竞争性安防生产商制度要如何运作？一开始就该清楚，要回答这个问题，就得脱离纯逻辑分析领域，因此种种答案，必然不像判断公共财货理论有效性那样确然无疑。摆在面前的问题，与市场怎样解决汉堡生产的问题如出一辙，尤其是，假定汉堡迄今为止，都由政府独家生产，以致无人能从既往汲取经验，所能表述的唯有尝试性答案。没有人可以大致知道汉堡产业的确切结构——有多少家竞争企业能够并存，该产业原本相对其他产业的重要性，汉堡的样子该是怎样，有多少种汉堡将会上市，由于缺少需求，大概又有多少种将会下架，等等。没有人可以知道所有将会影响整个汉堡产业结构的种种情况及变化——不同消费群体的需求变化及技术变化，直接或间接影响该产业的不同商品价格变化，等等。须强调，尽管关于安防的私人生产也

by force of logic one is committed to abandoning liberalism and accepting instead its more radical child: libertarianism, the philosophy of pure capitalism, which demands that the production of security be undertaken by private business too.

How would a system of nonmonopolistic, competing producers of security work? It should be clear from the outset that in answering this question one is leaving the realm of purely logical analysis and hence the answers must lack the certainty, the apodictic character of pronouncements on the validity of the public goods theory. The problem faced is precisely analogous to that of asking how a market would solve the problem of hamburger production, especially if up to this point hamburgers had been produced exclusively by the state and hence no one could draw on past experience. Only tentative answers could be formulated. No one could possibly know the exact structure of the hamburger industry—how many competing companies would come into existence, what importance this industry might have compared to others, what the hamburgers would look like, how many different sorts of hamburgers would appear on the market and perhaps disappear again because of a lack of demand, and so on. No one could know all of the circumstances and the changes that would influence the very structure of

有相同问题，但决不意味着完全无确定性可言。假若对于安防服务需求的某些一般条件（多少贴近于当今世界的条件），要多少说点什么，那就是处于不同结构性约束条件之下运作，并以这些条件为特征的、不同安防生产的社会秩序，将如何不一样地反应^{【23】}。让本人首先分析垄断性及国营安防生产的具体细节，因为至少可从中获得关于结论有效性的丰富证据，然后将该体系与理想的非垄断替代性体系互相比较。

即令安防被视作公共财货，在稀缺资源分配方面，它也必定要与其他财货竞争。在安防上的花费，无法再被用到其他同样可能提高消费者满意度的财货。而且，安防不是单一的、同质的财货，确切说，它成份复杂、多维多面。不仅有预防犯罪、侦察嫌犯、执行法律，同时还有防范盗窃，制止强暴，抵御污染，抗击天灾，等等。此

the hamburger industry—changes in the demands of various consumer groups, changes in technology, changes in the prices of various goods that affect the industry directly or indirectly, and so on. It must be stressed that although similar issues arise concerning the private production of security, this by no means implies that nothing definitive can be said. Assuming certain general conditions of demand for security services (conditions that more or less realistically reflect the world as it presently is) what can and will be said is how different social orders of security production, characterized by different structural constraints under which they have to operate, will respond differently.²³ Let me first analyze the specifics of monopolistic, state-run security production, for at least in this case one can draw on ample evidence regarding the validity of the conclusions reached and then compare this system with what could be expected if it were replaced by a nonmonopolistic one.

Even if security is considered to be a public good, in the allocation of scarce resources it must compete with other goods. What is spent on security can no longer be spent on other goods that also might increase consumer satisfaction. Moreover, security is not a single, homogeneous good, but rather consists of numerous components and aspects. There is not only prevention of crime, detection of criminals, and enforcement of the law, but there is also security from robbers, rapists, polluters, natural

外，安防决非在“总体”上获得生产，而是能在边际单位上取得供应。再者，不同人对安防整体乃至不同方面的重视程度不同，这取决于他们的个性，他们对各种不安因素的既往经验，以及他们生活的时代及地区^[24]。此处面临在竞争性用途中分配稀缺资源的根本经济问题，政府——完全不依赖于自愿捐献及销售产品，而部分或完全通过课税获得资金——如何决定要生产多少安防？对无数方面中的某一方面，又要供应多少？要向谁、在何处提供什么、提供多少？答案是，要决定以上问题，并无理性方法。从顾客观点出发，政府对其安防需求的反应，必定是武断的。我们是需要一名警察，一名法官，还是各一万名警察和法官？他们每月薪资应是一百美金，还是一万美金？尽管我们有许多警察，他们是否应该花更多时间用于巡街、捕盗、寻赃，或者将警力用于侦察无受害人犯罪如买春、吸毒或走私？法官是否应该花更多时间和精力用于听审离婚之诉、交通违章、入店行窃、谋杀或反垄断诉案？显然，所有这些问题都必定要以某种方式作出解答，因为只要存在稀缺性，而我们不是活在伊甸

disasters, and so on. Moreover, security is not produced in a “lump,” but can be supplied in marginal units. In addition, different people attach different importance to security as a whole, and also to different aspects of the whole thing, depending on their personal characteristics, their past experiences with various factors of insecurity, and the time and place in which they happen to live.²⁴ Here I address the fundamental economic problem of allocating scarce resources to competing uses, how can the state—an organization not financed exclusively by voluntary contributions and the sales of its products but rather partially or even wholly by taxes—decide how much security to produce, how much of each of its countless aspects, to whom and where to provide how much of what? The answer is that it has no rational way to decide this question. From the point of view of the consumers, its response to their security demands must be considered arbitrary. Do we need one policeman and one judge, or 100,000 of each? Should they be paid \$100 a month or \$10,000? Should the policemen, however many we might have, spend more time patrolling the streets, chasing robbers, and recovering stolen loot, or spying on participants in victimless crimes such as prostitution, drug use, or smuggling? And should the judges spend more time and energy hearing divorce cases, traffic violations, cases of shoplifting, and murder, or antitrust cases? Clearly, all of these questions must be

园，花在一样东西上的时间和金钱，就不能被利用于另一样东西。政府同样也必须回答以上问题，但它无论怎样行事，都不受盈亏标准之束缚。因此，从消费者观点来看，它的行动是武断的，且必然陷于浪费无度的不当分配^{【25】}。受雇于政府的安防生产者，在很大程度上不受消费者愿望的束缚而为所欲为。他们无所事事，游手好闲；假如开始工作，要么是挑拣最轻松的，要么是擅权而非服务顾客。警官驾车乱逛，寻找轻微违章者的麻烦，花大量金钱调查无受害人犯罪。由于不会立即遭受无受害人犯罪的影响，多数人（也即非参与者）不愿，而仅有极少人愿意花钱与之斗争。但一涉及到消费者最迫切的要求——阻止重罪（也即有受害人犯罪），将重犯绳之以法、追回赃物，并且有效保证惩罚侵犯者、补偿罪案的受害人——尽管预算分配猛涨不停，警察们的低效可谓恶名昭彰。

【23】关于竞争性安防生产的问题，参阅莫利纳里

answered somehow because as long as there is scarcity and we do not live in the Garden of Eden, the time and money spent on one thing cannot be spent on another. The state must answer these questions, too, but whatever it does, it does it without being subject to the profit-and-loss criterion. Hence, its action is arbitrary and necessarily involves countless wasteful misallocations from the consumer's viewpoint.²⁵ Independent to a large degree of consumer wants, the state-employed security producers instead do what they like. They hang around instead of doing anything, and if they do work they prefer doing what is easiest or work where they can wield power rather than serving consumers. Police officers drive around a lot, hassle petty traffic violators, spend huge amounts of money investigating victimless crimes that many people (i.e., nonparticipants) do not like but that few would be willing to spend their money on to fight, as they are not immediately affected by them. Yet with respect to what consumers want most urgently—the prevention of hardcore crime (i.e., crimes with victims), the apprehension and effective punishment of hard-core criminals, the recovery of loot, and the securing of compensation of victims of crimes from the aggressors—the police are notoriously inefficient, in spite of ever higher budget allocations.

23 On the problem of competitive security production, see Gustave

《安防生产》；罗斯巴德《权力与市场》（堪萨斯城：希德·安德鲁斯和麦克米尔，1977年）第1章、《为了新自由》（纽约：麦克米伦，1978年）第12章；W·C·伍尔德里奇《山姆大叔这个垄断者》（纽约新罗谢尔：阿灵顿屋，1970年）第5-6章；莫里斯和琳达·坦希尔《自由的市场》（纽约：自由放任图书，1984年）第2部分。

【24】见曼弗雷德·默克《公共安全社会学》（法兰克福：坎帕斯，1980年）。

【25】资源分配过程因缺乏盈亏标准的有效作用而为武断的说法，并不意味着不管怎样都要作出的决定不受任何制约，因此纯粹是一时兴起。并非如此，任何这样的决定都面临着对决策者的某种制约。举例说，倘若产品要素分配由民主决策，那么这对于大多数人必定有诱惑力。倘若某个决定受这种方式制约，或以其他方式作出决定，依自愿购买或不购买的消费者观点，这样依然是武断的。

关于民主控制下的分配，各种缺陷十分明显。例如，布坎南与理查德·E·瓦格纳写道（《凯恩斯的恶果》伦敦：经济事务研究院，1978年，第19页）：

deMolinari, *Production of Security*; Murray N. Rothbard, *Power and Market* (Kansas City: Sheed Andrews and McMeel, 1977), chap. 1; idem, *For A New Liberty* (New York: Macmillan, 1978), chap. 12; W.C. Woolridge, *Uncle Sam the monopoly Man* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1970), chaps. 5-6; Morris and Linda Tannehill, *The Market for Liberty* (New York: Laissez Faire Books, 1984), part 2.

24See Manfred Murck, *Soziologie der Öffentlichen Sicherheit* (Frankfurt: Campus, 1980).

25To say that the process of resource allocation becomes arbitrary in the absence of the effective functioning of the profit-loss criterion does not mean that the decisions that somehow have to be made are not subject to any kind of constraint and hence are pure whim. They are not, and any such decisions face certain constraints imposed on the decision maker. If, for instance, the allocation of production factors is decided democratically, then it evidently must appeal to the majority. But if a decision is constrained in this way or if it is made in any other way, it is still arbitrary from the point of view of voluntarily buying or not-buying consumers.

Regarding *democratically* controlled allocations, various deficiencies have become quite evident. As, for example, James Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner write (*The Consequences of Mr.*

“市场竞争是持续性的；对每一桩买卖，买者能够在竞争的卖者中挑选。政治竞争是间歇性的；某个决定在确定的若干年内，一般都是约束性的。市场竞争允许若干竞争者同时生存……政治竞争导致成王败寇的结果……在市场竞争中，买者可以相当肯定从交易中获得什么。在政治竞争中，买者实际购入的，是一家他无法约束机构的服务……此外，因为一位政客需要保证大多数政客的合作，投票给一位政客的意义，比起‘投票’给一家私企的意义，更为模糊不清。”

另阅布坎南“在投票和市场中的个人选择”。同作者《财政理论和政治经济学》（教堂山：北卡大学出版社，1962年）；对这个问题更一般的探讨参阅布坎南和塔洛克《一致同意的计算》。

常被忽略的是一一尤其是那些试图把民主给予每个人平等投票权，而消费者主权允许不平等“投票”这个事实当成优点的人所忽略的一一也即最重要的思虑不周：在一个消费者主权体系下，人们或许不平等地投票，可无论如何，他们对物品实施排他性的控制，而这

Keynes [London: Institute of Economic Affairs,1978], p. 19):

Market competition is continuous; at each purchase, a buyer is able to select among competing sellers. Political competition is intermittent; a decision is binding generally for a fixed number of years. Market competition allows several competitors to survive simultaneously. . . . Political competition leads to an all-or-nothing outcome. . . . In market competition the buyer can be reasonably certain as to just what it is that he will receive from his purchase. In political competition, the buyer is in effect purchasing the services of an agent, whom he cannot bind. . . . Moreover, because a politician needs to secure the cooperation of a majority of politicians, the meaning of a vote for a politician is less clean than that of a “vote” for a private firm.

See also James M. Buchanan, “Individual Choice in Voting and the Market,” In idem, *Fiscal Theory and Political Economy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962); for a more general treatment of the problem Buchanan and Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent*.

What has commonly been overlooked, though—especially by those who try to make a virtue of the fact that a democracy gives equal voting power to everyone, whereas consumer sovereignty allows for unequal “votes”—is the most important deficiency of all: Under a system of consumer sovereignty people might cast unequal votes but, in any case,

些物品由原始占有或者契约取得，因此行动绝无不道德之处。在一个生产民主制下，假定每个人对他未曾以如上方式取得之物有发言权；因此，一个人将恒久受到引诱，除了制造法律不稳定性，连带对资本形成过程的全方面负作用，还雪上加霜地采取了不道德行动。这一点另参阅米塞斯《社会主义》（印第安纳波利斯：自由基金，1981年），第31章。

其次，无论受政府雇佣的警察或法官刚好做了什么（其必为武断），他们也将倾向于草率举动，这是因为他们的收入，几乎不依赖顾客对他们服务的评价。因此警察的武断粗鲁，以及司法过程的迟滞缓慢，都可观察得知。并且，值得一提的是，警察与法院系统都不提供给顾客哪怕有那么一点像服务契约的东西，那上面载明毫不含糊的条款，规定当遇到具体情况时，应该为顾客发起怎样的程序。更确切说，两者都是以无凭无契的方式运作，最终允许自身随意更改程序规则；这就解释了真正荒唐的事实之所在：一方是警察和法官，另一方是私人，两方争议不被指派给独立第三方，却被指派给争议一方的同一雇主

they exercise control exclusively over things that they acquired through original appropriation or contract and hence are forced to act morally. Under a democracy of production everyone is assumed to have something to say regarding things one did not so acquire; hence, one is permanently invited thereby not only to create legal instability with all its negative effects on the process of capital formation, but, moreover to act immorally. See on this also Ludwig von Mises, *Socialism* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1981), chap. 31.

Furthermore, whatever state-employed police or judges happen to do (arbitrary as it must be), they will tend to do poorly because their income is more or less independent of the consumer's evaluations of their services. Thus one observes police arbitrariness and brutality and the slowness in the judicial process. Moreover, it is remarkable that neither the police nor the judicial system offers consumers anything even faintly resembling a service contract in which it is laid down in unambiguous terms what procedure the consumer can expect to be set in motion in a specific situation. Rather, both operate in a contractual void that over time allows them to change their rules of procedure arbitrarily and that explains the truly ridiculous fact that the settlement of disputes between police and judges on the one hand and private citizens on the other is not assigned to an independent third party, but to another

即政府雇佣的另一位警察或法官。

第三，任何见过国营警局和法院，更别提监狱的人，都明白虽然提供给我们的安防是这般水准，但所投入的生产要素是滥用、失修及糟蹋的。因为利用这些生产要素的人并不实际拥有它们（没有人可以贩卖它们并独占销售所得），体现在运用资本上的价值亏损（及盈余）因此被社会化，每个人将倾向于将自己私人收入的提高，建立在对要素的利用上，而付出资本价值损失的代价。因此，边际成本将愈来愈倾向于超过边际产品的价值，并将产生资本的过度利用。假如某种特例下，这一点恰巧并不明显，其所以可能，也是由于耗费成本相对而言，远远高于任何类似的私人企业成本^{【26】}。

一旦安防服务的给定需求，遇到具有迥异生产激励架构的竞争性市场，则在垄断性安防生产体系中固有的一切问题，无疑就将相对顺畅地迎刃而解。但这决不是说，我们找到了解决安防问题的“完美”钥匙。抢劫者和谋杀犯不会绝迹；不是所有赃物被追回，所有凶徒被擒获。但从消

policeman or judge who shares employers with one party—the government—in the dispute.

Third, anyone who has seen state-run police stations and courts, not to mention prisons, knows how true it is that the factors of production used to provide us with such security are overused, badly maintained, and filthy. Since no one using these factors of production actually owns them (no one can sell them and privately appropriate the receipts from sale) and losses (and gains) in the value embodied in the capital used are thus socialized, everybody will tend to increase his private income resulting from the use of the factors at the expense of losses in capital value. Hence, marginal cost will increasingly tend to exceed the value of marginal product, and an overutilization of capital will result. And if, in an exceptional case, this happens not to be so and an overutilization should not be apparent, then this has only been possible at costs that are comparatively much higher than those of any similar private business.²⁶

Without a doubt, all of these problems inherent in a system of monopolistic security production would be solved relatively quickly once a given demand for security services was met by a competitive market with its entirely different incentive structure for producers. This is not to say that a “perfect” solution to the problem of security would be found. There would still be robberies and murders; and not all loot would be

费者的评价角度来说，情况将会得到改善的程度，将达到人性允许其改善的程度。首先，只要存在一个竞争性体系（也即只要安防服务生产商依靠自愿性购买，大部分购买采用的方式也许是，在任何不安全或侵犯实际“发生”前，预先同意的服务及保险契约），若生产商不顾客户感受，不努力改善服务或产品质量，就无法提高收入。此外，所有安防生产商加在一起，也不能增加他们这个特定行业的重要性，除非顾客开始出于种种原因，对安防的评价真的高于对其他财货的评价，从而确保安防生产的开展，不致于以一种竞争性私人财货，如奶酪的停产或减产为代价。并且由于面临数以兆计的顾客对安防产品高度多样化的需求，安防服务生产商不得不相应多样化产品供应。直接依赖于自愿性顾客支持的生产商，倘若不恰当地响应顾客的种种需求及需求变化，就旋即受到财务上的损害。这样，每位顾客都会直接影响产出的财货在安防市场上的生灭，纵使微不足道。市场上将出现种类繁多的服务组合，而不像政府的生产政策那样，向人人提供一个模子的“安防套餐”。它们将根据不

recovered nor all murderers caught. But in terms of consumer evaluations the situation would improve to the extent that the nature of man would allow it to improve. First, as long as there is a competitive system (i.e., as long as the producers of security services depend on voluntary purchases, most of which probably take the form of service and insurance contracts agreed to in advance of any actual “occurrence” of insecurity or aggression), no producer could increase its income without improving services or quality of product as perceived by the consumers. Furthermore, all security producers taken together could not bolster the importance of their particular industry unless, for whatever reasons, consumers indeed started evaluating security more highly than other goods, thus ensuring that the production of security would never take place at the expense of the non- or reduced production of, let us say, cheese, as a competing private good. In addition, the producers of security services would have to diversify their offerings to a considerable degree because a highly diversified demand for security products among millions and millions of consumers exists. Directly dependent on voluntary consumer support, they would immediately be hurt financially if they did not appropriately respond to the consumers’ various wants or change in wants. Thus every consumer would have a direct influence, albeit small, on the output of goods appearing on or disappearing from

同人的不同安防需求而被量身定作,并考虑到不同职业,不同风险承受行为,不同保障及保险需求,不同地理位置和时段限制。

【26】莫利纳里在《安防生产》第13-14页总结道:

“若……顾客不得自由选购所喜爱的安防,恣意专断、经营不善之一大职业即现于世人面前。正义将迟来而昂贵,警察则无理而蛮横,个人自由不再受到尊重,安防代价虚高且分配不公,全照彼阶层顾客或此阶层顾客的权势大小而定。”

然而这远非全部。除了产品多样化,产品的内容和质量也将会得到改善。不仅安防企业的雇员将立即善待顾客,而且目前警察及司法体系中的冷漠态度、专断蛮横与粗心迟缓,终将消失。由于警察和法官将依赖自愿顾客的支持,任何粗暴对待顾客、无礼失职之举,都将令他们下岗。甚至于,总是将客企争议交由后者裁决的怪异情

the security market. Instead of offering a uniform “security packet” To everyone, a characteristic of state production policy, a multitude of service packages would appear on the market. They would be tailored to the different security needs of different people, taking account of different occupations, different risk-taking behavior, different needs for protection and insurance, and different geographic allocations and time constraints.

26Sums up Molinari, *Production of Security*, pp. 13–14,

If . . . the consumer is not free to buy security wherever he pleases, you forthwith see open up a large profession dedicated to arbitrariness and bad management. Justice becomes slow and costly, the police vexatious, individual liberty is no longer respected, the price of security is abusively inflated and inequitably apportioned, according to the power and influence of this or that class of consumers.

But that is far from all. Besides diversification, the content and quality of the products would improve, too. Not only would the treatment of consumers by the employees of security enterprises improve immediately, the “I-could-care-less” attitude, the arbitrariness and even brutality, the negligence and tardiness of the present police and judicial systems would ultimately disappear. Since policemen and judges would be dependent on voluntary consumer support, any instances of

形，几乎肯定会从书本里消失，由独立方裁决纠纷，将成为安防生产商提供的产品标准。最重要的是，为了吸引挽留顾客，这些服务的生产商不得不提供契约，让顾客了解自己买到了什么，让他在安防生产商不守契约时，能提起一个有效的、主体间可明确的申诉索赔。更具体说，就那些并非顾客唯一投保本人风险的个体服务契约，而是要求将个人风险与他人风险共同分摊的保险契约而言，与当前政府的作法相反，这些契约几乎肯定不复包含任何刻意藏置的，以彼群体代价满足此群体的再分配方案。否则，如果任何人感觉到，待签契约要他为别人的独特需要及风险即潜在的不安全因素付费，也即认为他本人的情形不适用之，将简单拒签或不予续费。

maltreatment of consumers, of impoliteness or ineptness could cost them their job. Further, the peculiarity that the settlement of disputes between a client and his business partner is invariably entrusted to the latter's judgment, would almost certainly disappear from the books, and conflict arbitration by independent parties would become the standard offered by producers of security. Most importantly, in order to attract and retain customers the producers of such services would have to offer contracts that would allow the consumer to know what he was buying and enable him to raise a valid, intersubjectively ascertainable complaint if the actual performance of the security producer did not live up to the contract. More specifically, insofar as they are not individualized service contracts where payment is made by a customer to cover his own risks exclusively but are rather insurance contracts that require pooling one's own risks with those of other people, contrary to the present statist practice these contracts most certainly would no longer contain any deliberately built-in redistributive scheme favoring one group of people at the expense of another. Otherwise, if anyone had the feeling that the contract offered to him required him to pay for other people's peculiar needs and risks—factors of possible insecurity, that is, that he did not perceive as applicable to his own case—he would simply reject signing it or discontinue his payments.

但上述所说，不免让人生疑：“安防生产竞争制度难道不必然引起永久性社会冲突，导致混乱和无政府局面吗？”解答如下。首先，应该注意到这样的印象与历史的、经验的证据决不相符。不同地方的竞争法庭体系（例如在古爱尔兰或汉莎同盟时期）在现代国民政府形成以前就存在，且据我们所知，它们运行良好^{【27】}。从当时存在的犯罪率（人均犯罪）判断，所谓狂野西部（顺带说它不像某些电影暗示的那样狂野）的私人警力比起今天政府支持的警力相对更成功^{【28】}。至于同时代的经验及例子，即使今天也存在数以兆计的国际契约——贸易及旅行契约——要说它们比起国内关系存在例如更多欺诈、更多犯罪和更多违约，则必定被疑为夸大其辞。应该注意到，国际契约中没有大一统垄断安防生产商及法律制定者。最后，不要忘记，即使在目前，在许多国家中，在政府周围就有各种各样私人安防生产商：私人调查员、私家侦探和私人仲裁业者。他们的工作似乎肯定了，他们对社会冲突的解决，比起公家同行更成功、而非更失败之论断。

Yet when all this is said, the question will inevitably surface.” Wouldn’t a competitive system of security production necessarily result in permanent social conflict, in chaos and anarchy?” Several responses can be made to this question. First, it should be noted that such an impression would by no means be in accordance with historical, empirical evidence. Systems of competing courts have existed at various places (e.g., in ancient Ireland or at the time of the Hanseatic League) before the arrival of the modern nation state, and as far as we know they worked well.²⁷ Judged by the then existent crime rate (crime per capita), the private police in the so-called Wild West (which incidentally was not as wild as some movies imply) were relatively more successful than today’s state-supported police).²⁸ And turning to contemporary experience and examples, millions and millions of international contracts exist even now—contracts of trade and travel—and it certainly seems to be an exaggeration to say, for instance, that there is more fraud, more crime, more breach of contract there than in domestic relations. And this, it should be noted, without there being one big monopolistic security producer and lawmaker. Finally it is not to be forgotten that even now in a great number of countries there are various private security producers alongside the state: private investigators, insurance detectives, and private arbitrators. Their work seems to confirm the thesis that they are

【27】参阅注释 22 引用的文献；亦可参阅布鲁诺·莱奥尼《自由和法律》（新泽西州普林斯顿：D·范诺丝丹，1961 年）；约瑟夫·佩登“在凯尔特爱尔兰法律中的财产权”《自由至上学报》1, no. 2（1977 年）。

【28】参阅特里·L·安德森和彼得·J·希尔“无政府资本主义的美国实验：不那么狂野的狂野西部”，《自由至上学报》3, no. 1（1980 年）。

然而，历史证据极易陷入争执，尤其是能否从中得出任何普遍信息。但上述问题所表达的担忧之所以毫无根据，亦有系统性的原因。尽管似乎陷于悖论，建立一个安防生产商竞争制度，意味着建立一种能产生法律及执法秩序的有组织激励结构，而这套秩序体现了对冲突解决而言最大可能程度的合意。比起垄断保护的状况，这种结构产生的社会动荡与冲突，将趋于减少而非增加^{【29】}。为理解以上悖论，务必细究这个让质疑者忧心忡忡，并相信安防生产垄断组织秩序更优的唯一典型情况：当 A 与 B 发生争议，两人向不

more, not less, successful in resolving social conflicts than their public counterparts.

27See the literature cited in note 22; also Bruno Leoni, *Freedom and the Law*(Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1961); Joseph Peden, “Property Rights in Celtic Irish Law,” *Journal of Libertarian Studies* 1, no. 2 (1977).

28See Terry L. Anderson and Peter J. Hill, “The American Experiment in Anarcho-Capitalism: The *Not So Wild, Wild West*,” *Journal of Libertarian Studies* 3, no. 1 (1980).

However, this historical evidence is very much subject to dispute, in particular regarding whether any general information can be derived from it. Yet there are systematic reasons, too, why the fear expressed by the question is not well-founded. Paradoxical as it may seem, establishing a competitive system of security producers implies erecting an institutionalized incentive structure to produce an order of law and law-enforcement that embodies the highest possible degree of consensus regarding the question of conflict resolution. Such a structure will tend to generate less rather than more social unrest and conflict than would occur under monopolistic auspices.²⁹In order to understand this paradox, it is necessary to take a closer look at the only typical situation that

同企业投保,而对他们各自顾客冲突主张的有效性,两家企业不能立即达成一致。(假如已经达成一致,或假如两者都向同一企业投保,问题就不复存在——至少与政府垄断下的问题没有区别。)难道不总会导致枪战爆发?然而,以上可能性极小。第一,企业间的任何暴力战争将昂贵和冒险,尤其是假设这些企业达到可信赖规模(对他们来说首屈一指的紧要之事,是让潜在客户感到他们是有效率的安全保障者)。更重要的是,在每一家企业依赖于自愿消费者支付的持续竞争制度下,任何两家企业的战争,都必须取决于每位顾客的支持意向。纵然仅一人怀疑为眼前争执开战的必要性而停止付费,也会立即向企业施压,促其寻求争执和解之道^{【30】}。因此任何竞争性安防生产商对采取暴力措施解决争执都格外小心。确切说,只要是顾客所愿的争执和解方案,每家安防生产商都会尽力提供、预先制定,并让人人知晓,在冲突主张评价不一致时,它自愿遵照及提交顾客的是怎样的仲裁程序。由于只有当这些仲裁措施在不同企业的顾客当中取得合意,这样的方案才能公开运作,一个将被所有

concerns the skeptic and that allows him to believe in the superior virtue of a monopolistically organized order of security production: when a conflict arises between A and B, both are insured by different companies and the companies cannot come to an immediate agreement regarding the validity of the conflicting claims brought forward by their respective clients. (No problem would exist if such an agreement were reached or if both clients were insured by one and the same company—at least the problem then would not be different in any way from that emerging under a statist monopoly.) Would not such a situation always result in a shoot-out? This is highly unlikely. First, any violent battle between companies would be costly and risky, in particular if these companies had reached a respectable size (which would be important for them to have in order to appear as effective guarantors of security to their prospective clients in the first place). More importantly, under a competitive system with each company dependent on the continuation of voluntary consumer payments, any battle would have to be deliberately supported by each and every client of both companies. If there were only one person who withdrew his payments because he was not convinced a battle was necessary in the particular conflict at hand, there would be immediate economic pressure on the company to look for a peaceful solution to the conflict.³⁰ Hence any competitive producer of security

竞争性安防生产商的顾客所广泛接受的,企业间的法治关联体系自然演化而成。此外,对促成代表合意的争议解决一般规则,经济压力的作用更加深远。在竞争性制度下,被委以重任寻找争议和解方案的独立仲裁人,将依赖于两家纠纷企业的持续资助,而只须假设,在双方都极为不满仲裁工作的成果时,它们就能够且势必选择不同的法官。因此,此时无关于法律程序而是法律内容,面临这些问题的法官都将承受压力,直至找到相关各企业所有顾客都能接受的解决方案^{【31】}。否则一家乃至全部企业都会失去顾客,因此导致这些企业下一回需要一位仲裁人时,转而求助于其他仲裁人^{【32】}。

would be extremely cautious about engaging in violent measures in order to resolve conflicts. Rather, to the extent that it is peaceful conflict resolution that consumers want, each and every security producer would go to great lengths to provide it to its clients and to establish in advance, for everyone to know, to what arbitration process it would be willing to submit itself and its clients in case of a disagreement over the evaluation of conflicting claims. And as such a scheme could appear to the clients of different firms to be working only if there were agreement among them regarding such arbitrational measures, a system of law governing relations between companies that would be universally acceptable to the clients of all of the competing security producers would naturally evolve. Moreover, the economic pressure to generate rules representing consensus on how conflicts should be handled is even more far reaching. Under a competitive system, the independent arbitrators who would be entrusted with the task of finding peaceful solutions to conflicts would be dependent on the continued support of the two disputing companies insofar as the companies could and would select different judges if either one of them were sufficiently dissatisfied with the outcome of the arbitration work. Thus, these judges would be under pressure to find solutions to the problems handed over to them that, this time not with respect to the procedural aspects of law but its content, would be

【29】以下参阅霍普《财产权、无政府和国家》（奥普拉登：西德出版社，1986年）第5章。

【30】这一点，与有权课税从而不需要人人慎重支持就可参战的政府政策，形成了鲜明对比；试问，假如有人只要对政府外交事务的处理方式感觉忤意，就有权停止缴税的话，战争的风险是增还是减？

【31】此处再次提醒，包含最大可能程度合意的那些规范，当然也正如前述，是论辩的先决条件，并只有为各方接受，达成共识才有可能。

【32】再次强调，将这一点与受政府雇佣的法官对比，因为他们是由税收养活，因此相对而言，顾客满意度无关痛痒，他们可作出人人看来明显不公正的裁决；试问，若每当有人感到某法官有朝一日在受理他本人案子时，无法足够谨慎地收集和判断案件事实，或者该法官简直就是彻头彻尾的骗子，他就有施加经济压力的可能性，那么在一件给定案子中，泯灭真相的风险是减还是增？

acceptable to all of the clients of the firms involved.³¹ Otherwise one or all of the companies might lose customers, thus inducing those firms to turn to different arbitrators the next time they are in need of one.³²

29 On the following, see Hans-Hermann Hoppe, *Eigentum, Anarchie, und Staat* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1986), chap. 5.

30 Contrast this with the state's policy of engaging in battles without having everyone's deliberate support because it has the right to tax people; and ask yourself if the risk of war would be lower or higher if one had the right to stop paying taxes as soon as one had the feeling that the states' handling of foreign affairs was not to one's liking.

31 And it may be noted here again that norms that incorporate the highest possible degrees of consensus are, of course, those that are presupposed by argumentation and whose acceptance makes consensus on anything at all possible, as indicated above.

32 Again, contrast this with state-employed judges who, because they are paid from taxes and so are relatively independent of consumer satisfaction, can pass judgments that are clearly not acceptable as fair by everyone; and ask yourself if the risk of not finding the truth in a given case would be lower or higher if one had the possibility of exerting economic pressure whenever one had the feeling that a judge who one day might have to adjudicate in one's own case had not been sufficiently

但一家安防生产企业，难道不可能在竞争制度下成为不法企业——在它的顾客支持下发起对其他企业的侵犯？这种可能性当然无可否认，尽管必须再次强调，这里处于经验社会科学的领域，无人可以确定知晓这类事情。可是，说安防企业成为不法企业的可能性，多少揭示了纯资本主义社会秩序的哲学和经济学有严重不足，这种暗示则显荒诞不经^[33]。

首先，应该牢记，任何社会体系，国家主义与社会主义秩序也好，纯市场经济也好，其存续取决于公众舆论；任何时代的既有公众舆论，限定了什么能否发生，以及发生可能性的大小。例如，西德的公众舆论现状，决定了当前苏式国家主义及社会主义制度，极不可能甚至决不可能被强加于西德公众。这类体系缺少公众支持就注定失败和崩溃。任何强加秩序的企图，更不可能在美国人当中有望得逞。因此，为了让我们正确看

careful in assembling and judging the facts of a case, or simply was an outright crook.

But wouldn't it be possible under a competitive system for a security producing firm to become an outlaw company—a firm, that is, which, supported by its own clients, started aggressing against others? There is certainly no way to deny that this might be possible, though again it must be emphasized that here one is in the realm of empirical social science and no one could know such a thing with certainty. And yet the tacit implication that the possibility that a security firm could become an outlaw company somehow indicates a severe deficiency in the philosophy and economics of a pure capitalist social order is fallacious.³³

First, it should be recalled that any social system, a statist-socialist order no less than a pure market economy, is dependent for its continued existence on public opinion and that a given state of public opinion at all times delimits what can or cannot occur as well as what is more or less likely to occur. The current state of public opinion in West Germany, for instance, makes it highly unlikely or even impossible that a statist-socialist system of the current Soviet type could be imposed on the West German public. The lack of public support for such a system would doom it to failure and make it collapse. It is even more unlikely that any

待不法企业这个问题，对此应作如下表述：在一个给定社会的特定公众舆论状态下，任何这类事件发生的可能性有多大？就此而言，答案明显因社会不同而各异。对于公众的社会主义思想根深蒂固的某些社会，侵犯机构要东山再起，可能性更大；而对其他社会而言，可能性就小得多。但然后，一个安防生产竞争制度的前景，在任何给定情况下，是优于还是劣于集权体制继续存在的前景？以今日美国为例。假想政府通过法案，废除税金维持的安防，引入安防生产竞争制度。鉴于公众舆论的状态，不法生产者迅速涌现的可能性有多大？答案明显依赖于公众对这一情况变化的反应。因此，对于私人安防市场观念的反对者，一开始就可回敬：你会怎样？你的反应如何？你对不法企业的恐惧是否意味着，会以行动勾结那些侵犯他人生命及财产的安防生产商，假如这家生产商这样做时，你们会持续支持它吗？批评者对此必将哑口无言。但更重要的是，这种回敬当中所寓含的系统性挑战。显然，上述情况变化，将意味着一旦每个人必须做出决定时，都将面临成本收益结构发生的变化。在安防生产竞

attempt to impose a Soviet-type order could ever hope to succeed among Americans, given American public opinion. Hence, in order for us to see the problem of outlaw companies correctly, the above question should be phrased as follows: How likely is it that any such event would occur in a given society with its specific state of public opinion? Formulated in this way, it is clear that the answer would have to be different for different societies. For some, characterized by socialist ideas deeply entrenched in the public, there would be a greater likelihood of the reemergence of aggressor companies, and for other societies there would be a much smaller chance of this happening. But then, would the prospect of a competitive system of security production in any given case be better or worse than that of the continuation of a statist system? Let us look, for instance, at the present-day United States. Assume that by a legislative act the state had abolished its right to provide security with tax funds and a competitive system of security production was introduced. Given the state of public opinion, how likely then would it be that outlaw producers would spring up, and what if they did? Evidently, the answer would depend on the reactions of the public to this changed situation. Thus, the first reply to those challenging the idea of a private market for security would have to be: What about you? What would your reaction be? Does your fear of outlaw companies mean that you would then go out and

争制度引入之前，参与和支持（政府）侵犯是合法的。而现在这样的行动将非法化。因此，鉴于人的良心，它造成每个决定多少具有代价（也即要与他心目中的正当行为法则多少协调一致），支持剥削那些不情不愿者的机构，将比以往代价更高。鉴于这一事实，从而必须假定，无论在何处尝试这一社会实验，现在将钱花在那些践信守诺企业的人数（甚至将包括那些原来准备向政府伸出援手的人）都将增加。对比之下，仍旧致力于剥削政策即损人利己的人数将会下降。这个后果当然极端取决于公众舆论。手头的例子——美国，财产自然权利理论在该国广泛传播，并被接受为私人伦理，自由至上哲学本质上是该国的建国理念，并引导它达到如此高度^{【34】}——效果自然就会特别显著。相应的，决心维护及实施自由至上法律的安防生产企业，将会吸引绝大部分公众的支持和财力资助。然而，他们中的某些人，尤其是旧秩序的受益者，也可能真地会继续支持侵犯政策，但要在数量及财力上成功推行之，却极度不可能。确切说，最大可能的结果将是，各诚信企业将发展出必要的力量——单独或共同

engage in trade with a security producer that aggressed against other people and their property, and would you continue supporting it if it did? Certainly the critic would be much muted by this counterattack. But more important than this is the systematic challenge implied in this personal counterattack. Evidently, the described change in the situation would imply a change in the cost-benefit structure that everyone would face once he had to make his decisions. Before the introduction of a competitive system of security production, it had been legal to participate in and support(state) aggression. Now such an activity would be illegal. Hence, given one's conscience, which makes each decision appear more or less costly (i.e., more or less in harmony with one's own principles of correct behavior), support for a firm engaging in the exploitation of people unwilling to deliberately support its actions would be more costly than before. Given this fact, it must be assumed that the number of people (including even those who otherwise would have readily lent their support to the state) who would now spend their money to support a firm committed to honest business would rise wherever this social experiment was tried. In contrast, the number of people still committed to a policy of exploitation—of gaining at the expense of others—would fall. How drastic this effect would be would of course depend on the state of public opinion. In the example at hand—the United States, where the natural

努力,并赢得本企业自愿顾客的支持——扼制这些不法生产者的形成,并且无论它们在何时何地出现,都予以摧毁^{【35】}。

【33】以下可参阅罗斯巴德《为了新自由》第233页之后。

【34】参阅伯纳德·拜林《美国革命意识形态起源》(剑桥,马塞诸萨:哈佛大学出版社);杰克逊·特纳·梅恩《反联邦主义者:批判宪法》(教堂山:北加州大学出版社,1961年);罗斯巴德《孕育于自由》(纽约:

theory of property is extremely widespread and accepted as a private ethic, the libertarian philosophy being essentially the ideology on which the country was founded and that led it to the height it reached³⁴—the effect would naturally be particularly pronounced. Accordingly, security producing firms committed to the philosophy of protecting and enforcing libertarian law would attract the greatest bulk of public support and financial assistance. And while it may be true that some people, and among them especially those who have profited from the old order, might continue their support of a policy of aggression, it is very unlikely that they would be sufficient in number and financial strength to succeed in doing so. Rather, the likely outcome would be that the honest companies would develop the strength needed—alone or in a combined effort and supported in this effort by their own voluntary customers—to check any such emergence of outlaw producers and destroy them wherever and whenever they came into existence.³⁵

33See on the following in particular Rothbard, *For A New Liberty*, pp. 233ff

34See Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967); Jackson Turner Main, *The Anti-Federalists: Critics of the Constitution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961); Murray N. Rothbard,

阿灵顿屋，1975-1979年)

【35】自然而然的，保险企业将发挥一个扼制不法企业形成的特别重要作用。莫里斯和琳达·坦希尔（《自由的市场》第110-111页）：

“保险企业，任何完全自由经济的重要组成部分，将会有特别的动机与任何侵犯者决裂，且施展可观的商业影响力反对他们。侵犯性暴力导致价值损失，保险行业将承担大多数这种损失的主要成本。一名无法无天的侵犯者，乃活生生的责任负担；无论距他最初的侵犯有多远，没有一家保险企业会希望承担他下一步侵犯本企业某位客户的风险。除此之外，侵犯者及其同伙有更大可能性卷入暴力状况，因此属于恶性的保险风险。一家保险企业出于最小化其侵犯所引发任何未来损失的预期，基本上会拒绝为这类人提供保险。即便这家企业无先见之明，为了避免承担他们的暴力倾向所引发的额外风险，也会被迫极大提高他们的保险费，或者完全取消对他们的保险。在一个竞争性经济体中，没有一家保险企业敢于继续予以侵犯者及其关系人保险，并将成本简单转嫁给本企业的忠实顾客；否则，这些顾客将迅速流失到其他更受尊敬的企业，而这些企业有能力对他们的

Conceived in Liberty (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1975-1979).

35 Naturally, insurance companies would assume a particularly important role in checking the emergence of outlaw companies. Note Morris and Linda Tannehill (*The Market of Liberty*, pp. 110-11):

Insurance companies, a very important sector of any totally free economy, would have a special incentive to dissociate themselves from any aggressor and, in addition, to bring all their considerable business influence to bear against him. Aggressive violence causes value loss, and the insurance industry would suffer the major cost in most such value losses. An unrestrained aggressor is a walking liability, and no insurance company, however remotely removed from his original aggression, would wish to sustain the risk that he might aggress against one of its own clients next. Besides, aggressors and those who associate with them are more likely to be involved in situations of violence and are, thus, bad insurance risks. An insurance company would probably refuse coverage to such people out of a foresighted desire to minimize any future losses which their aggression might cause. But even if the company were not motivated by such foresight, it would still be forced to rate their premiums up drastically or cancel their coverage altogether in order to avoid carrying the extra risk invoked in their inclination to violence. In a

保险责任范围收取较低廉的费用。”

competitive economy, no insurance company could afford to continue covering aggressors and those who had dealings with aggressors and simply pass the cost on to its honest customers; it would soon lose these customers to more reputable firms which could afford to charge less for their insurance coverage.

第二章
税收的经济学
与社会学

2

The Economics and
Sociology of Taxation

从《经济学家与人文学刊》1, no. 2(1990年)再版

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正如本章标题所示,我给自己设定了两个目标。首先,我要解释税收的一般经济效应。这部

As the title of the chapter indicates, I have set myself two goals. I want to explain the general economic effect of taxation. This part of the

分代表着对税收的行动学逻辑分析,其本身远未超越前人所述。在更富创见的第二部分,我将试图回答:为什么存在税收;何以一直以来税收不断增加?解答以上问题,决不是经济学理论的任务;要承担这个任务的,是受行动学逻辑晓谕及制约的社会学或历史解释和重建。这个求知领域从一开始就存在着更广阔思考空间。

壹

关于税收的经济学效应,所能讲述的已无新意;但这不等于说,熟悉这些内容的人不在少数。在对多种流行经济学教材考察后,实际上我要讲述的内容,为今天的大多数经济学家和经济专业学生所寡闻。这些教材对税收经济效应之所涉,除了纯粹描述不同税制及其历史发展^[1],对何为税收一般效应的问题,则近乎缄默。此外,在税负归宿问题的讨论中,关于各特定税收形式的经济效应,这些教材的讲述总有缺憾。然而这一状态所反映的,仅仅是知识退化的过程。早在150年前,今天关于税收经济学理应知晓的一

chapter represents a praxeological analysis of taxation and as such should not be expected to go much beyond what has already been said by other economists. More originality might be found in the second part, where I will try to answer the question: why is there taxation; and why is there always more of it? Answering such questions is not the task of economic theory but of praxeologically informed and constrained sociological or historical interpretations and reconstructions, and from the very outset much more room for speculation in this field of intellectual inquiry exists.

I.

To say there is nothing new to be stated regarding the economic effects of taxation is not to say that what there *is* would not be news to many. In fact, after surveying several popular economics textbooks it would seem that what I have to say is news to most of today's economists and students of economics. Insofar as these texts deal with the economic effects of taxation at all, beyond a purely descriptive presentation of various tax-schemes and their historical development, they are almost completely silent on the question of what the general effects of taxation are. Moreover, what in their discussion of the problem of tax-incidence these texts then say about the economic effects of specific forms of taxation is invariably flawed. However, this state of

切，几乎都由一位经济学历史上的巨擘，让·巴蒂斯特·萨伊在其《政治经济导论》中正确无疑地阐明。

相形之下，今天的作者在他的整个教材知识体系当中，信手安排税收讨论的位置；而萨伊从一开始，就正确地将这个现象放在“财富的消费”这个总标题下。然后，他准确将税收识别解释为对财产取得与生产的攻击性惩罚；这必然导致体现于这些财产的财富形成的减损，以及一般生活水平的下降。

萨伊强调：

“佯称税收对国民财富有所裨益，因为它夺去一部分国民财富，或税收使国民得以致富，因为它消费了一部分国民财富，都是荒谬绝伦的。”^{【2】}

“所谓税收，是指一部分国民产品从个人手中转移到政府手中，以支付公共消费或开支。不论它以什么名义，赋税、捐贡、摊派、消费税、关税、援助、补贴、补助或免费馈赠，实际上都是统治权力某一时候加在个

affairs merely reflects a process of intellectual degeneration. As early as 150 years ago almost everything that should be understood today about the economics of taxation had been correctly and convincingly stated by such a prominent figure in the history of economics as Jean Baptiste Say in his *Treatise on Political Economy*.

In contrast to today's textbook writers, who assign the discussion of taxation to arbitrary places within the overall architectonic of their books, from the beginning Say correctly locates the phenomenon under the general heading "Of the Consumption of Wealth." He then unmistakably identifies and explains taxation as an attack on and punishment of the acquisition and production of property, which necessarily leads to a reduction in the formation of wealth embodied in such property and to a lowering of the general standard of living.

Notes Say:

It is a glaring absurdity to pretend, that taxation contributes to national wealth, by engrossing part of the national produce, and enriches the nation by consuming part of its wealth.²

Taxation is the transfer of a portion of the national products from the hands of individuals to those of the government, for the purpose of meeting public consumption or expenditure. Whatever be the denomination it bears, whether tax, contribution, duty, excise, custom, aid, subsidy, grant, or free gift,

人或团体之上的负担,为的是满足据说适合由他们支付的消费。按字面意思,简而言之,就是被强加的。”^{【3】}

由于这些基本洞察似乎已被遗忘,或至少在今天不再显而易见,请允许我在首项任务中,对萨伊的核心论点及其有效性,用行动学逻辑理由和解释重新展示,同时也顺带驳斥某些广为流传的“抗辩”,它们宣称证明了税收不必然阻碍财产及财富的形成。然后根据这个一般解释,我将证明税负归宿的标准教材分析中,存在着基本的逻辑谬误。

首要且必然要将税收理解成财产及财富形成的破坏手段,这点可从税收意义的简单逻辑分析中推导出来。

税收,是特定物理资产(今天主要但非绝对以货币形式)及其包含价值的一种强制性、非契约性转移,即从先前持有这些资产,并且继续持有它们本应取得收入的某个人或群体,转移给现在持有它们并取得现时收入的另一人或群体。这

it is virtually a burden imposed upon individuals, either in a separate or corporate character, by the ruling power for the time being, for the purpose of supplying the consumption it may think proper to make at their expense; in short, an impost, in the literal sense.³

Since such fundamental insights seem to have been forgotten, or at least no longer appear obvious today, let me, as my first task, present anew a praxeological account and explanation for Say's central argument and its validity, and in so doing refute some popular "counterarguments" claiming to show that taxation need not obstruct the formation of property and wealth. In light of this general explanation, I will then demonstrate the fundamental logical fallacy in the standard textbook analysis of tax-incidence.

That taxation—foremost and above all—is and must be understood as a means for the destruction of property and wealth-formation follows from a simple logical analysis of the meaning of taxation.

Taxation is a coercive, non-contractual transfer of definite physical assets (nowadays mostly, but not exclusively money), and the value embodied in them, from a person or group of persons who first held these assets and who could have derived an income from further holding them, to another, who now possesses them and now derives an income from so doing. How did these assets come into the hands of their original

些资产是怎样进入最初所有者的手中？排除这是前一次课税的结果，并且注意到只有尚未被消费的资产，或价值尚未被消费行动耗竭的资产，才可能被课税（一个敛税者不会取走他人的无用之物，而是取走仍有价值的！），它们为一个人所拥有，有且仅有三种可能：要么是察觉某种天然财货是稀缺的，在他人见到和占有前就积极拥有它们；要么是利用自己的劳动手段，从以上先占财货当中生产它们；要么是从前一先占者或生产者那里自愿性、契约性取得它们。唯有通过这三种活动类型，一个人才可能取得和增加有价值的因此是可课税的资产。

先占行动将某些原先不被人看成是潜在收入来源之物，转化成提供收入的资产；就其本质而言，生产行动旨在将价值较低的资产转化成价值较高的资产；而每份契约交换所涉，都是将特定财产从较低评价者手中，交换和重新定向到那些较高评价者手中。

由此可推导出，任何课税方式都意味着一个

owners? Ruling out that this was the outcome of another previous act of taxation, and noting that only those assets can be taxed that have not yet been consumed or whose value has not yet been exhausted through acts of consumption (a tax-gatherer does not take away another man's garbage but rather his still valuable assets!), three and only three possibilities exist: They come into one's possession either by one's having perceived certain nature-given goods as scarce and having actively brought them into one's possession before anyone else had seen and done so; by having produced them by means of one's labor out of such previously appropriated goods; or through voluntary, contractual acquisition from a previous appropriator or producer. Only through these types of activities is one capable of acquiring and increasing valuable—and hence taxable—assets.

Acts of original appropriation turn something which no one had previously perceived as a possible source of income into an income-providing asset; acts of production are by their very nature aimed at the transformation of a less valuable asset into a more valuable one; and every contractual exchange concerns the change and redirection of specific assets from the hands of those who value their possession less to those who value them more.

From this it follows that any form of taxation implies a reduction of

人从先占、生产、契约中期望所得的减少。由于所需稀缺资源——至少是时间和对自己身体的利用——本可用于消费和（或）享受，从事先占、生产及契约活动的机会成本上升，边际效用降低，而消费和闲暇的边际效用提高，相应造成将前一种用途替换成后一种用途的趋势。

【1】对税收的专门描述性分析参阅如萨缪尔森《经济学》第10版第9章；《今日经济学》第6版（纽约：哈珀与罗，1988年）第6章。

【2】萨伊《政治经济学导论》（纽约：奥古斯都·M·凯利）第446-447页。

【3】同上，第446页；关于萨伊的税收经济分析另参阅罗斯巴德“中立税收的神话”，尤其是第551-554页。

【4】关于这点，另阅罗斯巴德《人、经济和国家》第12章第8段、《权力与市场》第4章第1-3段。

因此，通过强制将有价值的、尚未被消费的

income a person can expect to receive from original appropriation, from production, or from contracting. Since these activities require the employment of scarce means—at least time and the use of one's body—which could be used for consumption and/or leisure, the opportunity cost of performing them is raised. The marginal utility of appropriating, producing, and contracting is decreased, and the marginal utility of consumption and leisure increased. Accordingly, there will be a tendency to shift out of the former roles and into the latter ones.⁴

¹Exclusively descriptive analyses of taxation are given, for instance, by Paul Samuelson, *Economics*, 10th ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1976), chap. 9; Roger L. Miller, *Economics Today*, 6th ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), chap. 6.

²Jean Baptiste Say, *A Treatise on Political Economy* (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1964), pp. 446-47.

³*Ibid.*, p. 446; on Say's economic analysis of taxation see also Murray N. Rothbard, "The Myth of Neutral Taxation," *Cato Journal* (Fall, 1981), esp. pp. 551-54.

⁴See on this also Murray N. Rothbard, *Man, Economy, and State* (Los Angeles: Nash, 1970), chap. 12.8; *idem*, *Power and Market* (Kansas City: Sheed Andrews and McMeel, 1977), chap. 4, 1-3.

财产，由它们的生产者（广义上包含先占者及契约者）转移给非生产者，税收降低了生产者的现有收入及潜在消费水平。并且，它削弱了未来生产有价值资产的现时激励，因此同样降低了未来收入及可消费水平。税收并非仅仅惩罚消费而无损生产努力；税收对生产，这个提供及可能增加未来收入及消费支出的唯一手段，也构成了攻击。通过降低与未来导向的价值生产型努力相关联的当前价值，税收提高了实际时间偏好率，也即原始利息，并相应导致生产期及准备期的缩短，因此必然无情地推动人类通往仅能糊口的生存状态。只要尽可能加税，就将见到人沦为兽一般的水平。

尽管这些推理似乎直截了当，反对它的流行观点亦有不少。例如，从误以为经济学是经验科学的经济学家阵营来看，经济学得出的只是假设

Thus, by coercively transferring valuable, not yet consumed assets from their producers (in the wider sense of the term including appropriators and contractors) to people who have not produced them, taxation reduces producers' present income and their presently possible level of consumption. Moreover, it reduces the present incentive for future production of valuable assets and thereby also lowers future income and the future level of available consumption. Taxation is not just a punishment of consumption without any effect on productive efforts; it is also an assault on production as the only means of providing for and possibly increasing future income and consumption expenditure. By lowering the present value associated with future-directed, value-productive efforts, taxation raises the effective rate of time preference, i.e., the rate of ordinary interest and, accordingly, leads to a shortening of the period of production and provision and so exerts an inexorable influence of pushing mankind into the direction of an existence of living from hand to mouth. Just increase taxation enough, and you will have mankind reduced to the level of barbaric animal beasts.

Straightforward as such reasoning may seem, there are a number of popular objections raised against it. For instance, from the side of economists who falsely conceive of economics as an empirical science

性解释，这些解释要被证实，总是必须接受经验证据的检验（类似自然科学的情况）。以下观点屡见不鲜：从经验角度，反复观察到税负水平提高，事实上伴随着国民生产总值或其他产量增加（而非降低）；那么，无论以上推理听起来多有多道理，在经验上必定是无效的。实际上，这类经验主义者中的某些人甚至更进一步，强烈主张税收实际有助于生活水平的提高，正如事实所验证的，某些国家经历了低生活水平与低税负，如今则享有更多财富与更高税负。

两种反对意见都纯粹是混淆视听。经验无法打败逻辑；与逻辑推理规律不符的观测证据，不被解释成以上推理的反驳，反被当成头脑混乱的迹象（有人报告说他曾发现一只鸟是红的同时又是非红的，又有谁会这样的观测报告接受为对矛盾律的反驳，而非白痴的呓语？）。

至于更强的论点，也不过是在炫耀极具迷惑性的后此谬误。观察到高税及富裕的关联事件，

that produces nothing but hypothetical explanations which invariably must be tested against empirical evidence in order to be validated(analogous to the situation in the natural sciences), the following argument is frequently heard: Empirically, it has been observed repeatedly that a rise in the level of taxation was actually accompanied by a rise (not a fall) in GNP or other measures of productive output; hence, the above reasoning, however plausible, must be considered empirically invalid. In fact, some empiricists of this sort go even further and make the stronger claim that taxation actually helps increase the standard of living as evidenced by the fact that some countries with once low standards of living and low levels of taxation now enjoy a much greater wealth with much higher taxes.

Both objections are simply confused. Experience cannot beat logic, and interpretations of observational evidence which are not inline with the laws of logical reasoning are no refutation of these but the sign of a muddled mind (or would one accept someone's observational report that he had seen a bird that was red and non-red all over at the same time as a refutation of the law of contradiction rather than the pronouncement of an idiot?).

As regards the stronger thesis, it is nothing but a beautiful illustration of the ever so attractive *post hoc ergo propter hoc* fallacy.

滞后于低税及贫困的关联事件，就由这个事实推测税收增加导致财富增加。但这样推理大约与萨伊所嘲讽的论证——有人观察到富人比穷人消费更多，因此富人的高消费水平必定是他们富有的原因——一样没有说服力^{【5】}。正如从消费的含义推断其不可能，富人可不是因为高消费水平而富有，相反是因为他们先前节制消费并参与价值生产型活动，因此尽管有这样的事情，从税收的含义出发，不可能推导出人类因税负水平提高而走向繁荣。

较弱的论点——经验至少证否了税负与产量必然负相关的主张——同样不得要领。上述行动学逻辑推理，并不完全排除经验主义经济学家误为反驳的那些事实。在前面的探讨中已得出结论说，税收的作用是相对减少有价值财产的产量——也就是说，假如根本无税或尚未加税，产量与本该有的水平相比是减少的；至于有价值财产的绝对产出水平，不曾明说或暗示什么。实际上，例如国民生产总值的绝对增长，不仅与我们先前

From the fact that the correlated events of high taxation and wealth were to be observed later than those of low taxation and wealth it is inferred that increased taxation increases wealth. Yet to reason in this way is about as convincing as the argument—justly ridiculed by Say—that one can observe rich men consuming more than poor ones; therefore, their high level of consumption must be responsible for the fact that they are rich.⁵ Just as it follows from the meaning of consumption that this is impossible and that, on the contrary, the rich are not rich because of their high level of consumption but because they previously abstained from consumption and engaged instead in value-productive actions, so it follows from the meaning of taxation that mankind cannot have prospered because of higher levels of taxation but despite such a fact.

The weaker thesis—that experience would at least disprove any claim of a relationship between taxation and productive output that was negative by necessity—is also off the mark. The praxeological reasoning presented above does not at all rule out what empiricist economists falsely interpret as a refutation. In this earlier discussion the conclusion had been reached that the effect of taxation is a relative reduction in the production of valuable assets—a reduction, that is, as compared with the level of output that would have been produced had there been no taxation at all or had the level of taxation not been raised. Nothing was said or

的行动学逻辑分析相容,甚至生产力的潜在与现实进步,也应被视为完全正常的现象。假若通过改进生产技术,使同等投入(从成本角度)能够得到更高产量,或使减少投入能够得到同等物理产量,那么税负增加与有价值财产的产出增加同时发生,则不足为奇。然而,这一点不影响前面税收导致相对贫困这个论述的有效性。给定技术知识的状态,尽管它也许随时间而变化,税收性质(对于价值生产型努力的惩罚)维持不变,生产量水平必定低于同等知识以及无税或低税条件下本该达到的水平。这里的统计研究是完全离题的:它们既不能增强也不能削弱该论述的有效性。

另一个有一定支持的反驳意见,认为征税或加税,会导致应税资产的收入减少;相对于从其他活动形态产生的边际效用,这个减少量提高了

implied with respect to the absolute level of the output of valuable assets. As a matter of fact, absolute growth of GNP, for instance, is not only compatible with our earlier praxeological analysis, but can even be seen as a perfectly normal phenomenon to the extent that advances in productivity are possible and actually take place. If it has become possible through improvements in the technology of production to produce a higher output with an identical input (in terms of cost), or a physically identical output with a reduced input, then the coincidence of increased taxation and an increased output of valuable assets is anything but surprising. However, this does not in the least affect the validity of what has been stated about relative impoverishment resulting from taxation. With a given state of technological knowledge, though it may change over time, and taxation being what it is (a punishment of value-productive efforts), the level of productive output must be lower than the one that could have been attained with the same knowledge and no or lower taxation. Statistical studies here are entirely beside the point: they can neither help strengthen it, nor can they ever be used to weaken it.

Another theoretical objection which enjoys some popularity is that imposing or raising taxes leads to a reduction of income derived from the assets taxed; that this reduction raises the marginal utility of such assets

应税资产的边际效用；因此，税收实际上有助提高而非降低从事生产的倾向。对于向货币资产课税的通常情况而言，这等于说，税收减少了货币收入，从而提高了货币的边际效用，反过来增强了取得货币收入的激励。这个论辩就其本身而言是绝对正确的。然而，以为我所提出的相对贫困论点的有效性遭到否定，则为大错。首先，为了澄清是非，应该注意到这点即便无误——如同刚刚介绍的论辩好像暗示的，尽管我们将明白其为谬误——既然等比例增加了工作积极性，加税并不导致有价值财产产量的相对减少；可那些从事价值生产者的收入已经减少，这仍为事实。即便他们的产量与先前持平，唯有耗费比以前更多的劳动才可能做到。因为任何额外劳动支出，意味着舍弃闲暇或消费（连同有价值财产的同等产量，还有他们本该享有的闲暇或消费），他们的整体生活水平必然下降^[6]。

税收可唯独减少消费，而无损有价值财产的产量，这种假设包含致命缺陷的原因正趋于明

as compared to what can be derived from other forms of activity; and thus, instead of lowering it, taxation actually helps increase the tendency to engage in production. For the usual case of taxing money assets this is to say that taxes reduce monetary income which raises the marginal utility of money, and this in turn increases the incentive to attain monetary returns. This argument, to be sure, is perfectly true as far as it goes. However, it is a misconception to believe that it does anything to invalidate the relative impoverishment thesis that I have advanced. First of all, in order to keep the record straight it should be noted that even if it were true—as the just presented argument seems to suggest, albeit falsely as we will see—that increased taxation does not lead to a relatively lower output of valuable assets produced since it spurs a proportional increase in workaholism, it is still the case that the income of value-productive individuals has fallen. **Even if they produce the same output as previously, they can only do so if they expend more labor now than before. Since any additional labor expenditure implies forgone leisure or consumption (leisure or consumption which they otherwise could have enjoyed along with the same output of valuable assets), their overall standard of living must be lower.**⁶

It now becomes apparent why the assumption that taxation can leave the productive output of valuable assets unaffected and exclusively

朗。假定税收降低某人的收入（包括现时消费和闲暇产生的收入），并且假定时间偏好的普遍事实存在，也即行动人相对未来财货总是偏好现时财货（由于维持消费必不可少，唯有以消费品形式为相应等待期提供储备，才能够从事更长、更迂回的生产方法），则无疑推导出课税（等待的负效用必已增加）必然提高了一个人的实际时间偏好率，那么相对于原来的选择，他势所必然地要缩短生产结构的长度。他的有价值资产未来可获得的产量，相应将不可避免地低于原有水平。倘若在低税或无税时，他的收入本该增加，在他的时间偏好表给定的情况下（无论在任何时刻发生什么），他将投资于更长的生产过程，结果是他的有价值未来财产的产量本该相对提高^{【7】}。

税收对生产具有中立效应的观点，谬在忽视了时间偏好这个事实。到目前的谨慎论证，正确指出了税收蕴含着双重信号：一方面是有利消费

cripple consumption is fatally flawed. If taxation reduces one's income (which includes that derived from present consumption and leisure), and given the universal fact of time preference, that is, that human actors invariably prefer present goods over future goods (that they cannot do without continuous consumption and can engage in lengthier, more roundabout methods of production only if a provision in the form of consumption goods has been made for the corresponding waiting period), then it necessarily follows that a person's effective rate of time preference must have been raised through this very act (the disutility of waiting must have increased), and that he will have to shorten the length of the structure of production as compared to the one that he otherwise would have chosen. Accordingly, his output of valuable assets available at future dates will have to be lower than would be the case otherwise. If with lower or no taxation his income had been higher and his time preference schedule being given (whatever it happens to be at any particular point in time), he would have invested in lengthier production processes. As a consequence, his output of valuable future assets would have been relatively greater.⁷

The error in the thesis that taxation can have a neutral effect on production lies in the fact that time preference is not taken into account. The argument presently under scrutiny is quite correct in pointing out

和闲暇而不利劳动的替代效应；另一方面，是提高应税资产边际效用的收入效应。然而，误将以上简单解释为矛盾信号的浑然一体——前者有利于劳动而后者相反——以致于一个人无法说出生产上税收效应的范畴（绝对）本质，从而税收是否导致有价值财产的产出更低或更高，这个问题必然被当成是纯粹经验性的问题^{【8】}。实际上，一旦认识到，税收正传递给人信号，而人的行动无不受时间偏好束缚时，那么，这两个信号就没有矛盾。对于从事上述行动的人，不仅存在劳动与完全不劳动之间的替代，而且也存在生产有价值资产时，采用更多或更少时间消耗方式之间的替代。他们总在以下两者间取舍：迅速而直接获得一样资产，几乎从不等待，然而代价是依靠更低效率的生产方式（那位著名的渔夫决定自己徒手捕鱼，企图比使用迂回生产方式更快获取它）；或者通过更富效率的方法获得同样的资产，但在收获成果前，不得不等待更长时间（渔夫受到未来更高回报的诱惑，决定忍耐一个更长的等待期，先着手制造一张渔网）。然而，考虑到以上选择，税收发出的信号就十分清晰明确；认识

that taxation implies a twofold signal: on the one hand the substitution effect working in favor of consumption and leisure and against work; and on the other hand the income effect of raising the marginal utility of the taxed asset. However, it is false to interpret this simplistically as a mixed bag of contradictory signals—one in favor of and one against work—so that one can then state nothing of a categorical nature regarding the effects of taxation on production, and the question of whether or not taxation provides for a lower or a higher output of valuable assets must be conceived of as an entirely empirical one.⁸ For in fact, the signal of taxation is not contradictory at all once it has been recognized that it is being sent to persons whose actions are invariably constrained by time preference. For such actors there exists not only the alternative between work and no work at all but also one between producing a valuable asset in more or less time-consuming ways. Invariably, they must also choose between obtaining an asset quickly and directly, with little waiting time involved, but at the price of having to resort to less efficient methods of production (the famous fisherman who decides to use his bare hands to catch fish in order to obtain it more quickly than by going through more roundabout methods of production), or obtaining it through more productive methods but then having to wait longer for them to bear fruit (the fisherman who, lured by higher future returns, decides to endure a

到替代效应系统性压倒任何收入效应,就不再存有任何疑虑。假若不仅存在拥有某物或不拥有某物的选择,而且存在更快拥有较少某物或更慢拥有较多某物的选择,则通过税收发送的双重信号,就不难被合成转化为一个信号:降低等待时间;缩短迂回生产过程!此举将使有价值财产更早获得——与提高的边际效用是契合的。缩短迂回生产过程,使得源于税收的两个似乎矛盾的信号,同时得到了解释。与税收对生产具有系统性“中立”效应的声称恰恰相反,任何这样缩短迂回生产方法的后果,都是产量的减少。课税及每次增税,就那些供应未来消费的有价值资产而言,总须付出生产力被迫降低,而生活水平紧接着下降的代价。每一次课税,都必定促进更密集资本化和更高度生产力的生产过程,通往食不果腹的生存状态。

longer waiting period and first builds a net).However, given these choices, the message of taxation is completely unambiguous and unequivocal, and there can no longer be any question that the substitution effect must be thought of as systematically dominating any income effect: If there is not only the option of having something or not having it but also of having less of something sooner or more of it later, the double message sent through taxation is easily integrated and translated into one: reduce the waiting time;shorten the roundabout methods of production! By doing so, valuable assets will be obtained earlier—in line with their increased marginal utility. Simultaneously, in shortening the waiting period, more room will be given for leisure—in line with its increased marginal utility. By reducing the length of roundabout methods of production the two seemingly contradictory signals stemming from taxation are simultaneously accounted for. Contrary to any claim of a systematically“neutral” effect of taxation on production, the consequence of any such shortening of roundabout methods of production is a lower output produced. The price that invariably must be paid for taxation,and for every increase in taxation, is a coercively lowered productivity that in turn reduces the standard of living in terms of valuable assets provided for future consumption. Every act of taxation necessarily exerts a push away from more highly capitalized, more productive production

【5】参阅萨伊《政治经济学导论》448页

【6】关于这点另参阅罗斯巴德《权力与市场》95页后。

【7】这时也许有人会反对说，税金收入将到达某些人——那些政府官员或政府转移支付受惠者之手——并且对他们而言，增加的收入导致了实际时间偏好率的降低，这也许会抵销纳税一方实际时间偏好率的提高，因此让整个比率及生产结构不致改变。然而，这样的推理漏洞百出：首先完全不能把政府开支当作投资。确切说，政府开支是且仅是消费。原因正如罗斯巴德所解释的：

“在任何一种劳动分工经济当中，投资者制造资本财货，不是为了自身，而是利用它们生产低阶财货乃至最终消费财货。简而言之，投资消费的特征是，有关财货不是被用于满足投资者的需求，而是别人——消费者的需求。然而，当政府从私人市场经济体中征收资源，恰恰否认了消费者的愿望；这么做，是为了满足政府官员的念头，而非满足顾客的要求。”（《人、经济与国家》第816-817页）。

processes in the direction of a hand-to-mouth-existence.

5See Say, *A Treatise on Political Economy*, p. 448.

6See on this point also Rothbard, *Power and Market*, pp. 95f.

7One might object here that the tax receipts will come into someone's hands—those of government officials or of governmental transfer-payment recipients—and that their increased income, resulting in a lower effective time preference rate for them, may offset the increase in this rate on the taxpayers' side and hence leave the overall rate and the structure of production unchanged. Such reasoning, however, is categorically flawed: For one thing, insofar as government expenditure is concerned, it cannot be regarded as investment at all. Rather, it is consumption, and consumption alone. For, as Rothbard has explained,

[i]n any sort of division-of-labor economy, capital goods are built, not for their own sake by the investor, but in order to use them to produce lower-order and eventually consumers' goods. In short, a characteristic of an investment expenditure is that the good in question is not being used to fulfill the needs of the investor, but of someone else—the consumer. Yet, when government confiscates resources from the private market economy, it is precisely defying the wishes of the consumers; when government invests in any good, it does so to serve the

“因此按照定义，政府开支不能被认为是生产结构的延长，从而抵销了纳税人提高的时间偏好率。另一方面，至于政府的这种**转移**开支（包括官僚薪酬以及给予特权集团的补贴），其中一部分将确实用于储蓄和投资。然而，这些投资不代表顾客的自愿需求，而代表**生产型消费者**所不需要的生产领域中的投资……一旦消除该税，则……这些特殊利益需求引起的新投资将被证明是不当投资。”（《权力和市场》第 98 页）。

因此，转移开支同样无法被视作对纳税人缩短生产结构的补偿。这样的开支所能做的一切，是延长错误生产的结构。“无论如何”，罗斯巴德总结说：

“政府消费量保证了所得税的效应将是提高时间偏好率，并且降低储蓄与投资。”（同上，第 98 页）

【8】关于收入效应相对替代效应重要性的这类毫不相

whims of government officials, not the desires of consumers. (*Man, Economy, and State*, pp. 816–17)

Thus, government expenditure, by definition, cannot be conceived of as lengthening the production structure and hence as counterbalancing the taxpayers' raised time preference rate.—On the other hand, as for the *transfer* expenditures made by the government (including the salaries of bureaucrats and subsidies to privileged groups), it is true that some of this will be saved and invested. These investments, however, will not represent the voluntary desires of consumers, but rather investments in fields of production *not* desired by the *producing consumers*. . . . Once let the tax be eliminated, and . . . the new investments called forth by the demands of the specially privileged will turn out to be *malinvestments*. (*Power and Market*, p. 98)

Consequently, transfer expenditures also cannot be conceived of as compensating for the fact that taxpayers shorten the length of the production structure. All such expenditures can do is to lengthen the structure of mal-production. “At any rate” concludes Rothbard,

the amount consumed by the government insures that the effect of income taxation will be to raise time-preference ratios and to reduce saving and investment. (*Ibid.*, p. 98)

8See for such—irrelevant—empirical studies regarding the relative

干的经验研究，参阅乔治·F·布雷克“税负归宿及经济效应”载于《公共财政经济学》（华盛顿特区：布鲁克林，1974年）第180页后；A·B·阿金森和维瑟夫·E·斯蒂格利茨《公共经济学文集》（纽约：麦克劳·希尔，1980年）第48页后；斯蒂格利茨《公共部门经济学》（纽约：诺顿，1986年）第372页。

倘若某人考虑对货币资产课税这种常见情况，不难揭示这些结论的有效性。正因为货币资产在将来可被用于购买有价值资产，它们才会被需要和持有。它们完全没有自己天生的使用价值（如法定纸币情形下），或这些使用价值与交换价值相比并不显著（如金本位情形下，货币依然有——尽管微小的——商品价值）。确切说，附着在它们身上的价值源于它们未来的购买力。然而，如果货币价值代表着其他未来可获得的资产，对货币课税的效应则一目了然。最重要的是，随着闲暇或消费边际效用的提高，这样的税收提高了这些未来资产的边际效用。这种激励束的变化对行动人而言，愈来愈转化成以耗时较少的生产过程，更快获得这些资产的企图。相比先取得

importance of income vs. substitution effects George F. Break, “The Incidence and economic Effects of Taxation,” in *The Economics of Public Finance*(Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1974), pp. 180ff.; A.B. Atkinson and Joseph E.Stiglitz, *Lectures on Public Economics* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1980), pp. 48ff.;Stiglitz, *Economics of the Public Sector* (New York: Norton, 1986), p. 372.

It is not difficult to illustrate the validity of these conclusions if one considers the all-too-familiar case of taxing money assets. Such assets are only acquired and held because they can purchase other valuable assets at future dates. They have no own intrinsic use-value at all (as in the case of a fiat paper money), or such use-value is insignificant compared to the exchange-value (as in the case of the gold standard where money also has an—albeit small—commodity value). Rather, the value attached to them is due to their future purchasing power. Yet if the value of money consists of representing other future available assets, the effects of taxing money becomes clear immediately. Most importantly, along with increasing the marginal utility of leisure or consumption, such a tax increases the marginal utility of such future assets. This change in the constellation of incentives translates itself for an actor into increased attempts to obtain these assets more quickly, in less time-consuming

货币间接取得未来财产的生产过程,现在系统性缩短的生产过程,乃通过直接交换取得未来财产。因此,税收意味着用直接交换替代更长及更迂回的货币交换生产方法。但再次强调,更深依赖直接交换,是在退回原始野蛮的经济状态。正因为以直接交换为目的的生产导致极端低下的产量,人类实际上摆脱了这一发展阶段,转而更深依赖及拓展以间接交换为目的的生产体系,而这个体系要求更长的等待期,数目及种类不断增多的资产卷入货币关系,从而获得远高得多的回报。每次课税都意味着这个进程的被迫倒退。它降低产量,削弱劳动分工程度,并且抑制社会和经济一体化(应该注意到,假若没有间接货币交换机制,社会和经济一体化就不会成为世界性的)。并且,每次强制掠夺货币所引起的,通往更多采用直接交换而非间接交换机制的一般趋势,对货币本身的取得方法一样有巨大影响。与非货币资产的情况一样,货币边际效用与闲暇消费边际效用的提高,都使耗时更少的赚钱方法吸引力相对提升。税收提高了更迅速、更直接取得货币的激励,而非仅仅通过生产及契约这样的迂

production processes. The only production processes now that are systematically shorter than those of attaining future assets indirectly, via the earlier acquisition of money, are those of acquiring them through direct exchanges. Thus, taxation implies that barter trade will be substituted increasingly for the lengthier roundabout production method of monetary exchanges. But once again, resorting increasingly to barter is a regression to economic primitivism and barbarism. It was precisely because production for bartering purposes yielded an extremely low output that mankind actually outgrew this developmental stage and instead increasingly resorted to and expanded a system of production-for indirect-exchange purposes which, while requiring a longer waiting period, renders a far larger return of ever more and different assets drawn into the cash nexus. Every act of taxation means a coerced step backward in this process. It reduces output, decreases the extent of the division of labor, and leads to a reduction in social and economic integration(which, it may be noted, could never have become worldwide,were it not for the institution of indirect monetary exchanges).Furthermore, the general tendency towards increasingly adopting direct instead of indirect exchange mechanisms caused by every coercive seizure of money also has highly important consequences with regard to the methods of attaining money itself. Just as in the case of non-monetary assets, the

回方法,从价值生产型努力回报也即互惠交换框架中取得货币。一方面,这意味着一个人将更倾向于尝试逃税从而简单地增加货币资产。另一方面,将出现更多强制掠夺货币的趋势——要么通过称为盗窃的非法形式,要么通过合法参与所谓政治的游戏^{【9】}。

对税收效应的一般经济分析已经完成。今天的经济学教材作者,通常根本不愿涉及以上内容。眼下接着探讨这些作者在税负归宿这个标题下常说的税收效应。根据前面的分析,将不难发现这些解释的致命缺陷。实际上,假若一个人不用心研习基础,当遇到具体问题时,一头扎进谬误就毫不奇怪。对税负归宿问题的标准解释,大多以营业税或销售税为例,就像这样^{【10】}: **假设征收营业税或销售税。谁必须承受该税的负担?**

increased marginal utility of money along with that of leisure-consumption also makes it relatively more attractive to acquire money in less time-consuming ways. Instead of acquiring it in return for value-productive efforts, i.e., within the framework of mutually beneficial exchanges, taxation raises the incentive to acquire it more quickly and directly, without having to go through such tediously roundabout methods as producing and contracting. On the one hand, this means that one will try more frequently to increase one's money assets by simply hiding them from the tax collector. On the other hand, a growing tendency will emerge to come into the possession of money through coercive seizure—either in the illegal form called stealing, or legally, by participating in the game called politics.⁹

Having completed this general economic analysis of the effects of taxation, which today's economic textbook writers typically prefer not to deal with at all, let me now turn to what they typically do say about the effects of taxation under the heading of tax-incidence. In light of our previous analysis it will be easy to detect the fatal flaw in such accounts. Indeed, that one should fall headlong into error in dealing with specifics if one has not bothered to study the basics can hardly come as a complete surprise. The standard account of the problem of tax-incidence most frequently exemplified by the case of an excise or sales tax goes like

要认识到——我当然无意反驳以上的有效性——在某种意义上，毫无疑问必定由顾客承受税收的正面冲击，并且总是如此。因为无论这种税收的具体后果为何，必定要么是消费者被迫为同样商品支付更高价格，其生活水平因此蒙受损害的情况，要么是税收将更高成本加在生产者身上，然后顾客因为更低产量而遭到惩罚的情况。然而至于说，开征某种税究竟以哪一种方式损害顾客，属于未决经验性问题，其答案取决于应税产品的需求弹性。假如需求是完全无弹性的，那么生产者会将所有税负通过涨价方式转嫁给顾客。假如是需求是富有弹性的，那么生产商将被迫以更高生产成本的形式吸收税负，并且假如需求曲线的一部分是无弹性以及其他弹性（据称经验上这是最通常的情况），那么税负将或多或少被分摊，它部分由消费者承担，部分由生产者承担。对于这种说法，我们将不得不坚决表示反对。

这类论辩到底错在哪里？尽管所用措辞不同于我的先前分析，极易发觉它只是在更具体一

this:10 Suppose an excise or sales tax is imposed. Who must bear the burden of this?

It is recognized—and I have of course no intention of disputing the validity of this—that in one sense there can be no question that consumers must take the brunt, and invariably do. For no matter what the specific consequences of such a tax are, it must either be the case that consumers will have to pay a higher price for the same goods and their standard of living will be impaired because of this, or it must be the case that the tax imposes higher costs on producers, and consumers will then be punished because of a lower output produced. However, and it is with this that we will have to disagree sharply, it is then argued that whether or not the imposition of a tax harms consumers in the former or in the latter way is an open empirical question, the answer to which depends on the elasticity of demand for the taxed products. If the demand is sufficiently inelastic, then producers will shift the entire burden onto consumers in the form of higher prices. If it is highly elastic, then producers will have to absorb the tax in the form of higher costs of production, and if some section of the demand curve is inelastic and another elastic (this allegedly being empirically the most frequent case), then the burden somehow will have to be shared, with part of it being shifted onto consumers and another falling on producers.

点的讨论层次上,重犯在一般层次上已被证明的谬误: 税收可能会、也可能不会降低产量,在税收与产量之间没有必然联系,必须从经验上考虑到税收也许仅仅影响消费而不损害生产的可能性等论调。正如税负归宿的教材解释,假设税负可被全部或部分向前转嫁给顾客,这纯粹等于说,税收不会损害生产。因为假如将任何数量的税负转嫁给顾客是可能的,这个数量将代表“非生产税”,一种完全对消费的课税^{【11】}。

【9】前面多少有点不同联系的注释7中已经解释过的,此处再次显露无遗:为什么认为税收也许对生产具有“中立”效应,对纳税者的任何“负面”效应,也许被用税者的“正面”效应所相应抵销,乃是犯了一个基本错误。在这类推理中被忽略的,是税收的介入,不仅意味着损害生产者而有利非生产者。因为通过非生产手段相对低成本地取得额外收入,也即不通过实际生产

What is wrong with this sort of argument? While it is couched in terms different from those used in my earlier analysis, one can hardly fail to notice that it merely restates, on a somewhat more specific level of discussion, what has already been demonstrated as false on a more general level: the thesis that taxes may or may not reduce productive output; that there is no necessary connection between taxes and productive output; and that it must be considered empirically possible that a tax may affect consumption exclusively while production remains untouched. To assume, as the textbook-account of tax incidence does, that taxes can be shifted forward, either totally or partially, onto consumers is simply to say that a tax may not negatively affect production. For if it were possible to shift any amount of a tax forward onto consumers, that amount would represent a “nonproduction tax,” a tax exclusively on consumption.¹¹

Here once again what has already been explained in a somewhat different connection in note 7 above becomes evident: why it is a fundamental mistake to think that taxation might have a “neutral” effect on production such that any “negative” effects on taxpayers may be compensated by corresponding “positive” effects on tax spenders. What is overlooked in this sort of reasoning is that the introduction of taxation not only implies favoring nonproducers at the expense of producers. It

更多财货，而是厕身于已生产财货的非契约取得过程，对于生产者也好，非生产者也好，这同时改变了不同收入取得方式上附带的成本。假如将这样一种迥异的激励结构运用到既定人群，那么必定缩短生产结构的长度，且必然导致财货产量的减少。对此另参阅霍普《社会主义和资本主义的理论》（波士顿：克卢沃学术出版社，1989年）第4章。

【10】参阅如鲍莫尔和布林德《经济学：原理和政策》第636页后；丹尼尔·R·富斯菲尔德《经济学：政治经济学原理》第3版（伊利诺伊斯州格伦维尤：斯考特·福斯曼，1988年）第463页后及469页后；斯坦利·费舍尔、吕迪格·多恩布施、理查德·施马兰西《宏观经济学》第2版（纽约：麦格劳·希尔，1988年）第385页后。

【11】纯消费税的不可能性另参阅罗斯巴德《权力和市场》第108页后。

simultaneously changes, for producers and nonproducers alike, the cost attached to different methods of attaining an income, for it is then relatively less costly to attain an additional income through nonproductive means, i.e., not through actually producing more goods but by participating in the process of noncontractual acquisitions of already produced goods. If such a different incentive structure is applied to a given population, then the length of the production structure will necessarily be shortened, and a decrease in the output of goods produced must result. See on this also Hans-Hermann Hoppe, *A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism* (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), chap. 4.

10 See for instance William Baumol and Alan Blinder, *Economics: Principles and Policy* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), pp. 636ff.; Daniel R. Fusfeld, *Economics: Principles of Political Economy*, 3rd ed. (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1987), pp. 639ff.; Robert Ekelund and Robert Tollison, *Microeconomics*, 2nd ed. (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1988), pp. 463ff. and 469f.; Stanley Fisher, Rudiger Dornbusch, and Richard Schmalensee, *Microeconomics*, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1988), pp. 385f.

11 On the impossibility of a pure consumption tax see also Rothbard, *Power and Market*, pp. 108ff.

要反驳常见的教材分析,只要简单回顾先前的结论:在时间偏好的束缚下,人们所承担的税负对生产的不利影响,必定远远超过对消费的不利影响。然而,此处我将选择有些另类的路线来论证本质上相同的观点,从而证明任何税负均未转嫁给消费者的具体论点。纵然假定的是一些明显不可思议之事。

只要试将税负向前转嫁的学说,应用于持续以双重职能行动,即同时是生产者与消费者的单个行动者身上,那么它的荒谬性就昭然若揭。对于这样既生产又消费的人而言,这等于说,假如他面临某些未来财货取得成本提高——也即他本人视为成本上涨的事件——然后他将这些增加的成本转嫁给自己,办法是赋予财货相应更高的价值,从而恢复曾经的利润率,因此在他的生产者职能方面不受影响及损害,而唯独要求在消费者职能方面进行调整。或者更极端地设想,就某人的价值生产型努力而言,税收对他毫无影响,因为他正相应地,开始更加喜爱即将生产的

In order to refute the typical textbook analysis, one could simply go back to our previous discussion that resulted in the conclusion that any tax imposed on people constrained by time preference must negatively affect production above and beyond any negative consequences that it implies for consumption. However, I will choose a somewhat different route of argument here in order to make essentially the same point and thereby establish the more specific thesis that no amount of any tax can be shifted onto consumers. To assume otherwise is to assume something manifestly impossible.

The absurdity of the tax-forward-shifting doctrine becomes clear as soon as one tries to apply it to the case of a single actor who continuously acts in both roles—that of a producer and a consumer. For such a producer-consumer, the doctrine amounts to this proposition: If he is faced with an increase in the costs of attaining some future good—an increase, that is, that he himself perceives as a cost-increasing event—then he shifts these higher costs onto himself in such a way that he responds by attaching a correspondingly higher value to the good to be obtained, thereby restoring his old profit-margin, thus leaving his role as producer unchanged and unimpaired, and requiring restrictive adjustments exclusively in his role as a consumer. Or, formulated even more drastically, insofar as his value-productive efforts are concerned, a

财货。

浅近之理揭示了这样的荒谬来自基本概念的混淆：向前转嫁学说是由于未认识到，一个人在他的分析中，必须假设需求给定，这是因为需求实际在任一时刻上都是既定的。任何没有把握这一点的分析都是有缺陷的，因为倘若假定需求已经变化，那么凡事皆有可能；生产也许会增加、减少或维持不变。假定我是茶商且茶叶遭受课税，假定同时发生了茶叶需求的增加，那么现在人们自然愿意为茶叶支付比先前更高的价格。然而这明显不是税负向前转嫁化的结果，而是需求变化的结果。在税负归宿的标题下介绍这种可能性，纯属胡言乱语：实际分析的，是完全不同的问题，即价格如何被需求变化所影响，与税收效应毫无关系。此处的混淆就如同，倘若某人想要反驳一个苹果再加一个苹果就有两个苹果这个主张，凭着说：“不，我刚加上一个苹果，看，这不是两个苹果而是三个苹果。”在数学上这种信口雌黄难以幸存；然而在经济学上，几乎一样荒谬的学说则为正统。

tax does not make any difference for an individual, because he just starts liking the to-be-produced good correspondingly more.

Plain reasoning reveals that what generates such absurdity is a fundamental conceptual confusion: The forward-shifting doctrine arises from not recognizing that in one's analysis one must assume that demand is given—and that this must be assumed because it in fact is given at any point in time. Any analysis that loses track of this is flawed, for if one were to assume that demand had changed, then everything would be possible: production might increase, decrease, or remain unchanged. If I am a producer of tea and tea is taxed and if it is assumed that the demand schedule for tea rises concurrently, then, naturally, it is possible that people are now willing to pay a higher price for tea than previously. Yet this is obviously not a forward shifting of the tax but the result of a change in demand. **To present this possibility under the heading of tax-incidence analysis is plain nonsense: it is in fact an analysis of the entirely different question of how prices are affected by changes in demand and has nothing whatsoever to do with the effects of taxation. The confusion here is on as grand a scale as that which one would encounter if someone were to “refute” the statement that one apple and another make two by saying “No, I have just added another apple, and look, there are not two but three apples here.” It is hard to get away with**

然而，每当一个人试图回答税负是否向前转嫁的问题，倘若他在逻辑上决心假定需求是给定的，那么每次课税必须被理解为单独影响供给端的一个事件：它降低了供给者所能支配的供给^{【12】}。任何其他结论，都将等于否认初始假定的一一税收的确被生产者这样承受及看待。当税金被征收（而需求曲线维持不变），唯有供给曲线被移动的说法，不过是等于说，整个税负实际上必定被供给者吸收了。的确，供给曲线的左移会引起价格上涨，并且消费者自然要么被迫支付这些更高价格，要么支付同样价格取得更少财货，从而蒙受损害^{【13】}。然而要牢记，消费者总是受税收损害，这点当然毫无疑问。然而，认为价格上涨，意味着税负从生产者转嫁给消费者，这种看法则为错觉。确切说，消费者此时受损，“不过”是由于生产者正蒙受损害，尽管供给要价提高，生产者必定首当其冲^{【14】}。试问，假若一位企业家真能将任何数量的税负，由他本人转嫁给消费者，他难道会等到强制性税收实际降临，为什么

such nonsense in math; in economics a doctrine hardly less absurd is the orthodoxy.

Yet if one is logically committed to assuming demand to be given whenever one tries to answer the question whether or not a tax can be shifted forward, every tax must be interpreted as an event that exclusively affects the supply side: it reduces the supplies at the disposal of suppliers.¹² Any other conclusion would amount to a denial of what had been assumed from the outset—that a tax had indeed been imposed and perceived as such by producers. To say that only the supply curve is shifted whenever a tax is extracted (while the demand curve remains the same as before) is to say nothing else than that the entire tax-burden must in fact be absorbed by the suppliers. To be sure, the leftward shift of the supply curve would cause prices to rise and consumers would naturally be harmed by having to pay these higher prices and by only being able to afford a smaller amount of goods at such a price.¹³ Yet that consumers will invariably be hurt by taxes has of course never been doubted as one should recall. However, it is a misconception to think that this higher price is a shifting of the tax burden from producers to consumers. Rather, consumers are hurt here “only” by harm being done to producers who, despite higher prices charged for their supplies, must bear the brunt.¹⁴ One must ask oneself why, if an entrepreneur could indeed shift any

他不早早主动给自己“加税”！答案是明显的：他在制定价格的过程中，一直受到实际给定需求的限制。任何企业家制定价格都伴随着这个预期，即价格一旦高于实际选择的价格，就会产生收入的下降。否则，假若他预测到某个更高价格会带来收入增加，那么他就会涨价。只要企业家预测在涉及的任何价格区域范围内，需求是无弹性的，他就会利用这点并选择涨价。他之所以停止涨价，并接受某个特定价格，是因为他的预期正好相反，他预测在这个价格上的需求曲线是有弹性的。假如企业家面临课税，这些关于需求曲线非弹性及弹性部分的预期毫无改变。那么也和现在一样，他预测涨价会使收入受损。因此，他明显谈不上可以避免税负。实际上，假若供给减少导致现有价格上涨，这个上移必定进入需求曲线的弹性部分，因此必须设想，企业家以降低收入的形式支付了全部代价。其他任何结论，都有逻辑缺陷。只有当课税时，企业家就预测到需求变化，那么他才能改变价格而不因此招致损失。例如，假定他预测需求已经增加，这样在现行价格上，眼前就有一个非弹性的需求曲线延伸，他

amount of the tax-burden away from himself and onto consumers, he would not have already done so by voluntarily imposing a tax on himself instead of waiting for the actual coercive tax to come along! **The answer is clear: At all times he is constrained in his price-setting activity by the actual given demand.** The price set by any entrepreneur is set with the expectation that a price higher than the one actually chosen would yield a lower total revenue. Otherwise, if he expected a higher price to bring about a larger revenue he would raise it. As long as an entrepreneur expects the demand to be inelastic within the region of any price-range under consideration, he will take advantage of this and choose the higher price. **He stops raising prices and settles for a specific one because his expectations are reversed and he anticipates the demand curve above this price to be elastic.** These expectations regarding inelastic and elastic portions of the demand curve are not at all changed if the entrepreneur is faced with a tax. Then as now he expects higher prices to produce revenue losses. Thus, it is obviously out of the question to argue that he could escape the burden of the tax. In fact, if as a consequence of the reduced supply the price now rises, this upward movement must be into an elastic portion of the demand curve, and the entrepreneur thus must assumedly pay the full price of it in the form of reduced revenue. Any other conclusion is logically flawed. Only if the entrepreneur expects a

将能涨价而不受惩罚。再次强调，这可不是税负向前转嫁，而是需求增加。无论有无税收，企业家的行动都如出一辙。税收与这种价格变化无关。无论如何，税负必定被应税财货的供应者独自及全部支付【15】。

【12】鲍莫尔和布林德《经济学：原理和政治》第636页，介绍了因税收而变化的需求曲线。

【13】为免误解：在教材税负归宿分析指出这个事实的程度内，它们是完全正确的。而他们给出现象解释是彻底混乱的！

【14】这一点可参阅罗斯巴德《人、经济和国家》第809页。

【15】假如税收没有立即影响供给，短期内可能如此，那么从上述分析当中可以得出，要价根本不会变动。因为以涨价作为对课税的回应，将再一次意味着，将价格

change in demand occurring simultaneously with taxation could he change his price without thereby incurring losses. If he expects demand to have increased, for instance, such that there will now be an inelastic rather than an elastic stretch of the demand curve above the presently going price, he will be able to raise it without punishment. Again, this is not a forward shifting of the tax. This is increased demand. With or without the tax the entrepreneur would have acted in precisely the same way. The tax has nothing to do with such price changes. In any case, the tax must be paid exclusively and in full by the suppliers of the taxed goods.15

12Baumol and Blinder, *Economics: Principles and Policy*, p. 636, present the *demand* curve as changing in response to a tax.

13To avoid any misunderstanding then: Insofar as the textbook analyses of tax-incidence point out this fact they are of course entirely correct. It is the interpretation of this phenomenon they give which is fundamentally confused!

14See on this point also Rothbard, *Man, Economy, and State*, p. 809.

15Should a tax not immediately affect supply at all, as can happen in the short run, then it follows from the above analysis that the price

推入需求曲线的弹性区域。从长期看，供给将被迫相对减少，价格必定进入这个区域。无论哪种情况，都没有向前转嫁发生。关于这点，另参阅罗斯巴德《人、经济和国家》第 807 页后、《权力和市场》第 88 页后。

贰

毫无疑问，税收一贯减少生产，导致消费者生活水平下降。无论哪种状况，都难免得出结论，即税收是破坏财富形成，从而造成相对贫困的手段。

这带来第二个主题：税收的社会学。假如税收是阻碍财富形成的工具，那么对以下问题的回答立刻变得迫切：何以解释税收的存在；何以解释总有更多税；何以解释我们所经历的，尤其是近百年来，税收不仅在绝对水平上，而且在相对水平上，处于不断增长中；何以解释这种制度导致西方课税型政府在国际政治领域中权势不断扩张，日益主宰世界各地的这个进程。

charged will not change at all. For to raise it in response to the tax would once again imply pushing it into an elastic region of the demand curve. In the long run the supply will have to be relatively reduced and prices must move into this region. In any case, no forward shifting takes place. See on this also Rothbard, *Man, Economy, and State*, pp. 807ff.; *idem*, *Power and Market*, pp. 88ff.

There can be no doubt, then, that taxes invariably reduce production and with this the consumer's standard of living. Whichever way things are put, there is no escaping the conclusion that taxation is a means of obstructing the formation of wealth and thereby creating relative impoverishment.

This brings me to my second subject: the sociology of taxation. If taxation is an instrument for the destruction of wealth-formation, then the question immediately becomes pressing of how it can be explained that there is taxation; that there is ever more of it; that we have experienced, in particular during the last hundred years, a steady increase not just in the absolute but also in the relative level of taxation; and that the institutions which lead the way in this process, the tax-states of the Western World, have simultaneously assumed ever more powerful

要解答这些问题就得离开经济理论领域。经济学回答这样的问题：“征税的后果是什么？”其结论推导要凭借理解行动以及课税这个特定行动类型的含义。税收何以存在，则是心理学、历史或社会学的主题。经济学，或确切说是人的行动学，认识到一切行动都由观念决定，无论这些观念或对或错，好坏与否。但它不试图解释这些观念是什么，人们怎样开始具有或改变这些观念。确切说，经济学将观念视为给定，它试图解释的，是建立在这些观念之上的行动所导致的逻辑后果，而不考虑这些观念是什么。历史和社会学则探究这些观念为何，人们怎样开始具有这些观念，并且为什么他们以这种方式行事^{【16】}。

对于“税收何以不断增长”这个问题，高度抽象的答案是：其根源在于公众舆论当中正义观念缓慢而惊人的变化。

容我解释：一个人要么可以通过拓殖、生产及契约取得财产，要么通过掠夺及剥削拓殖者、生产者及契约者取得财产，除此外别无他法^{【17】}。

positions in the arena of international politics and increasingly dominate the rest of the world.

With these questions one leaves the realm of economic theory. Economics answers the question “What is the consequence if taxation is introduced?” It deduces its answer from an understanding of the meaning of action and the meaning of taxation as a particular type of action. Why there is taxation is the subject matter of psychology, history, or sociology. Economics, or rather praxeology, recognizes that all actions are determined by ideas, correct or incorrect, good or bad. But it does not attempt to explain what these ideas are and how people come to hold or change them. Rather, it assumes them to be given and aims at explaining the logical consequences that flow from acting upon them, whatever they are. History and sociology ask what these ideas are, how people come to entertain them, and why they act the way they do.¹⁶

On a highly abstract level the answer to the question why there is steadily increasing taxation is this: The root cause for this is a slow but dramatic change in the idea of justice that has taken place in public opinion.

Let me explain. One can acquire property either through homesteading, production, and contracting, or else through the expropriation and exploitation of homesteaders, producers, or

两者之于人类都是自然方式。与生产及契约相伴的，总是非生产及非契约取得财产的过程。正如生产业可以发展为公司及企业，掠夺及剥削业也可日益壮大成政权及政府^{【18】}。诸如此类的税收乃至不断增税动机的存在，都不足为奇。非生产性或非契约性占有的观念，几乎与生产性占有的观念一样久远，每个人——剥削者无疑与生产者一样——喜欢高而非低的收入。

【16】区分经济学与历史或社会学，当然不等于说，经济学对后面这些学科毫不重要。实际上，经济学对所有其他社会科学都不可或缺。而反过来就并非如此，没有历史或社会学知识，一样可以发展和推动经济学。唯一后果是这样的经济学也许是乏味的；因为它要表述的是社会当中无法发生的，或需要实际满足特定条件才会发生的，从而欠缺对实例应用的考虑（就好比假设说有人要以税收经济学为题写作，尽管贯穿历史缺少关于税收的实例）。因此，任何历史或社会学解释，都受经济理

contractors. There are no other ways.¹⁷ Both methods are natural to mankind. Alongside production and contracting there has always been a process of nonproductive and noncontractual property acquisitions. Just as productive enterprises can develop into firms and corporations, so can the business of expropriating and exploiting occur on a larger scale and develop into governments and states.¹⁸ That taxation as such exists and that there is the drive toward increased taxation should hardly come as a surprise. For the idea of nonproductive or noncontractual appropriations is almost as old as the idea of productive ones, and everyone—the exploiter certainly no less than the producer—prefers a higher income to a lower one.

16 To make this distinction between economics and history or sociology is not to say, of course, that economics is of no importance for these latter disciplines. In fact, economics is indispensable for all other social sciences. While the reverse is not the case, economics can be developed and advanced without historical or sociological knowledge. The only consequence of doing so is that such economics would probably not be very interesting, as it would be written without consideration of real examples or instances of application (as if one were to write on the economics of taxation even though there had never been

论奉行原理的逻辑束缚,且任何史家或社会学家有违这些原理的解释,必定被视为彻底混淆。对经济理论和历史之间关系的论述,可参阅米塞斯《理论和历史》(阿拉巴马州奥本:米塞斯学院,1985年);霍普《人的行动学和经济科学》(阿拉巴马州奥本:米塞斯学院,1988年)。

【17】参阅弗兰茨·奥本海默《论国家》(纽约:前卫出版社,1914年),详见第24-27页;罗斯巴德《权力和市场》第3章;霍普《社会主义和资本主义的理论》第2章。

【18】关于政府理论的发展——除了注释17引用的文献——详见赫伯特·斯宾塞《社会静力学》(纽约:沙尔肯巴赫基金,1970年);奥伯伦·赫伯特《政府强制的是与非》(印第安纳波利斯:自由基金,1978年);阿尔伯特·J·诺克《我们的敌人:政府》(佛罗里达州坦帕:豪伯格出版社,1983年);罗斯巴德《为了新自由》(纽约:麦克米伦,1978年)、《自由的伦理》(纽约大西洋高地:人文出版社,1982年);霍普《财产,无政府和国家》(奥普拉登:西德出版社,

an actual example of it in all of history), for it would formulate what could not possibly happen in the social world, or what would have to happen provided that certain conditions were in fact fulfilled. Thus, any historical or sociological explanation is logically constrained by the laws as espoused by economic theory, and any account by a historian or sociologist in violation of these laws must be treated as ultimately confused. On the relationship between economic theory and history see also Ludwig von Mises, *Theory and History* (Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1985); Hans-Hermann Hoppe, *Praxeology and Economic Science* (Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1988).

17 See on this also Franz Oppenheimer, *The State* (New York: Vanguard Press, 1914) esp. pp. 24–27; Rothbard, *Power and Market*, chap. 2; Hoppe, *A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism*, chap. 2.

18 On the theory of the state as developed in the following see—in addition to the works cited in note 17—in particular Herbert Spencer, *Social Statics* (New York: Schalkenbach Foundation, 1970); Auberon Herbert, *The Right and Wrong of Compulsion by the State* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1978); Albert J. Nock, *Our Enemy, the State* (Tampa, Fla.: Hallberg Publishing, 1983); Murray N. Rothbard, *For a New Liberty* (New York: Macmillan, 1978); idem, *The Ethics of Liberty* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1982); Hans-Hermann Hoppe,

1986年)；安东尼·德·雅赛《论政府》(牛津：布莱克威尔，1985年)。

关键在于：是什么控制及限制了掠夺业的规模及发展？

在对掠夺生产者及契约者的行业中，对于组织规模的限制，显然不同于对从事生产性交换的组织规模的限制。与公共选择学派的主张不同，政府和私人企业从事的业务根本不同。它们的运营方式有天壤之别^{【19】}。

【19】关于公共选择学派的核心观念，最有代表性的表达如下：

“经济关系与政治关系均代表两个或更多个人的合作。市场和政府皆为手段，经由这些手段，合作得到实施并成为可能。人们凭借交换财货和服务，在有组织市场进行合作，且这样的合作意味着互惠。个人进入一种交换关系，在这种关系中，他通过提供直接有益于另一方的产品或服务而增进自己的利益。从本质上说，按照个人主义的政府观，政治和集体行动与此几乎相同。

Eigentum, Anarchie und Staat (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1987); Anthony de Jasay, *The State* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985).

The decisive question is this: what controls and constrains the size and growth of such a business?

It should be clear that the constraints on the size of firms in the business of expropriating producers and contractors are of a categorically different nature than those limiting the size of firms engaged in productive exchanges. Contrary to the claim of the public choice school, government and private firms do not do essentially the same sort of business. They are engaged in categorically different types of operations.¹⁹

¹⁹This central idea of the public choice school has been expressed by its foremost representatives as follows:

Both the economic relation and the political relation represent cooperation on the part of two or more individuals. The market and the state are both devices through which co-operation is organized and made possible. Men co-operate through exchange of goods and services in organized markets, and such co-operation implies mutual gain. The individual enters into an exchange relationship in which he furthers his own interest by providing some product or service that is of direct benefit

两个或更多个人会发现，通力合作完成某些共同目标，对彼此都有好处。确确实实，他们在向共同利益体‘交换’及贡献资源。”

参阅詹姆斯·M. 布坎南与戈登·塔洛克《一致同意的计算》（安阿伯：密歇根大学出版社，1962年）第192页。

无疑，对这类“新政治观念”最令人震惊之事，是居然有人把它当真。约瑟夫·A. 熊彼特评论这类观点：

“将税收比作俱乐部会费或购买医疗服务，仅仅证明了社会科学的这一部分，离科学的思维习惯有多远。”参阅《资本主义、社会主义和民主》（纽约：哈珀，1942年）第198页。

门肯对类似于布坎南和塔洛克的论调这样说：

“政府其为物乃外在于人及他的全体同胞——它是贰心异志及杯葛敌意之权力，唯有部分受人控制，却能予人巨大摧残……抢劫政府处处被视为比抢劫个人

to the individual on the other side of the transaction. At base, political or collective action under the individualistic view of the state is much the same. Two or more individuals find it mutually advantageous to join forces to accomplish certain common purposes. In a very real sense, they “exchange” and devote resources to the construction of the common good. (James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent* [Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press], p. 192)

Surely, the most amazing thing about such a “new theory of politics” is that anyone takes it seriously. Remarks Joseph A. Schumpeter on such views:

The theory which construes taxes on the analogy of club dues or the purchase of the service of, say, a doctor only proves how far removed this part of the social sciences is from scientific habits of mind. (*Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* [New York: Harper, 1942], p.198)

And H.L. Mencken has this to say regarding a thesis such as Buchanan’s and Tullock’s:

that government is something lying outside him and outside the generality of his fellow men—that it is a separate, independent and often hostile power, only partly under his control, and capable of doing him great harm. . . . Is it a fact of no significance that robbing the government

乃至社团罪过更轻，难道毫无道理？……当私人遭抢时，一位可敬者惜被夺去勤勉节俭之果实；当政府遭抢时，最坏无非是某些恶徒闲汉，不能像从前一样有钱翻云覆雨。他们赚到这钱的想法不值一哂；在明察秋毫者看来荒谬可笑。他们只是流氓无赖，凭着法律失灵而有些许可疑权利，可劫掠同胞血汗来分赃。当赃款为私人企业所减损，总比未曾减损更值得赞赏。”参阅《门肯选集》（纽约：古典书局，1949年）第146-147页。

生产业规模所受限制，一方面来自于消费者需求（对可获得总收入的限定），另一方面来自于其他生产者的竞争，从而不断逼迫每家想要维持生意的企业，在最低可能成本上运营。生产性企业要形成规模，就必须以最有效方式满足顾客最迫切的需求。唯有自愿性消费者的购买才能支撑起它的规模。

对其他类型的组织、政权或政府，情况则截然不同。首先，认为它的形成发展与经济性企业具有同等意义，是违悖常理的。不管如何延伸想

is everywhere regarded as a crime of less magnitude than robbing an individual, or even a corporation? . . . When a private citizen is robbed a worthy man is deprived of the fruits of his industry and thrift; when the government is robbed the worst that happens is that certain rogues and loafers have less money to play with than they had before. The notion that they have earned that money is never entertained; to most sensible men it would seem ludicrous. They are simply rascals who, by accidents of law, have a somewhat dubious right to a share in the earnings of their fellow men. When that share is diminished by private enterprise the business is, on the whole, far more laudable than not. (*A Mencken Chrestomathy* [New York: Vintage Books, 1949] pp. 146-47)

The size of a productive enterprise is constrained on the one hand by consumer demand (which imposes a definite limit on the total revenue attainable), and on the other hand by the competition of other producers, which continuously forces each firm to operate with the lowest possible costs if it wishes to stay in business. For such an enterprise to grow in size the most urgent consumer wants must be served in the most efficient ways. Nothing but voluntary consumer purchases support its size.

The constraints on the other type of firm, of government or the state, are altogether different. For one thing, it is absurd to say that its size is determined by demand in the same sense as the size of a private firm is

象力，一个人都不能说，将部分资产上缴政府的拓殖者、生产者和契约者需要这种服务。相反，他们接受这项服务必然是被迫的，这是该服务实际上根本不被需要的关键证据。因此，不可将需求视作对政府规模的限制。纵然公开**违背**需求，政府也伺机扩张。

政府也不像生产业一样受竞争限制。与企业不同，政府不必以最低成本，反而可在更高成本上运营，因为政府可凭课税或者管制，将增加的成本转嫁给竞争者。因此，也不能认为政府规模受到成本竞争的限制。纵然不顾**没有**成本效益的事实，政府也伺机膨胀。

然而，这不等于说，政府的规模完全不受限制，且各国政府规模的历史变化纯粹是随机性的。这仅仅是说，对于这个组织——“政府”的限制必定是截然不同的。

剥削性组织的发展不受成本及需求条件的限制，而受公众舆论的限制^[20]：决非得到自愿

determined by demand. One cannot say, by any stretch of the imagination, that the homesteaders, the producers, and the contractors who must surrender part of their assets to a government have demanded such a service. Instead, they must be coerced into accepting it, and this is conclusive proof of the fact that the service is not actually in demand at all. Hence, demand cannot be considered as a limit on the size of government. Insofar as it grows, the state grows by acting in open *contradiction* to demand.

The state is also not in the same way constrained by competition as is a productive firm. Unlike such a firm, the state must not keep its cost of operation at a minimum but can operate at above-minimum costs because it is able to shift its higher costs onto competitors by taxing or regulating their behavior. Thus, the size of the state also cannot be considered as constrained by cost competition. Insofar as it grows, it does so in spite of the fact that it is *not* cost-efficient.

This, however, is not to say that the size of government is not constrained at all and that the historical fluctuations in the size of states are mere random walks. It only states that the constraints on the firm“government” must be fundamentally different.

Instead of being constrained by cost and demand conditions, the growth of an exploitative firm is constrained by public opinion:20 It is

性支持，从本质上说运用了强制。在同一枚硬币的另一面，强制意味着制造牺牲者；牺牲者不是剥削性组织规模的支持者，而是其主动或被动的抵制者。可以想象，在一个人或一群人剥削一个人或两至三个人，或规模大致相当的另一群体的情况下，这种抵制可被武力持续镇压。然而不可想象，在少数人掠夺和剥削百倍、千倍乃至万倍规模人口的类似实际情况下，光凭武力本身可以解释对抵抗的镇压^{【21】}。以上情况要能发生，这样的组织除了本身的强制性武力外，还必须得到公众的支持。大部分人必须承认它的运作是合法的。这种承认可从主动热情直至消极顺从，但这必然意味着，大多数人面对非生产性及非契约性取得财产的任何企图，必定放弃了积极或消极抵抗。不是表现出对这些行动的义愤填膺，或对参与者的鄙夷蔑视和不予协助（更不必说积极破坏），大多数人必定积极或消极支持政府。唯有如此，才能解释少数人可以统治多数人。支持政府的公众舆论，必然抵消受害财产主的抵抗，以致于积极抵抗徒劳无功。

not voluntarily supported, but by its very nature employs coercion. On the other side of the same coin, coercion implies creating victims, and victims are not supporters but active or passive resisters of a firm's size. It is conceivable that this resistance can be lastingly broken by force in the case of one man, or one group of men, exploiting one or maybe two or three others, or another group of roughly the same size. It is inconceivable, however, to imagine that force alone can account for the breaking down of resistance in the actually familiar case of small minorities operating their business of expropriating and exploiting populations tens, hundreds, or thousands of times their size.²¹ For this to happen, such a firm must have public support in addition to its coercive force. A majority of the population must accept its operations as legitimate. This acceptance can range from active enthusiasm to passive resignation. But there must be acceptance in the sense that a majority must have given up the idea of actively or passively resisting any attempt to enforce nonproductive and noncontractual property acquisitions. Instead of displaying outrage over such actions, of showing contempt for everyone who engages in them, and of doing nothing to help make them successful (not to mention actively trying to obstruct them), a majority must actively or passively support them. Only in light of this can it be explained how the few can govern the many. State-supportive public

公众舆论的状态也会在另一方面限制政府规模。从事大规模财产掠夺业的每个组织，必定理所当然地要在特定领域中成为垄断者，因为须有可抢之物，一个人才能在这一行中发家。然而，假如允许掠夺业中存在竞争，显然就会争抢殆尽。因此，一家政府为了维持运营，必定要成为垄断者。

即便没有国内竞争，不同地区的政府竞争仍然存在，正是这种竞争对政府规模施加了严格的限制。一方面，这开辟了人们针对政权用脚投票，弃国离境的可能性，假如他们觉察到别处提供了剥削相对较少的生活条件。各政府理所当然视之为关键问题，因为它们实际靠人口生存，因此任何人口损失也是潜在政府收入的损失^{【22】}。公众舆论状态对维持剥削统治再次显现重要性。唯有当政府在公众中成功制造出这种印象，即本国国内优于其他地方，或至少过得去，它才能够巩固及扩张自己的势力。

opinion must counterbalance the resistance of victimized property owners to the extent that active resistance appears futile.

The state of public opinion also imposes a constraint on the size of the state in another respect. Every firm in the large-scale business of property expropriation must naturally aim to be a monopolist in a definite territory, for one can only prosper in such a business so long as there is something that can be expropriated. However, if competition were allowed in the business of expropriating, there would obviously be nothing left to take. Hence, in order to stay in business, one must be a monopolist.

Even if there is no internal competition, competition between governments operating in *different* territories still exists, and it is this competition that imposes severe limits on the size of government. On the one hand, it opens up the possibility that people may vote with their feet against a government and leave its territory if they perceive other territories as offering less exploitative living conditions. Naturally, each state must see this as a crucial problem, for it literally lives off a population, and any population loss is thus a loss of potential state-income.²² Again, the state of public opinion is of utmost importance for maintaining exploitative rule. Only if the state succeeds in generating the impression in the general public that that state's own

【20】这点可参阅罗斯巴德《解剖国家》，以及《反自然的平等主义论文集》（华盛顿特区：自由至上评论出版社，1974年），详见37-42页。

【21】也许有人认为政府取得此等成绩，依靠的是武器改良：打个比方，用原子弹替代火器步枪相要胁。然而，由于实际必须假定，这些武器改良的技术诀窍难以保密，尤其当它被实际运用时。那么政府为了灌输恐惧而改良武器，同样也会带来受害者抵抗手段在方法上的升级。因此，在解答这些不可回避的疑问时，必须排除这些改良。

【22】目睹太多政府竟至于冷酷无情地向每个只是试图离开本国迁往他处，而未犯下任何罪行的人开火！

公众舆论也在国家互相侵犯时起关键作用。尽管并无逻辑必然，政府身为剥削业的本质，使之高度可能（不仅因为刚处理的人口迁徙问题）

territory compares favorably, or at least tolerably well with others will it be able to secure and expand its position.

20See on this also Murray N. Rothbard, “The Anatomy of the State” in idem, *Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature and Other Essays* (Washington, D.C.:Libertarian Review Press, 1974), esp. pp. 37–42.

21It might be thought that the government could accomplish such a feat by merely improving its weaponry: by threatening with atomic bombs instead of with guns and rifles, so to speak. However, since realistically one must assume that the technological know-how of such improved weaponry can hardly be kept secret, especially if it is in fact applied, then with the state’s improved instruments for instilling fear the victims’ ways amid means of resisting improve as well. Hence, such advances must be ruled out as an explanation of what must be explained.

22Witness the all-too-numerous states that go so far as to shoot everyone down without mercy who has committed no other sin than that of trying to leave a territory and move elsewhere!

Public opinion also plays a decisive role in the case of interstate aggression. While not a logical necessity, the nature of a state as an exploitative enterprise still makes it highly likely (not the least because

发动针对“外国”领土的侵犯，或者它必须保护自己免受其他政府的侵犯^{【23】}。并且，为从这样的国家间战争或好战行动中脱颖而出，一家政府必须支配足够（相对而言）的经济资源，这些资源本身让这些行动得以维持。然而，这些资源只能被生产性人口提供，因此，要确保赢得战争的必要资料，以及避免战时面临生产不足，公众舆论再次被证明是控制政府规模的关键变量。国家战争唯有具备公众支持，才可能维持和取胜。

最后，公众舆论还以第三种方式限制了政府规模。当政府维持它相对于受剥削人口的地位，靠的是强制及对公众舆论的成功操控；要维持其本身内部秩序，以规范政府不同分支及其雇员的关系，除了公众舆论外别无依靠。因为政府之外没有人可以把内部规则强加给它。确切说，要成功推行这些规则，唯有依靠不同政府分支雇员自身当中有利的公众舆论^{【24】}。也就是说，总统无法强迫将军参战——实际上，优势的物质力量更

of the just addressed problem of population movements)that it will become engaged in aggression against a “foreign” territory, or that it must defend itself against such aggression from other states.²³ Moreover, in order to emerge successfully from such interstate wars or warlike actions, a state must be in command of sufficient(in relative terms) economic resources that alone make its actions sustainable. However, these resources can only be provided by a productive population. Thus, to secure the means necessary to win wars and avoid being confronted with slackening productive outputs while at war, public opinion again turns out to be the decisive variable controlling the size of government. Only if popular support for the state’s war exists can it be sustained and possibly won.

Finally, the state of public opinion limits the size of government in yet a third way. **While the state maintains its position vis-à-vis the exploited population through coercion and the successful management of public opinion, to maintain its own internal order, which regulates the relationships between the various branches of government and its employees, there is nothing else at its disposal but public opinion, for clearly, no one outside the state exists who could enforce its internal rules upon it.** Rather, the enforcement must be accomplished exclusively by means of supportive public opinion among state employees

可能处在将军一方；接着将军无法强迫他的士兵去战斗和杀戮——实际上，他们可以随时消灭将军。正因为有利的国内公众舆论，也唯有压倒性多数的政府雇员，至少消极赞同他们的行动为合法，总统和将军才可能成功。假若在政府不同分支内部，只要受到大多数人的彻底反对，总统政策就无法付诸实现。假若将军意识到他的主力部队视战争为非法，或国会、国税局以及大多数公共教育者及所谓社会福利部门，都憎恶这些行动并公然反对，即令他本人支持总统命令，都将面临一个不可完成的任务^{【25】}。

【23】关于国家与战争的密切关系，可参阅埃克哈德·克里彭多夫的重要研论《国家和战争》（法兰克福：苏尔坎普，1985年）；另可参阅查尔斯·提利《有组织犯罪：战事与国事》，彼得·埃文斯等编《找回国家》（剑桥大学：剑桥大学出版社，1985年）。

themselves in the various branches of government.²⁴ That is, the president cannot coerce the general to go to war—in fact, the greater physical strength would probably be on the general’s side; and the general in turn cannot coerce his soldiers to do the fighting and killing—in fact, they could smash him anytime. President and general can only succeed because of favorable intrastate public opinion, and only insofar as the overwhelming majority of the state employees at least passively supports their actions as legitimate. If, in the various branches of government, a large majority of them were strictly opposed to the enforcement of presidential policy, it could not be put into action successfully. The general who thinks most of his troops consider the war illegitimate or who thinks that the Congress, the IRS, the large majority of public educators and the so-called social services regard such actions as outrageous and to be openly opposed, would face an impossible task even if he himself supported the presidential command.²⁵

23On the intimate relationship between state and war see the important study by Ekkehart Krippendorff, *Staat und Krieg* (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp,1985); also Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime”in Peter Evans et al., eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1985).

24This insight (which refutes all talk about the impossibility of

【24】这个洞察（它驳斥了一切无政府主义不可能的泛泛之论，证明了政府内部关系实际上是政治无政府状态）在这篇极其重要的文章中得到解释，阿尔弗雷德·G·古赞“我们是否真正走出无政府”《自由至上学报》3, no. 2（1979年）。

“无论尘世政府在哪里建立或存在，无政府对所有社会成员，通常指臣民或公民而言，都是正式禁止的。他们不再根据自身情况与其他人联系……确切说，所有社会成员必须接受外在的‘第三方’——政府——介入他们的关系，拥有强制性权力的第三方实施裁决及惩罚反对者——然而，在行使政府权力的那些人自身当中，这种对于社会的‘第三方’安排是不存在的。换言之，没有‘第三方’在组成第三方本身的个人当中实施裁决。统治者相互之间仍旧处于一种无政府状态。他们在自己当中解决纠纷，而不考虑某一家政府（外在于他们的实体）。无政府仍然存在。倘若缺少政府，就是市场或自然无政府状态，那么目前就是政治无政府状态，权力内部的无政府状态。”（古赞，第152-153页）

【25】这一观念的古典阐述者之一是大卫·休谟。他在《政府第一原理》一文中写道：

anarchism in showing that intra-governmental relations are, in fact, a case of—political—anarchy) has been explained in a highly important article by Alfred G. Cuzán, “Do We Ever Really Get Out of Anarchy,” *Journal of Libertarian Studies* 3, no.2 (1979). Wherever earthly governments are established or exist, anarchy is officially prohibited for all members of society, usually referred to as subjects or citizens. They can no longer relate to each other on their own terms. . . . Rather, all members of society must accept an external “third party”—a government—into their relationships, a third party with the coercive powers to enforce its judgments and punish detractors. . . . However, such a “third party” arrangement for society is non-existent among those who exercise the power of government themselves. In other words, there is no “third party” to make and enforce judgments among the individual members who make up the third party itself. The rulers still remain in a state of anarchy *vis-à-vis* each other. They settle disputes *among themselves*, without regard for a Government (an entity outside themselves). Anarchy still exists. Only whereas without government it was market or natural anarchy, it is now a *political* anarchy, an anarchy inside power. (Cuzán, pp.152-53)

25 One of the classic expositors of this idea is David Hume. In his essay, “Of The First Principles of Government,” he writes:

“对于那些以哲学家眼光考察人类事务的人来说，没有什么比下列事实更令人惊讶：多数人居然轻易为少数人所统治，而且人们竟能压抑自己的情绪和喜好，顺从统治者的情绪和喜好。我们如果探究这种奇迹是如何发生，就会发现：由于力量总在被统治者一边，统治者除了公众舆论的支持别无依靠。因此，政府完全建立在公众舆论基础上。这一箴言既适用于最自由、最民主的政府，也适用于最专制和最军事化的政府。埃及苏丹或罗马皇帝就像野兽，驱使他无害的臣属克制自己的情绪和喜好。但他要领导他的马木留克或者皇家禁卫军，也至少得像普通人一样依靠舆论。”参阅《道德、政治和文学散文集》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，1971年）第19页。）

由此认定，公众舆论而非需求、成本条件，才是政府规模的束缚力量；这就回到我的最初解释，即税收与日俱增之现象，“纯粹”源于流行观念的转变。

假如剥削性组织的规模，最终受公众舆论的限制，那么从纯意识形态角度解释它的扩张就合

Nothing appears more surprising to those, who consider human affairs with a philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the many are governed by the few; and the implicit submission, with which men resign their own sentiments and passions to those of their rulers. When we enquire by what means this wonder is effected, we shall find, that as FORCE is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments, as well as to the most free and most popular. The soldan of EGYPT, or the emperor of ROME, might drive his harmless subjects, like brute beasts, against their sentiments and inclination: but he must, at least, have led his *mamalukes*, or *praetorian bands*, like men, by their opinion. (*Essays, Moral, Political and Literary* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971], p.19)

With public opinion rather than demand and cost conditions thus identified as the constraining force on the size of government, I return to my original explanation of the phenomenon of ever-increasing taxation as “simply” a change in prevailing ideas.

If it is public opinion that ultimately limits the size of an exploitative firm, then an explanation of its growth in purely ideological

情合理。实际上任何其他解释，不从意识形态转变而从“客观”条件改变出发，都必然是错的。政府规模的扩张，与任何脱离观念控制的客观因素无关，肯定也与对政府的需求无关，真正原因是公众舆论流行是非观念的变化。一度被公众舆论认定并针锋相对的暴行，开始逐渐被接受为合法。

一般公众的正义概念发生了怎样的变化【26】？

罗马帝国衰亡后，西欧逐步瓦解为封建小国治下高度无政府体系的疆域。在弱化一国内部权力及有利人口迁徙之国际无政府状态的促进下【27】，在日益成为天主教会知识精英强大理论之自然法及自然权利观念的滋养下，唯有私有制与人作为理性存在本质相契合的无误直觉作用彰显【28】。在那些政府权力被减至前所未有程度的地方，各小型城镇中心发展起来：北意大利，最著名的当属威尼斯；汉莎联盟，例如吕贝克和汉堡；佛兰德斯和低地国家，尤其是安特卫普和阿姆斯特丹。在这些地方，奴役束缚、严格划分阶

terms is justified. Indeed, any other explanation, not in terms of ideological changes but of changes in “objective” conditions must be considered wrong. The size of government does not increase because of any objective causes over which ideas have no control and certainly not because there is a demand for it. It grows because the ideas that prevail in public opinion of what is just and what is wrong have changed. What once was regarded by public opinion as an outrage, to be treated and dealt with as such, has become increasingly accepted as legitimate.

What has happened regarding the general public’s conception of justice?26

In the aftermath of the fall of the Roman empire, Western Europe gradually fell into a highly anarchic system of territories ruled by small-scale feudal governments. **Facilitated by this international anarchy, which tended to reduce each individual government’s internal power and ease population movements,27 and nourished by the ideology of natural law and natural rights, which emerged as an increasingly powerful theory within the intellectual elite of the catholic Church, man’s unmistakable instinct that only private property is compatible with one’s nature as a rational being took effect.28** Small centers developed where governmental power had been whittled away to a degree heretofore unknown: the cities of northern Italy, most notably Venice, those of the

层的等级制度等封建观念，被拥护自由、平等、财产权及契约关系的公众舆论所取代。自由之富于生产力是自证的；各种类似观念及无与伦比的繁荣，刺激和吸引了新人口的不断涌入，使得这种公众舆论愈发势不可挡^{【29】}。

【26】参阅下列尤其是罗斯巴德《左与右：自由的前景》、《反自然平等主义等论文集》。

【27】国际无政府状态对于封建制度衰落及资本主义兴起的重要性，在让·贝希勒的著作《资本主义的起源》中得到公正的强调（纽约：圣马西出版社，1976年），详见第7章。他写道：“市场在范围和强度上的不断扩大，根源是缺少覆盖整个西欧的政治秩序。”（第73页）“资本主义扩张的源头及理由是政治无政府状态……集体主义和政府管治唯有在学校的书本中有效。”（第77页）

“一切权力都趋于绝对。假如它不够绝对，正是因

Hanseatic League, such as Lübeck and Hamburg, and those of Flanders and the Low Countries, in particular Antwerp and Amsterdam. There, the feudal ideas of bondage, of servitude, and of a hierarchically stratified society of rigidly separated classes was supplanted by public opinion that instead supported freedom, equality, property rights, and contractual relations. This public opinion steadily gained momentum with a continuous influx of new population, inspired by similar ideas and attracted by the unrivaled prosperity that freedom was proving itself capable of producing.²⁹

26 See on the following in particular also Murray N. Rothbard, “Left and Right: The Prospects for Liberty” in idem, *Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature and Other Essays*.

27 The importance of international anarchy for the erosion of feudalism and the rise of capitalism has been justly emphasized by Jean Baechler, *The Origins of Capitalism* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1976), esp. chap. 7. He writes: “The constant expansion of the market, both in extensiveness and in intensity, was the result of an absence of a political order extending over the whole of Western Europe” (p. 73). “The expansion of capitalism owes its origin and *raison d’être* to political anarchy. . . . Collectivism and state management have only succeeded in school textbooks” (p. 77).

为某种限制在发挥作用……那些身居权力中心者，不断试图打破这些限制。他们不曾成功的原因，照我看来，与国际体系紧密相关：对外行使权力的限制，以及外部干扰的不断威胁（多极体系的两个特点），意味着权力还局限于内部，且必须依靠各自自治决策中心，所以唯有小心翼翼地使用它们。”（第78页）

【28】现代自然法传统的核心特点（以圣托马斯·阿奎那、路易斯·德·莫利纳、弗朗西斯科·苏亚雷斯以及16世纪后期西班牙经院学者，新教徒胡果·格老秀斯为代表）是它的彻底理性主义：人之行动的普遍有效、绝对及不变原理的观念——探求于、建基于并最终独立于任何神学信仰——被单独推理出来。“人，”弗雷德里克·柯普斯登在《阿奎那》（伦敦：企鹅出版社，1955年，第213-214页）一书中写道：

“可以说，无法读出神的心意……（但）人可以识别基本倾向及其本性需要，通过思索它们，他可以得出自然道德原理的知识……每个人都拥有……他能够凭以思考的理性之光……向自我揭示自然法。自然法是正

All power tends toward the absolute. If it is not absolute, this is because some kind of limitations have come into play . . . those in the positions of power at the center ceaselessly tried to erode these limitations. They never succeeded, and for the reason that also seems to me to be tied to the international system: a limitation of power to act externally and the constant threat of foreign assault (the two characteristics of a multi-polar system) imply that power is also limited internally and must rely on autonomous centers of decision-making and so may use them only sparingly. (p. 78)

28The central characteristic of the modern natural law tradition (as represented by St. Thomas Aquinas, Luis de Molina, Francisco Suarez, and the late sixteenth century Spanish Scholastics, and the Protestant Hugo Grotius) was its thorough rationalism: its idea of universally valid, absolute, and immutable principles of human conduct that are—ultimately independent of any theological beliefs—to be discovered by and founded in and reason alone. “Man,” writes Frederick C. Copleston, [*Aquinas* (London: Penguin Books, 1955), pp. 213–14]

cannot read, as it were, the mind of God . . . (but) he can discern the fundamental tendencies and needs of his nature, and by reflecting on them he can come to a knowledge of the natural moral law. . . . Every man possesses . . . the light of reason whereby he can reflect . . . And

确理性所告知的趋善避恶之全体普遍律令。”

关于自然权利学说的起源及发展,和它的关于正义及财产的观念(包括前述主人公得出的国家主义过失及粗疏),参阅理查德·塔克《自然权利理论》(剑桥:剑桥大学出版社,1979年);关于自然法观念的革命特点,参阅阿克顿勋爵《自由和权力论文集》(格伦科,伊利诺伊州:自由出版社,1948年);当代杰出自然权利哲学家,参阅亨利·维奇《人的权利》(巴吞鲁日:路易斯安那州立大学出版社,1985年)。

【29】关于城市的崛起参阅 C. M. 契波拉《工业革命前:欧洲社会和经济 1000-1700 年》(纽约:诺顿,1980年),第4章“1000年左右的欧洲”,契波拉写道

“由若干乡村微观经济——庄园……可怜和原始地组成……社会笼罩着对外部世界的逃避、猜疑及恐惧……艺术、教育、贸易、生产和劳动分工降至最低谷。货币的使用几乎彻底消失。人口稀少,生产低下,一贫如洗……流行观念写照出一个野蛮和迷信的社会——战争和祈祷是唯一受尊重的活动……那些劳动者被视

promulgate to himself the natural law, which is the totality of the universal precepts of dictates of right reason concerning the good which is to be pursued and the evil which is to be shunned.

On the origin and development of the natural rights doctrine and its idea of justice and property (including all the statist failings and slips of its aforementioned heroes) see Richard Tuck, *Natural Rights Theories* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); on the revolutionary character of the idea of natural law see Lord (John) Acton, *Essays on Freedom and Power* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1948); as an eminent contemporary natural rights philosopher see Henry Veatch, *Human Rights* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985).

29On the rise of the cities see C.M. Cipolla, *Before the Industrial Revolution: European Society and Economy 1000-1700* (New York: Norton, 1980), chap. 4. Europe around 1000, writes Cipolla,

was poor and primitive . . . made up of numberless rural microcosms—the manors. . . . Society was dominated by a spirit of resignation, suspicion, and fear toward the outside world. . . . The arts, education, trade, production, and the division of labor were reduced to a minimal level. The use of money almost completely disappeared. The population was small, production meager, and poverty extreme. . . . The prevailing ideas reflected a brutal and superstitious society—fighting and

为卑微的奴仆……在这个备受压抑及令人沮丧的世界里，城市在 10 至 11 世纪的兴起，代表着改变历史进程的新生因素。”（第 144 页）

“城市发展实质上是一场巨大的迁徙运动。”（第 145 页）

“11-13 世纪的城镇之于欧洲人，就如同 19 世纪的美国之于欧洲。城镇是‘前沿’，一个充满活力的新鲜世界，那里的人们感觉自己可以割断与痛苦过去的联系，他们渴求获得经济和社会成功的机遇，那里僵化的传统体制和歧视不复存在，在那里首创、勇敢和勤勉精神将获得丰厚回报。”（第 146 页）

“在封建世界中，通常盛行一种垂直安排，其中人际关系可用这样的概念描述：封地及服役，授勋和效忠；领主、陪臣和农奴。在城市当中，出现一种水平安排，以平等合作为特征。”（第 148 页）

另可参阅亨利·皮雷纳《中世纪城市》（新泽西州普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1952 年）第 5 章；迈克尔·泰格和马德琳《征收、法律和资本主义的兴起》（纽

praying were the only respectable activities. . . . Those who labored were regarded as despicable serfs. . . . In this depressed and depressing world, the rise of cities between the tenth and thirteenth centuries represented a new element which changed the course of history. (p. 144)

At the root of urban growth was a massive migratory movement. (p.145)

The town was to the people of Europe from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries what America was to Europeans in the nineteenth century. The town was the “frontier,” a new and dynamic world where people felt they could break their ties with an unpleasant past, where people hoped they could find opportunities for economic and social success, where sclerotic traditional institutions and discriminations no longer counted, and where there would be ample reward for initiative, daring, and industriousness (p. 146). In the feudal world, a vertical arrangement typically prevailed, where relations between men were dictated by the concepts of fief and service; investiture and homage; lord, vassal, and serf. In the cities, a horizontal arrangement emerged, characterized by cooperation among equals. (p. 148)

See also Henri Pirenne, *Medieval Cities* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1952), chap. 5; Michael Tigar and Madeleine Levy, *Law and the Rise of Capitalism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977).

约：月评出版社，1977年）。

然而，人的理性、自由和私有财产的观念尚未充分普及，仅仅在少数几个分散地区生根发芽，这种发展自然被远近封建势力认为是自身稳定的威胁，它们可以重新集合力量，在封建内斗的漫长过程中，巩固疆域形成大国从而蓄集武力，凭以粉碎盛行于寥寥几个地区的自由观念竞争，并依靠不断增长的实力，将其剥削统治再次强加给这些地区。专制主义时代拉开帷幕，封建大国时代随之粉墨登场。成功集中各地区封建剥削体系的君主制，首次达到我们熟悉的现代民族国家的规模。随着专制主义的巩固，竞争性自由城邦被迫再次沦入经济衰退和停滞，在某些情况下，持续数世纪之久^{【30】}。

然而这种胜利并未摧毁自由和私有财产的观念。恰恰相反，这些观念获得更强有力的表达，并造就日益高涨的公众舆论。在不断进步的自然资源传统的影响下，另一种世俗化智识传统出现

However, the ideas of human rationality, freedom, and private property were not yet widespread enough. Rooted only in a few dispersed areas, the more or less distant feudal powers that naturally recognized such developments as a threat to their own stability could once again reassemble strength. **By consolidating their territories in a long process of inter feudal struggles and warfare into large-scale states and thereby concentrating and centralizing their forces, they were able to succeed in crushing the competition of the idea of freedom blossoming in just a few places and reimpose their exploitative rule over such areas with increased strength.** The age of absolutism had set in, and with it the age of a feudal super-power, the monarchy, which successfully centralized the system of feudal exploitation over territories that for the first time reached the size of familiar modern nation states. With absolutism taking hold, the competitive territories of free cities were again forced into economic decline and stagnation, which in some cases lasted for centuries.³⁰

Yet this victory did not defeat the ideas of freedom and private property. On the contrary, these ideas found ever more powerful expression and increasingly inspired public opinion. Influenced by the continuously advanced natural rights tradition, another secularized

并且虏获人心：这个传统后来以古典自由主义闻名于世。它更加坚定地围绕个人自由和财产的概念，并全力以赴给出智识理由^{【31】}。此外，受到自由及契约环境所致空前繁荣的鼓舞，经济观念取得突飞猛进的发展。当时正统国家主义学说，如重商主义、财政主义、行政主义，被愈来愈多的新政治经济学家在智识上予以摧毁。他们以彻底全面的态度，系统解释了私有财产乃至促进生产及财富形成的契约主义不可替代的作用，并相应支持激进的自由放任政策^{【32】}。

大约 18 世纪以后，公众舆论受这些观念的吸引，以致在西欧君主专制中革命条件达到成熟的程度。英国在 17 世纪已经历一系列革命，严重摧毁了专制政府权力。18 世纪则以美国和法国革命的风暴而告终。接着直到大约 19 世纪中叶的一系列剧变，逐渐将政府剥削在整个西欧削弱至历史最低水平。

intellectual tradition emerged and captivated minds: The tradition of what later became known as classical liberalism and was even more decisively centered around the notion of individual freedom and property and devoted to its intellectual justification.³¹ In addition, stimulated by the recent experiences of unrivaled prosperity achieved under conditions of freedom and contractualism, the development of economic thinking took great strides. The then orthodox statist doctrines of mercantilism, cameralism, and *Polizeiwissenschaft* became intellectually demolished by a swelling number of new political economists who systematically explained, with great thoroughness and comprehensiveness, the indispensable role of private property and contractualism for the process of production and wealth formation and who accordingly hailed a policy of radical laissez-faire.³²

From about 1700 onward, public opinion was captivated by these ideas to such an extent that revolutionary conditions emerged within the absolutist monarchies in Western Europe. England had already gone through a number of revolutions during the seventeenth century that severely shattered the powers of the absolutist state. The eighteenth century ended with the cataclysmic events of the American and French revolutions. Then until about the mid-nineteenth century a constant series of upheavals gradually stripped away governmental exploitation to an

征服了公众舆论以及促成了政府权力削减的观念，正是那些个人自由和私有制是正义的、不证自明的、自然的、不可侵犯的和神圣的观念，以及将任何这些权利的侵犯者，即令是政府机构亦无异于（或更甚于）个人侵犯者，统统当成人所不齿弃儿对待的观念。

【30】参阅卡洛琳·韦伯和阿伦·威尔达弗斯基《西方世界税收及支出史》（纽约：西蒙和舒斯特，1986年），第235-241页；皮雷纳《中世纪城市》第179-180页及第227页后。

【31】对这一传统的杰出捍卫，参阅约翰·洛克《政府二论》，彼得·拉士略主编（剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，1960年）。

“每个人对他自己的人身享有一种财产权，除他以外任何人都无这种权利。他的身体所事劳动，他的双手所做工作，我们可以说，都正当地属于他。所以只要他使得任何东西脱离自然提供及存留给它的状态，他就已经混合了自己的劳动，加入了自己的东西，从而使它成为自己的财产。既然是由他来使这件东西脱离自然安排的一

all-time low all over Western Europe.

The idea that had conquered public opinion and that had made this reduction of governmental power possible was that individual freedom and private property are just, self-evident, natural, inviolable and holy, and that any invader of such rights, a governmental agent no less (or even more so) than a private offender, should be regarded and treated as a contemptuous outcast.

30See on this Carolyn Webber and Aaron Wildavsky, *A History of Taxation and Expenditure in the Western World* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), pp.235-41; Pirenne, *Medieval Cities*, pp. 179-80, pp. 227f.

31As the outstanding champion of this tradition see John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).

[E]very man has a property in his own person. This nobody has any right to but himself. The labour of his body and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left in it, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state nature placed it in, it hath by his labour something annexed to it that excludes the

般状态，其劳动之所添加就排斥了其他人的共同权利。因为，既然劳动是劳动者无可争议的财产，那么对添附他劳动的东西，除他以外就没有人能够享有权利。”亦可参阅欧内斯特·K·布雷斯特德和K·J·麦惠仕主编的《西方自由至上主义》（伦敦：朗文，1978年）。

【32】关于这些经济理论的发展，参阅马杰瑞·格瑞斯一哈庆逊《萨拉曼卡学派：西班牙货币史读物》（牛津：克拉伦登出版社，1952年）；雷蒙德·德罗弗《商业、银行和经济观念》（芝加哥：芝大出版社，1974年）；罗斯巴德“奥地利学派历史背景新论”载于埃德温·多兰主编《现代奥地利学派经济学的基础》（堪萨斯城：熙德与沃尔德，1976年）；尤其是关于里查德·坎蒂隆和A. R. J. 图尔阁，参阅《自由至上学刊》7, no. 2（1985年）（这一期专题研究坎蒂隆的成果）和罗斯巴德《图尔阁的光辉贡献》（阿拉巴马州奥本：米塞斯学院，不定期论文丛，1986年）；参阅熊比特《经济分析史》（纽约：牛津大学出版社，1954年）。

随着朝向自由的每步成功，这个运动来的更加猛烈。此外，由这些意识形态转变所带来的，

common right of other men. For this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to. (p. 305) See also Ernest K. Bramsted and K.J. Melhuish, eds., *Western Liberalism* (London: Longman, 1978).

32 See on these developments of economic theory Marjorie Grice-Hutchinson, *The School of Salamanca: Readings in Spanish Monetary History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952); Raymond de Roover, *Business, Banking, and Economic Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974); Murray N. Rothbard, “New Light on the Prehistory of the Austrian School” in Edwin Dolan, ed., *The Foundations of Modern Austrian Economics* (Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, 1976); on the outstanding contributions in particular of Richard Cantillon and A.R.J. Turgot see *Journal of Libertarian Studies* 7, no. 2 (1985) (which is devoted to Cantillon’s work) and Murray N. Rothbard, *The Brilliance of Turgot* (Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute, Occasional Paper Series, 1986); see also Joseph A. Schumpeter, *A History of Economic Analysis* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954).

With each successful step towards liberation, the movement grew stronger. In addition, the so-called Industrial Revolution that had been

伴随空前经济增长率的所谓工业革命，首次保持人口的稳步增长，维持一般生活水平的持续提高，创造了一种近乎无限的乐观主义^{【33】}。无疑，当自由及私有财产、反政府警惕的意识形态最受欢迎时，即使在 19 世纪上半叶的西欧，仍然残留大量的封建及绝对专制，但是，朝着政府剥削权力的加速消融，以及向着自由和经济繁荣的进步，几乎势不可挡^{【34】}。并且，现在有了独立的美国，免于封建的往昔且近乎无政府，发挥着类似中世纪自由城市的作用：作为意识形态的激励源头及众人瞩目的焦点，而规模更为空前^{【35】}。

今天，私有财产的伦理及其反政府警惕所剩无几。政府对私有财产主的掠夺，尽管规模更庞大，却不被抗拒地视为合法。再无普遍公众舆论，将政府视作建立在强迫性和非正义财产取得基础上的反社会机构，无论何时何地都出于原则性理由而加以反对及嘲讽。宣传甚至更恶劣地主动

ushered in by these ideological changes and that had brought about unheard of economic growth rates, sustaining for the first time a steadily increasing population and gradually but continuously raising the general standard of living, created an almost unbounded optimism.³³ To be sure, in Western Europe there was still plenty of feudal and absolutist despotism left even during the first half of the nineteenth century when the ideology of freedom and private property and of anti-statist vigilance reached its highest level of popularity, but progress toward an ever farther-reaching erosion of the exploitative powers of government and toward freedom and economic prosperity seemed almost unstoppable.³⁴ In addition, there now existed an independent America, free of a feudal past and with hardly any government at all, that assumed a role similar to that of the free cities of the middle ages: of serving as a source of ideological inspiration and a center of attraction but on a much larger scale.³⁵

Today, little is left of this ethic of private property and its anti-government vigilance. Although they now take place on a much grander scale, governmental appropriations of private property owners are overwhelmingly regarded as legitimate. There is no longer a general public opinion that regards government as an antisocial institution based on coercion and unjust property acquisitions, to be opposed and ridiculed

从事掠夺，不再被普遍视作是道德卑劣；也不再
有断绝与这些参与掠夺者私下往来的普遍舆论。

【33】关于工业革命及其正统（课本）历史学的错误解
释，参阅 F. A. 哈耶克主编的《资本主义及历史学家》
（芝加哥：芝大出版社，1963 年）。

【34】实际上，尽管自由主义在 19 世纪中叶衰落，它
所创造的乐观主义延续到 20 世纪早期。因此，约翰·梅
纳德·凯恩斯在《和平的经济学后果》（伦敦：麦克米
伦，1919 年）中写下：

“人类经济发展中多么非凡的一段篇章，可这个时
代却在 1914 年秋黯然落幕！诚然大部分人口劳碌艰辛，
可显然仍有理由，对此心满意足。但对于任何能力或特
质出众者而言，完全可能迈入中产或更高阶层，享受成
本低廉，忧虑极少的生活，舒适和快乐远胜于其他时代
最富有和最强大的君主……但最重要的是，除了继续改
进的方向，他视此为符合常态、深信不疑及永恒不变的，
任何偏离都是不合常态、谣言绯闻及能够避免的。军国
主义及帝国主义那些挟有种族和文化对抗，充斥垄断、
限制和排外，并决心将毒蛇纵至这个乐园的计划和政

everywhere and at all times on principled grounds. No longer is it
generally regarded as morally despicable to propagate or, even worse, to
actively participate in the enforcement of acts of expropriation, and no
longer is it the general opinion that one would not have any private
dealings whatsoever with people who engaged in such activities.

33 On the Industrial Revolution and its misinterpretation by the
orthodox(school-book) historiography see F.A. Hayek, ed., *Capitalism
and the Historians*(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).

34 In fact, though the decline of liberalism began around the
mid-nineteenth century, the optimism that it had created survived until
the early twentieth century. Thus, John Maynard Keynes could write
[*The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (London: Macmillan, 1919)]:

What an extraordinary episode in the economic progress of man that
age was which came to an end in August 1914! The greater part of the
population, it is true, worked hard and lived at a low standard of comfort,
yet were, to all appearances, reasonably contented with this lot. But
escape was possible, for any man of capacity or character at all
exceeding the average, into the middle and upper classes, for whom life
offered, at a low cost and with the least trouble, convenience, comforts,
and amenities beyond the compass of the richest and most powerful
monarchs of other ages. . . . But, most important of all, he[man] regarded

策，不过是每日报纸上的娱乐消遣，表面上对于正常的社会和经济生活，对于在实践上近乎完成的国际化，都几乎无足轻重。”（第6 - 7页）

类似描述另阅 J. P. 泰勒《英国史 1914-1915 年》（牛津：克拉伦登出版社，1965 年），第 1 页。

【35】在《危机和利维坦》（纽约：牛津大学出版社，1987 年）罗伯特·希格斯这样描写 19 世纪美国的特征：

“很久之前的某个时期，当普通美国人忙于日常生计时，几乎无法意识到政府——尤其是联邦政府。作为一名农夫、商人或手工业者，他可以决定何时何地以何种方式产销何种商品，而仅受市场力量的束缚。试想：没有农产品补贴、价格支持、面积控制；没有联邦贸易委员会。作为一名雇主、雇员、顾客、投资人、借贷人、债务人、学生或教师，他可以基本按自己的心愿行事。试想：没有国家劳动关系委员会；没有联邦消费者‘保

this state of affairs as normal, certain, and permanent, except in the direction of further improvement, and any deviation from it as aberrant, scandalous, and avoidable. The projects and politics of militarism and imperialism, of racial and cultural rivalries, of monopolies, restrictions, and exclusion, which were to play the serpent to this paradise, were little more than the amusements of his daily newspaper, and appeared to exercise almost no influence at all on the ordinary course of social and economic life, the internationalization of which was nearly complete in practice. (pp. 6-7)

For a similar account see also J.P. Taylor, *English History 1914-15* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 1.

35 Characterizing nineteenth-century America Robert Higgs (*Crisis and Leviathan* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1987]) writes:

There was a time, long ago, when the average American could go about his daily business hardly aware of the government—especially the federal government. As a farmer, merchant, or manufacturer, he could decide what, how, when, and where to produce and sell his goods, constrained by little more than market forces. Just think: no farm subsidies, price supports, or acreage controls; no Federal Trade Commission; no antitrust laws; no Interstate Commerce Commission. As an employer, employee, consumer, investor, lender, borrower, student, or

护’法；没有保障及交换委员会；没有就业均等机会委员会；没有卫生和福利部门。没有一家发行国家纸币的中央银行，人们通常使用金币完成买卖。没有销售税，没有社会保障税，没有所得税。尽管政府官员像现在一样腐败——也许更腐败——但可供他们贪污的少到可怜。公民私人消费超过政府所有消费的十五倍之多。”（第4页）

相反，不是被人哄笑下台，遭遇公开敌意或消极愤慨，这样的人被当作是体面人和诚实者。积极支持这个现行体制——非契约性财产课税及管制的继续运作，甚而要求扩张这个体制的政客，所到之处迎面的是尊重而非鄙视。那些正当化税收及管制的知识分子，在公众眼中被认可为深邃渊博的思想家，而非当成知识骗子予以当众揭穿。国税局人员被当成是如同你我一样的合法工作者，而不是无人愿意亲近、友善或毗邻而居的受排斥者。

teacher, he could proceed largely according to his own lights. Just think: no National Labor Relations Board; no federal consumer “protection” laws; no Securities and Exchange Commission; no Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; no Department of Health and Human Services. Lacking a central bank to issue national paper currency, people commonly used gold coins to make purchases. There were no general sales taxes, no Social Security taxes, no income taxes. Though governmental officials were as corrupt then as now—maybe more so—they had vastly less to be corrupt with. Private citizens spent about fifteen times more than all governments combined. (p. IX)

On the contrary, instead of being laughed off the stage or met with open hostility or passive indignation, such people are respected as decent and honest men. The politician who actively supports a continuation of the ongoing system of non-contractual property taxation and regulation or who even demands its expansion is treated everywhere with respect, rather than contempt. The intellectual who justifies taxation and regulation receives recognition as a deep and profound thinker in the public eye, instead of being exposed as an intellectual fraud. The IRS agent is regarded as a man doing a job just as legitimate as yours and mine, and not as an outcast that no one wishes to have as a relative,

政府如何取得这样的成就，如何带来公众舆论的转变，使之一反先前对政府规模的限制，允许（并依然允许）它在绝对及相对意义上扩张【36】？

毫无疑问，这个公众舆论转变的关键因素，乃是具有迷惑性的——或明或暗的——新国家主义意识形态的出现，在 19 世纪中叶的西欧、在世纪之交的美国发端，而一战后在全世界不断强化【37】。

实际上，各国政府一向意识到，在稳定与加强人口的剥削控制方面，那种支持国家的意识形态是至关重要的。出于这样的认识，它们一直以来努力对教育体系施加控制。甚至在政府最虚弱时，见到政府特别关注“正确”意识形态的指导，集中所剩权力，摧毁所有独立智识机构并由政府垄断之手接管，都是司空见惯的。为在持久的观念斗争中占据优势，对学校及大学稳步国有化或社会化（最近一例是密特朗政府企图摧毁法国天主教学校而未获成功），以及对义务教育期的延

friend, or neighbor.

How could government accomplish such a feat and bring about a change in public opinion that removed the former constraint on its size and instead allowed (and still allows) it to grow in absolute as well as relative terms?36

There can be no doubt that the key element in this turn-around of public opinion that started to take hold in Western Europe around the mid-nineteenth century, around the turn of this century in the U.S., and then at a steadily accelerating pace everywhere after World War I37 has been the emergence of attractive new—implicitly or explicitly—statist ideologies.

In fact, states have always been aware of the decisive importance of state-supportive ideologies for stabilizing and increasing their exploitative grip on a population, and in this knowledge they have always made attempts to exert their control, above all, over the institutions of education. Even at their weakest, it should appear natural to see them give particular attention to “correct” ideological instruction and to concentrate whatever is left of their power on the destruction of all independent institutions of learning and their take-over into the states’ monopolistic hands. Accordingly, in order to regain the upper hand in the permanent struggle of ideas, since the mid-nineteenth century a steady

长，都相应肇始于 19 世纪中叶。【38】

然而指出这一点，并指出政府与知识分子愈来愈紧密结盟【39】，乃至后者根据政府意识形态篡改历史的这些事实，仅仅是让问题成为瞩目的焦点。确实，当有人听说政府要接管教育体系，难道不会立即反问，它怎么能成功做到这一点，假如公众舆论真的倾向于私有财产伦理？！这样的接管是以公众舆论的转变为前提的。那么，以上如何实现，尤其是鉴于这种转变意味着接受明显错误的观念，因此难以解释为知识进步的内生驱动过程？

这种朝着谬误方向的转变，似乎要求系统性引入外生力量：一种正确的意识形态仅仅凭借其为正确而能够自我支持。而一种错误意识形态则须依靠对人们强加一种犀利的、有形的外力影响，以产生和支持一种智识堕落的气氛。

process of nationalizing or socializing schools and universities (with one of the most recent examples being the unsuccessful attempt by the Mitterand government to crush France's Catholic schools) and lengthening the period of compulsory schooling has taken place.³⁸

Yet pointing out this and the related facts of an increasingly close alliance between state and intellectuals³⁹ and the latter's rewriting history in line with statist ideologies merely puts the problem into focus. Indeed, when one hears about the state's take-over of the system of education, must one not immediately ask how it could succeed in doing so if public opinion were really committed to a private property ethic?! Such a take-over presupposes a change in public opinion. How, then, was this accomplished, especially in view of the fact that such a change implies the acceptance of manifestly wrong ideas and thus can hardly be explained as an endogenously motivated process of intellectual advancement?

It would seem that such a change toward falsehood requires the systematic introduction of exogenous forces: A true ideology is capable of supporting itself merely by virtue of being true. A false one needs reinforcement by outside influences with a clear-cut, tangible impact on people in order to be capable of generating and supporting a climate of intellectual corruption.

要理解近 100-150 年来私产伦理的衰落及相应的国家主义兴起,一个人必须正视这些实实在在的、支持及强化意识形态的因素。^{【40】}

【36】以下重点参阅 A. V. 戴雪《英国法律和公众舆论关系演讲录》(新泽西州新不伦瑞克: 交换书局, 1981 年); 哈爱理·海利维《19 世纪英国人的历史》第 2 卷(伦敦: 比恩, 1961 年); W. H. 格林里夫《英国政治传统》第 3 卷(伦敦: 梅休因, 1983 - 1987 年); 阿瑟·E. 埃克施《美国自由主义的衰落》(纽约: 雅典娜神庙, 1976 年); 希格斯《危机和利维坦》。

【37】关于一战以来世界范围国家主义的泛滥, 参阅保罗·约翰逊《现代: 从 20 年代到 80 年代的世界》(纽约: 哈珀与罗, 1983 年)。

【38】关于政府与教育的关系, 参阅罗斯巴德《教育、自由和强制: 个人的教育》(堪萨斯州威奇托: 自由教育中心, 1972 年)。

【39】关于政府和知识分子的关系, 参阅朱利安·本达《智识分子的背叛》(纽约: 诺顿, 1969 年)。

【40】以下重点参阅霍普《财产权、无政府和政府》第 1 章及第 5 章、《社会主义和资本主义的理论》第 8 章。

It is to these tangible, ideology-supporting and reinforcing factors that one must turn to understand the decline of the private property ethic and the corresponding rise of statism during the last 100 to 150 years.⁴⁰

36On the following see in particular A.V. Dicey, *Lectures on the Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in England* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1981); Elie Halevy, *A History of the English People in the 19th Century*, 2vols. (London: Benn, 1961); W.H. Greenleaf, *The British Political Tradition*, 3vols. (London: Methuen, 1983-87); Arthur E. Ekirch, *The Decline of American Liberalism* (New York: Atheneum, 1976); Higgs, *Crisis and Leviathan*.

37On the worldwide excesses of statism since World War I see Paul Johnson, *Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Eighties* (New York: Harper and Row, 1983).

38On the relation between state and education see Murray N. Rothbard, *Education, Free and Compulsory: The Individual's Education* (Wichita, Kans.: Center for Independent Education, 1972).

39On the relation between state and intellectuals see Julien Benda, *The Treason of the Intellectuals* (New York: Norton, 1969).

40On the following see in particular Hoppe, *Eigentum, Anarchie, und Staat*, chaps. 1, 5; idem, *A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism*, chap.

我将讨论以下四种因素，并解释它们对公众舆论的腐蚀作用。这些因素都是居于政府组织结构的变化。第一个因素，是政府从军事或警察国家向再分配国家的结构性调整（这种组织转变的原型，是常被效仿的俾斯麦治下的普鲁士）。以小部分统治阶层——他们将剥削掠夺资源几乎专供纯政府开支或军警维持——为特征的政府结构，被政府更加积极收买本身以外人口支持的作法所替代。通过转移支付体系、对特殊主顾特权的许可、对某些“民用”财货、服务（例如教育）的政府生产和供应，人们愈来愈依赖政府统治的延续。政府机构以外的人口，从政府存在中所获的实际经济利益日渐增长，假如政府失去权力，他们就至少会在短期及局部遭受损害。十分自然的，这种依赖性不断减少抵抗及增加支持。剥削似乎仍然应受谴责，但假如谁刚好也在某些方面是剥削行动的法定受益者，如此一来，则受谴责的程度减弱。

8.

I will discuss four such factors and explain their corruptive function for public opinion. All are changes in the organizational structure of the state. The first one is the state's structural adjustment from a military or police state toward a redistributive one. (The prototype of such an organizational change is the often copied Prussia under Bismarck.) **Instead of a governmental structure that is characterized by a small ruling class that uses its exploitatively appropriated resources almost exclusively for pure governmental consumption or for the maintenance of its military and police forces, states now increasingly engage in a policy of actively buying support among the people outside of the governmental apparatus itself.** Through a system of transfer payments, grants of privilege to special clients, and governmental production and provision of certain "civilian" goods and services (as for instance education), the population is made increasingly dependent on the continuation of state rule. People outside the governmental apparatus increasingly have a tangible financial stake in its existence and would be harmed, at least in the short run and in parts of their existence, if the government were to lose power. Quite naturally, this dependency tends to reduce resistance and increase support. Exploitation may still seem reprehensible, but it is less so if one also happens to be someone who at

政府意识到这种对公众舆论的腐蚀作用，从而更加热衷于再分配政策。政府的民用开支相对于军事开支及纯粹政府消费的份额增加。后一部分开支仍可在绝对意义上稳步增长，并且直至今今天也实际如此，但它们普遍失去了相对于再分配开支的重要性^{【41】}。

这些再分配政策依赖于特定的公众舆论环境，通常同时采取以下两种形式之一，普鲁士的情况则是两者皆备：一种是所谓福利改革的社会政策形式，一般涉及到收入再分配，即以生产者当中的“富余者”来补足“匮乏者”；另一种是商业卡特尔和管制，一般意味着另一种再分配，以生产性“匮乏者”或“未富者”倒贴既得“已富者”。随着社会政策的实施，产生了一种对平等主义情绪的呼吁，其实质部分则会堕落为承认政府剥削，以换取政府落实“社会正义”。随着商业卡特尔政策及管制的实施，尤其在布尔乔亚有势力者中，产生了一种保守主义情感，会带来

least on some fronts is a legal benefactor of such actions.

In recognition of this corruptive influence on public opinion, then, states increasingly become engaged in redistributive policies. The share of government expenditure for civilian spending compared to military spending and pure government consumption increases. The latter expenditures can still increase steadily in absolute terms, and they have indeed done so practically everywhere to this day, but they lose importance everywhere relative to expenditures allocated to redistributionist measures.⁴¹

Depending on the particular conditions of public opinion, such redistributionist policies typically simultaneously assume one of two forms and frequently, as in the case of Prussia both: On the one hand the form of *Sozialpolitik*, of so-called welfare reforms, generally involving an income redistribution from the “haves” among producers to the “have-nots,” and on the other hand that of business cartelizations and regulations, generally implying a redistribution from productive “have-nots” or “not-yet-haves” to the established “already-haves.” With the introduction of a *Sozialpolitik* an appeal is made to egalitarian sentiments and a substantial part of it can be corrupted into accepting state exploitation in exchange for the state’s enforcement of “social justice.” With the introduction of a policy of business cartelization and

对政府非契约性掠夺的接受,以换取政府维持现状的保证。平等社会主义和保守主义因此转化成国家主义的意识形态。他们在支持有所差异再分配模式的这个意义上相互竞争,但是他们互相角逐的努力,都汇聚成对国家主义及政府再分配的共同支持。

第二个结构性调整因素是政府构成的变化,它协助扭转了私产伦理。为回应私产伦理的挑战,政府从君主独裁制或贵族寡头政治,转变成今天常见的所谓自由民主制类型^{【42】}。限制进入政府本身与/或特定政府职位的种姓或等级合法性体系的政府机构,被原则上各政府职位向人人开放,允许在政府政策制定中有平等参与及广泛竞争权利的政府体制所取代。每个人——而非只是“贵族”——现在接受政府中的法定利益,而反抗其统治则相应趋于减少这种利益。尽管剥削和掠夺仍然像是邪恶的,然而人就是这样,一旦有机会参与剥削过程,且当公众中一度遇阻的潜在权欲现在有了制度性出口时,如此一来,则邪恶程度似乎也降低了。

regulation one appeals to conservative feelings, particularly among the bourgeois establishment, and it can be brought to accept the state's noncontractual appropriations in exchange for its commitment to the preservation of a status quo. Egalitarian socialism and conservatism are thus transformed into statist ideologies. They compete with each other in the sense that they advocate somewhat different patterns of redistribution, but their competitive efforts converge and integrate in joint support for statism and statist redistribution.

The second structural adjustment aiding in the roll-back of the private property ethic is a change in states' constitutions. In response to the challenge of the private property ethic, states change their constitutions from a monarchic autocracy or an aristocratic oligarchy to the now familiar type of a so-called liberal democracy.⁴² Instead of being an institution which restricts entry into itself and/or into particular governmental positions through a system of caste or class legislation, a state constitution is adopted which in principle opens every government position to everyone and grants equal and universal rights of participation and competition in the making of state-policy. Everyone—not just the “nobility”—now receives a legal stake in the state, and resistance to its rule tends to reduce accordingly. While exploitation and expropriation may have seemed bad, they seem much

【41】关于这一趋势，参阅韦伯和威尔达弗斯基《西方世界中税收和支出的历史》第 588 页后；关于整体上的再分配，参阅阿索德·雅西《政府》第 4 章。

【42】关于这一趋势，参阅莱因哈德·班迪克斯《君主与人民》（伯克利：加州大学出版社，1978 年）。

为补偿体制民主化的代价，政府腐蚀大部分的公众舆论，以致其逐渐忽略这个基本事实，即无论怎样、无论由谁决定和实施剥削及掠夺行动，一切表现及结果都纹丝不动。政府诱使他们转而接受这种观念，即只要保证一个人在剥削进程某处对行动拥有话语权，乃至以某种方式参与选择政府人员，这些行动就是合法的^{【43】}。

民主促进政府权力复苏的这种腐化作用，贝特朗·德·茹弗内尔有着洞若观火的描述：

less so, mankind being what it is, once one is given the chance to participate in its process, and while the ambitions of potential power-wielders within the general public previously must have been frustrated, now there is an institutionalized outlet for them.

41On this trend see Webber and Wildavsky, *A History of Taxation and Expenditure in the Western World*, pp. 588f.; on redistribution in general see also Jasay, *The State*, chap. 4.

42On this trend see Reinhard Bendix, *Kings or People* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

In paying the price of democratizing its constitution, the state corrupts substantial parts of public opinion into gradually losing sight of the fundamental fact that an act of exploitation and expropriation is in all appearances and consequences the same no matter how and by-whom it is decided and enforced. It lures them instead into accepting the view that such acts are legitimate as long as one is guaranteed a say over them somewhere along the line and could somehow somewhere participate in the selection of the state-personnel.⁴³

This corruptive function of democratization as a stimulus for the resurgence of state power has been described with great perceptiveness

“从12世纪到18世纪,政府权力不断扩张。这个过程为所有旁观者所明白;这迫使人们抗争不已,激烈回应。晚近时代,政府权力加速扩张,导致战争规模愈演愈烈。而现在我们对这一过程昧于理解,我们不再抗争,逆来顺受。我们的沉默是一种新现象,对此权力不得不感激自我包装的烟幕。先前它是可见的,在君主个人身上暴露无遗。君主不否认自己是主人,人们的情感可以认清他的面目。今天,在匿名的伪装下,权力主张本身并不存在,它不过是大众意志非人格及无情感的工具。但这明显只是编造……今时与往日一样,权力处在一帮操持权柄者的手中……所有的改变仅仅是,对于被统治者而言,更换掌权的领导者个人变得容易。从某个角度看,这削弱了权力,因为控制社会生活的意志,依照社会的好恶而由其他意志所取代,在这一点上,感觉更可信赖。但是,将掌权的愿景向所有野心勃勃者敞开,这一安排使得权力扩张更加容易。在旧制度下,社会的推动者知道没有分享权力的机会,迫切否认它最小的侵犯。现在则改弦更张,一旦人

by Bertrand de Jouvenel:

From the twelfth to the eighteenth century governmental authority grew continuously. The process was understood by all who saw it happening; it stirred them into incessant protest and to violent reaction. In later times its growth has continued at an accelerated pace, and its extension has brought a corresponding extension of war. And now we no longer understand the process, we no longer protest, we no longer react. The quiescence of ours is a new thing, for which Power has to thank the smoke-screen in which it has wrapped itself. Formerly it could be seen, manifest in the person of the king, who did not disclaim being the master he was, and in whom human passions were discernible. Now, masked in anonymity, it claims to have no existence of its own, and to be but the impersonal and passionless instrument of the general will. But that is clearly a fiction. . . . Today as always Power is in the hands of a group of men who control the power house. . . . All that has changed is that it has now been made easy for the ruled to change the personnel of the leading wielders of Power. Viewed from one angle, this weakens Power, because the wills that control a society's life can, at the society's pleasure, be replaced by other wills, in which it feels more confidence. But, by opening the prospect of power to all the ambitious talents, this arrangement makes the extension of Power much easier. Under the

人都有机会当上部长,就没人热衷于削减他渴望一朝得享的官署,或破坏他机会到时可用的机制。这样一来,在现代社会政治圈内,对权力扩张结成了广泛的共谋^{【44】}。”

为了摆脱支持低谷,恢复到先前规模,政府其他两个调整,都必定与国家间关系有关。首先,正如先前解释及刚刚由茹弗内尔再次提到的,作为垄断剥削者的政府倾向于卷入内部战争。随着他们内部剥削权力的减弱,通过外部扩张弥补这些损失的愿望增强。然而,在这一愿望由于缺少国内支持而遭受挫折后,政府依靠再分配政策、产业管制及民主化赢得支持。(实际上,不采取这些措施政府,注定要在长期持续战争中落败!)正是这种支持,可充当政府实现扩张愿望的跳板。

这个新支持利用了这个事实,即再分配、管制和民主化,意味着人们对特定政府更切身的认

ancien régime, society's moving spirits, who had, as they knew, no chance of a share of Power, were quick to denounce its smallest encroachment. Now, on the other hand, when everyone is potentially a minister, no one is concerned to cut down an office to which he aspires one day himself, or to put sand in a machine which he means to use himself when his turn comes. Hence it is that there is in the political circles of a modern society a wide complicity in the extension of Power.⁴⁴

The other two adjustments made by the state in order to overcome its lowest point of popularity and rise to its present size have to do with interstate relations. For one thing, as explained earlier and just mentioned again by de Jouvenel, states qua monopolistic exploiters tend to get involved in interstate warfare. With their internal exploitative power weak, the desire to compensate for these losses by external expansion rises. However, this desire is frustrated by a lack of internal support. The support is created through a policy of redistribution, industrial regulation, and democratization. (In fact, states that do not adopt these measures are bound to lose in any long-lasting warfare!) It is this support that is used as a springboard for a realization of the state's expansionist desires.

This newfound support takes advantage of the fact that redistribution, regulation, and democratization imply a greater tangible

同，并因此几乎自然导致保护主义的抬头，如若不然就是对“外来者”的公然敌对情绪，尤其是享有国家特权的生产者对于“外国”竞争的生来敌视。这种支持被政府及其智囊转变为国民主义的颠狂，并提供整合社会主义平等观、保守主义和民主情绪的智识框架^{【45】}。

在这种国民主义支持下，政府着手扩张。在一个多世纪当中，一系列几乎不受干扰的战事及帝国主义冒险开始，每一次都较前一次更野蛮及更具毁灭性，并且卷入愈来愈多的非战斗人员，一战、二战最终酿成，却并未划上止点。在社会主义、保守主义或民主国家的名义下，政府依靠战争手段，令它们的疆域扩张到罗马帝国都明显为之逊色的程度，并实际上将文化各异的民族，不断彻底摧毁或置于外国统治之下^{【46】}。

然而，不仅政府权力的外部扩张，是由国民主义意识形态带来。作为国民主义的自然产物，战争也是加强政府对内剥削及掠夺权力的手段。

identification of the population with a specific state and thus almost automatically lead to an increase in protectionist if not open antagonistic attitudes toward “outsiders” and that in particular state-privileged producers are by nature hostile to “foreign” competition. This support is transformed by the state and its intellectual bodyguards into a frenzy of nationalism and provides the intellectual framework for the integration of socialist-egalitarian, conservative, and democratic sentiments.⁴⁵

Backed by such nationalism, states begin on their expansionist course. For more than a century an almost uninterrupted series of wars and imperialist expeditions set in, each one more brutal and destructive than the previous one, with always greater involvement of the noncombative population, culminating in World War I and II but not ending with this. In the name of the socialist, conservative, or democratic nation, and by means of warfare, states have expanded their territories to sizes compared to which even the Roman Empire appears insignificant, and have actually wiped out or brought under foreign rule a steadily increasing number of culturally distinct nations.⁴⁶

However, not only external expansion of state power is brought about by the ideology of nationalism. War as the natural outgrowth of nationalism is also the means of strengthening the state’s internal powers of exploitation and expropriation. Each war is also an internal emergency

每次战争也是一次国内紧急状态，而紧急状态给予政府不断加强对自身人口控制的借口。依靠制造紧急状态所增强的控制，将在和平时期削弱，但它不会退回到战前水平。确切说，每次成功结束的战争（唯有胜利的政权才能生存），被政府及其知识分子用于宣传这样的观念，即因为国民主义的警惕及政府扩张的权力，“外国侵犯者”遭受打击而本国获得拯救，这个成功方子必定为下次紧急状态而保留。在刚刚证明的“主导性”国民主义的指引下，每次成功战争均以获得更多政府控制的新和平时代而告结束，从而继续增强政府实施下一次成功国际紧急状态的欲望^{【47】}。

【43】关于民主的社会心理学参阅加埃塔诺·莫斯卡《统治阶级》（纽约：麦格罗·希尔，1939年）；门肯《论民主》（纽约：克诺夫，1926年）；关于民主统治趋向于“退化”成寡头统治，参阅罗伯特·米契尔斯《政党政治的社会学》（斯图加特：克朗，1957年）。

【44】茹弗内尔《论权力》（纽约：维京出版社，1949年），第9-10页。

situation, and an emergency requires and seems to justify the acceptance of the state's increasing its control over its own population. Such increased control gained through the creation of emergencies is reduced during peacetime, but it never sinks back to its pre-war levels. Rather, each successfully ended war (and only successful governments can survive) is used by the government and its intellectuals to propagate the idea that it was only because of nationalistic vigilance and expanded governmental powers that the “foreign aggressors” were crushed and one's own country saved, and that this successful recipe must then be retained in order to be prepared for the next emergency. Led by the just proven “dominant” nationalism, each successful war ends with the attainment of a new peacetime high of governmental controls and thereby further strengthens a government's appetite for implementing the next winnable international emergency.⁴⁷

43 On the social psychology of democracy see Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1939); H.L. Mencken, *Notes on Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1926); on the tendency of democratic rule to “degenerate” to oligarchic rule see Robert Michels, *Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens* (Stuttgart: Kroener, 1957).

44 Bertrand de Jouvenel, *On Power* (New York: Viking Press, 1949), pp. 9-10.

【45】关于民族主义、帝国主义——以及它们与古典自由主义的水火不容——参阅米塞斯《自由主义》（旧金山：科布登出版社，1985年）、《民族、政府和经济》（纽约：纽约大学出版社，1983年）；熊彼特《帝国主义和社会阶级》（纽约：世界印刷社，1955年）；兰斯·E. 戴维斯和罗伯特·A. 哈登巴克《帝国的财欲和追求：英帝国主义的政治经济1860-1912年》（剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，1986年）。

【46】参阅克里彭多夫《国家与战争》；约翰逊，现代时报。

【47】这个过程是希格斯《危机和利维坦》的核心主题。

每个新的和平时期意味着与先前相比更高水平的政府干预：内部采取不断限制私有财产主对自身财产可做选择范围的形式；对外交往方面采取更多贸易壁垒及严格限制人口迁徙（尤其是对于移民出入境）的形式。不仅因为它建立在愈来愈针对外国人及外国贸易的歧视之上，而且任何这种和平，包含下一次国际冲突的风险日增，或逼迫有关政府协商双边或多边国际协定，从而共同剥削掠夺各自人口^{【48】}。

45On nationalism, imperialism, colonialism—and their incompatibility Classical liberalism—see Ludwig von Mises, *Liberalism* (San Francisco: Cobden Press, 1985); idem, *Nation, State and Economy* (New York: New York University Press, 1983); Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Imperialism and Social Classes* (New York: World Publishing, 1955); Lance E. Davis and Robert A. Huttenback, *Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire: The Political Economy of British Imperialism 1860–1912* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

46See Krippendorff, *Staat und Krieg*; Johnson, *Modern Times*.

47This process is the central topic of Higgs, *Crisis and Leviathan*.

Each new period of peace means a higher level of governmental interference as compared with the previous one: internally in the form of increased restrictions on the range of choices that private property owners are allowed to make regarding their own property; and externally, as regards foreign relations, in the form of higher trade barriers and of increasingly severe restrictions on population movements (most notably on emigration and immigration). Not the least because it is based on increased discrimination against foreigners and foreign trade, any such peace contains the increased risk of the next international conflict, or pressures the affected governments into negotiating bi- or multilateral

最后,其他三个调整使得第四个调整成为必要,原因依然是国家间竞争、危机和战争进程。比起再分配和民主化,以上不由该国政府自身决定,并且发动战争——和国家间竞争都完全不是由该国政府自身决定。使用著名的哈耶克术语,这正是缺少全球单一政府统治(这当然是每个政府的梦想!),其他政府的存续对每一国政府规模及结构施加限制这个事实的无意图后果。

不管是有无意图,假如谁想充分理解导致目前世界性国家主义的这些发展,也必须强调这种结构调整。也唯有涉及这个调整,才能最终回答,为什么**课税**国家特别上升到世界统治地位的这个**问题**。

解释 19-20 世纪西欧及北美国家怎样通过一系列国民战争,逐渐统治全球并四处留下烙印是轻而易举的。尽管眼下流行的是文化相对主义,以上原由却是这个简单的事实,即这些国家

interstate-agreements aimed at cartelizing their respective power structures and thereby jointly exploiting and expropriating each other's populations.⁴⁸

Finally, the fourth adjustment is made necessary by the other three, and again because of the ongoing process of interstate competition, crises, and warfare. It is less of the state's own making than are redistribution, democratization, and war-making—just as it is not of its own making that there *is* interstate-competition at all. Rather, in fashionable Hayekian terminology, it is the unintended consequence of the fact that short of one state's domination of the entire world(which is, of course, every state's dream!) the continued existence of other states keeps exerting a significant constraint on each state's size and structure.

Whether intended or unintended, this structural adjustment must also be noted if one wishes to fully understand the development that has led to the present world of statism. It is also only by mentioning this adjustment that the question why it is specifically the *tax*-state that has risen to world dominance is finally answered.

It is easy enough to explain how through a series of nationalistic wars during the nineteenth and twentieth century the states of Western Europe and North America could come to dominate the rest of the world and leave their imprint upon it. Notwithstanding the presently booming

都具备优越的智识传统——核心观念是个人自由和私有财产——西方理性主义的社会产物，而这种传统为创造出远胜其他各国的经济财富奠定了基础。由于这些国家的政府如寄生虫般汲取了这些优势的经济财富，所以完全不必惊讶于它们具备了战胜其他各国政府的能力。

除了某些太平洋国家的特例，大部分失败及重组的这些非西方国家，至今在显著提高他们的国际地位方面彻底失败，更不用说匹敌西方国民国家的地位；尤其在摆脱西方帝国主义取得政治独立后，仍然止步不前。这些国家从未有过理性主义和自由主义的内生传统，自然倾向于模仿或接受社会主义、保守主义、民主主义及国民主义等“成功”意识形态的输入；这些国家的智识精英在牛津、剑桥、伦敦、巴黎、柏林、哈佛及哥伦比亚大学的学习期间，所接触到的几乎统统都是这些意识形态。每一种乃至全部国家主义意识形态，当不受私产伦理的深远传统束缚时，理所当然地招致经济灾难，这样一种事实，多少消除

cultural relativism, the reason for this is the simple fact that these states were the outgrowth of societies with a superior intellectual tradition—that of Western rationalism—with its central ideas of individual freedom and private property, and that this tradition had laid the foundation for the creation of economic wealth far exceeding that existing anywhere else. Because they parasitically drew on such superior economic wealth, it is not at all surprising that these states were then able to battle all others victoriously.

It is also obvious why with the remarkable exception of a number of Pacific countries most of these defeated and reconstituted non-Western states have to this day utterly failed to significantly improve their international stature or even match that of the Western nation states, and have in particular failed to do so after having reached political independence from Western imperialism. With no endogenous tradition of rationalism and liberalism to speak of, such states naturally felt inclined to imitate or adopt the “victorious” ideological imports of socialism, conservatism, democratism, and nationalism, the very ideologies to which these countries’ intellectual elite had been exposed almost exclusively during their studies at the universities of Oxford and Cambridge, London, Paris, Berlin, Harvard, and Columbia. As a matter of course, a brew of such each-and-all statist ideologies, unconstrained

了国际政治的任何积极作用^{【49】}。

【48】这些协议中最为邪恶的，很可能是对想要移民到某一地区的非犯罪人限制入境——剥夺生活在这一地区的人雇佣他们的机会——并将他们引渡回母国的协议。

【49】关于所谓第三世界的问题，参阅彼得·T. 鲍尔和B. S. 亚梅《落后国家的经济学》（伦敦：尼斯贝特，1957年）；P. T. 鲍尔《发展的异议》（马萨诸塞州剑桥：哈佛大学出版社，1972年）、《平等，第三世界和经济幻觉》（马萨诸塞州剑桥：哈佛大学出版社，1981年）；斯坦尼斯拉夫·安得瑞斯基《非洲困境》（纽约：阿瑟顿出版社，1969年）、《寄生和破坏》（纽约：万神殿，1966年）。

尽管答案多少明显，试问假如西方各国互相冲突，结果将如何？在这些冲突中成功的决定因素是什么，导致失败的因素是什么？

by a significant tradition of private property ethic, spells economic disaster, and such a fact more or less rules out any prominent role in international politics.⁴⁹

48The most vicious of such agreements is very likely that of restricting entry for noncriminal persons wanting to immigrate into a given territory—and the chance for those living in this territory to offer employment to them—and of extraditing them back to their home-countries.

49On the problem of the so-called Third World see Peter T. Bauer and B.S.Yamey, *The Economics of Under-Developed Countries* (London: Nisbet and Co.,1957); P.T. Bauer, *Dissent on Development* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972); idem, *Equality, The Third World and Economic Delusion*(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); Stanislav Andreski, *The African Predicament* (New York: Atherton Press, 1969); idem, *Parasitism and subversion* (New York: Pantheon, 1966).

Yet what—and it is the answer to this that is somewhat less obvious—if the Western states fight each other? What determines the success in these conflicts, and what is bound to cause defeat?

在这里，再分配、民主化及国民主义当然再次不足为凭，假如这些政府为了恢复内部力量和准备国家间战争，首先已经接受了这样的政策。确切说，这些政府在世界中的统治地位，取决于它们相对更强的私产伦理传统，同样，其他条件不变，它们在西方国家生存斗争中的长期胜利，取决于谁采取相对更自由的政策。在它们中间，那些调整国内再分配政策，降低保守主义思维的经济管制政策相对于社会主义倾向的税收政策重要性的政府，在国际政治领域中会逐渐胜过它们的竞争对手。

管制——通过它，政府要么排斥、要么禁止两个及以上私人间的某些交易，与课税行动一样，都是对私产权利的侵犯。在追求两种类型再分配政策的过程中，官方代表以他人收入下降为代价，相应提高自己的收入。尽管说，管制的破坏性绝不亚于税收，但它的显著特征是为了强制而要求政府控制经济资源，却未同时带来自用资源的增加。实际上，这等于说，管制要求政府支

Naturally, redistribution, democratization, and nationalism cannot be cited again here, for assumedly these states have already adopted such policies in order to regain internal strength and prepare for interstate warfare in the first place. Rather, just as it is the relatively stronger tradition of private property ethic that is responsible for these states' dominance over the non-Western world, so, *ceteris paribus*, is a relatively more liberal policy responsible for their long run success in the struggle for survival among the Western states themselves. Among them, those states which have adjusted their internal redistributionist policies so as to decrease the importance of a conservatively minded policy of economic regulations relative to that of socialistically inclined policy of taxation tend to outstrip their competitors in the arena of international politics.

Regulations through which states either compel or prohibit certain exchanges between two or more private persons as well as acts of taxation are invasions of private property rights. In pursuing both types of redistributionist policies, the states' representatives increase their own income at the expense of a corresponding income reduction for someone else. However, while by no means less destructive of productive output than taxation, regulations have the peculiar characteristic of requiring the state's control over economic resources in order to become enforceable

配及花费税收，但它不为国家产生货币收入，而仅仅产生纯权力欲满足的收入形式（即当 A 非法化 B 和 C 的互惠交易，而自己却未获得物质利益）。另一方面，根据“从彼得到保罗”原则的课税及其收入再分配，政府至少依靠从再分配行动中收取“中介费”，增加了自身所能支配的经济手段，但除了实际拥有某些经济资源并能随心所欲地花费，也许不产生其他形式的满足（保罗更多的感激除外）^{【50】}。

【50】关于管制和税收作为不同的针对私有财产的侵犯形式，以及关于它们的经济学和社会学，参阅罗斯巴德《权力和市场》；霍普《社会主义和资本主义的理论》。

显然，国家间的冲突及战争要求经济手段，并且这样的事件越频繁，持续时间愈长，则需要的资源也就愈多。事实上，掌控更充足经济资源用于战费的政府，当其他条件不变时，会更易成

without simultaneously increasing the resources at its disposal. In practice, this is to say that regulations require the state's command over and expenditure of taxes, yet regulations produce no monetary income for the state but only income in the form of the satisfaction of pure power lust (as when A, for no material gains of his own, outlaws that B and C engage in mutually beneficial trade with each other). On the other hand, taxation and a redistribution of tax revenue according to the principle "from Peter to Paul" increases the economic means at a government's disposal at least by its own "handling-charge" for the act of redistribution but may produce no other satisfaction (apart from the increased appreciation by the Pauls) than that of actually possessing certain economic resources and being able to expend them according to its own whims.⁵⁰

50On regulation and taxation as different forms of aggression against private property and their economics and sociology see Rothbard, *Power and Market*; Hoppe, *A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism*.

Clearly, interstate conflicts and war require economic means, and even more resources the more frequent and longer-lasting such events are. In fact, those states which control more ample economic resources expendable on a war-effort will *ceteris paribus* tend to be victorious.

功。因此，既然税收政策乃至无管制的税收政策，比起管制政策乃至税收附带管制政策，可以向政府提供更高的货币收入。为避免国际失败，政府必定别无选择地朝着相对去管制经济，以及相对纯课税国家的方向发展。

国际政策中课税型政府胜过管制型政府的相对优势，解释了美国在世界顶级帝国主义势力行列中崛起的原因^{【51】}。同样也解释了那种高度管制的政府如纳粹德国及法西斯意大利的失败，苏联及其盟国相对北约国家的衰弱，以及近来的里根政府，以及稍逊的撒切尔政府，去除经济管制及升级帝国主义侵略的类似行动。

以上总结了我对当前国家主义的世界，尤其是关于课税型政府崛起的，受行动学逻辑晓谕的社会学解释。根据这样的理解，让我以如何才能摆脱课税型政府的若干简评作为结语。

仅仅依靠某家私人企业所能采取的抵制无济于事，因为一家从事剥削掠夺业的机构，不会尊重抵制表达的否定意见。仅仅依靠防卫性暴力反对它的侵犯也无济于事，这是因为政府侵犯受

Hence, since a policy of taxation, and taxation without regulation, yields a higher monetary return to the state than a policy of regulation, and of taxation cum regulation, states must willy-nilly move in the direction of a comparatively deregulated economy and a comparatively pure tax-state in order to avoid international defeat.

It is this relative advantage in international politics of the tax-state over the regulatory state that explains the rise of the U.S. to the rank of the world's foremost imperial power.⁵¹ It also explains the defeat of such highly regulatory states as Nazi-Germany and Fascist-Italy, the relative weakness of the Soviet Union and its allies as compared to the NATO-alliance, and the recent simultaneous moves toward economic deregulation and increased levels of imperialist aggression of the Reagan and, to a lesser extent, the Thatcher governments.

This concludes my praxeologically informed sociological account of the evolution of the present statist world and the rise, in particular, of the modern tax-state. Based on such an understanding let me end with just a few brief remarks of how it is possible to overcome the tax-state.

It cannot be fought by a simple boycott, as could a private business, because an institution devoted to the business of expropriating and exploiting does not respect the negative verdict revealed by boycotts. It also cannot simply be fought by countering its aggression with defensive

到公众舆论的支持。因此，摆脱它要依靠的是公众舆论的转变。私产伦理——私有财产是一种正义制度以及创造经济繁荣唯一手段的观念，以及政府作为破坏财富形成的受人排斥机构的观念，必须得到复兴，从而再度激荡人们的心灵。随着民族主义、民主主义和再分配（要么是社会主义类型，要么是保守主义类型）国家主义意识形态的泛滥成灾，情况有时也许令人绝望。然而，观念在以往曾经转变，在未来亦有可能再次转变。事实上，观念可以迎来突变^{【52】}。并且，私有财产观念具有一种决定性的魅力——私有财产观念，并且唯有这种观念，才是人作为理性存在的真实写照^{【53】}。

【51】关于帝国主义外交政策，尤其是美国外交政策，参阅克里彭多夫《政府和战争》，第3章第1页；以及罗斯巴德《为了新自由》第14章。

【52】关于这点亦可参埃蒂安·德拉博埃蒂《服从的政治：论自愿奴隶制》罗斯巴德编（纽约：自由人生编辑社，1975年）

violence because the state's aggression is supported by public opinion. Thus, overcoming it depends on a change in public opinion. The private property ethic—the idea that private property is a just institution and the only means of creating economic prosperity, and the view of the state as an outcast institution that is destructive of wealth formation, must be revived and must again inspire people's minds and hearts. With the rampant statist ideologies of nationalism, democratism, and redistributionism (of either the socialist or the conservative kind), this may sometimes appear hopeless. However, ideas have changed in the past and can change again in the future. In fact, ideas can change instantaneously.⁵² Moreover, the idea of private property has one decisive attraction: it, and only it, is a true reflection of man's nature as a rational being.⁵³

51 On the imperialistic foreign policy of, in particular, the U.S. See Krippendorff, *Staat und Krieg*, chap. III, p. 1; and Rothbard, *For a New Liberty*, chap. 14.

52 See on this also Etienne de la Boétie, *The Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude*, ed. Murray N. Rothbard (New York: Free Life Editions, 1975).

Resolve to serve no more, and you are at once freed. I do not ask

“决心再不忍受奴役，你们马上就获得自由。并非让你们捆绑暴君将他打翻在地，只要你们不再支持他，然后你们就将看到，他就像一尊被抽走底座的巨像，带着自身的重量轰然垮塌、裂成碎片。”（第52 - 53页）

【53】关于私产伦理——先验的——理性的正当理由，参阅霍普“从自由放任经济到自由至上伦理”，载于布拉克和小罗克韦尔主编的《人、经济和自由：纪念罗斯巴德论文集》（阿拉巴马州奥本：米塞斯研究院，1988年）、“经济效率的正义”（《奥地利经济学通讯》，1988年冬）；本书第8及第9章。

that you place bands upon the tyrant to topple him over, but simply that you support him no longer; then you will behold him, like a great colossus whose pedestals have been pulled away, fall of his own weight and break into pieces. (pp. 52–53)

53 On the—a prioristic—rational justification of the private property ethic see Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “From the Economics of Laissez Faire to the Ethics of Libertarianism,” in Walter Block and Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr., eds., *Man, Economy, and Liberty: Essays in Honor of Murray N. Rothbard* (Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1988); idem, “The Justice of Economic Efficiency,” *Austrian Economics Newsletter* (Winter, 1988); infra chaps. 8 and 9.

第三章
银行业、国民政府
与国际政治：
现行经济秩序的
社会学重建

从《奥地利学派经济学评论》4 (1990年)再版。

壹、货币和银行

要解释直接交换的出现，仅须以狭隘定义的自利心为假设。只要偏好更多选择甚于别无他

3

Banking, Nation States,
and International Politics:

A Sociological Reconstruction
of the Present Economic Order

[Reprinted from the *Review of Austrian Economics* 4 (1990).]

1. MONEY AND BANKING

In order to explain the emergence of barter, nothing more than the assumption of a narrowly defined self-interest is required. Insofar as man

选，喜爱更多财货甚于捉襟见肘，人愿意选择直接交换与劳动分工，而放弃自给自足。

遵循同样狭隘的自利心，货币从直接交换中脱颖而出；倘若参与直接交换经济，并且偏好较为优越而非低下的生活水平，人愿意选择及认同一种共同交换媒介。他选择货币，从而能够摆脱直接交换经济要求双重巧合存在的这个根本局限。货币拓宽了他的交换可能性。各种财货从而可以互相交换，不再依赖于双重巧合或有限分割。伴随这个扩大的可交换性，属于他的每件财货都提升了价值。

假如人参与交换经济，自利心驱使他去寻找特别适销的财货，它们拥有例如分割性、耐用性、识别性、便携性和稀缺性等适合的货币属性，并且需要这些财货非为自用，而为充当交换媒介。他愿意利用这种商品充当交换媒介，正如其他人也普遍这么做，这符合他本身的利益。实际上，货币的职能正是促进交换，扩大交换可能范围，从而提高一个人的财货价值（视其融合于交换经济的程度）。因此，一件商品愈被广泛用作货币，

prefers more choices and goods to fewer, he will choose barter and division of labor over self-sufficiency.

The emergence of money from barter follows from the same narrow self-interest, if man is integrated in a barter economy and prefers a higher to a lower standard of living, he will choose to select and support a common medium of exchange. In selecting a money he can overcome the fundamental restriction imposed on exchange by a barter economy, i.e., that of requiring the existence of a double coincidence of wants. With money his possibilities for exchange widen. Every good becomes exchangeable for every other, independent of double coincidences or imperfect divisibilities. And with this widened exchangeability the value of each and every good in his possession increases.

If as man is integrated in an exchange economy, self-interest compels him to look out for particularly marketable goods which have desirable money properties such as divisibility, durability, recognizability, portability and scarcity, and to demand such goods not for their own sake but for the sake of employing them as media of exchange. And it is in his self-interest to choose that commodity as his medium of exchange that is also used as such most commonly by others. In fact, it is the function of money to facilitate exchange, to widen the range of exchange possibilities, and to thereby increase the value of one's

就愈能顺利履行货币职能。仅仅是在狭隘自利心的驱动下，人总是偏好更通用，乃至尽可能普世接受而非稍逊的交换媒介。货币越通用，一个人所参与的市场就愈广阔，他的价值及成本计算愈合理（从某些人希望经济一体化及财富最大化的角度），他从劳动分工中获得的好处就愈可观^[1]。

【1】关于自由市场的货币形成，参阅门格尔《经济学原理》（纽约：纽约大学出版社，1976年），第257-285页；“货币”（《门格尔选集》第4卷，图宾根：莫尔，1970年）。

一度被选作的“因最通行而最优之货币”，从经验上来说，当然是黄金。假如没有政府强制，黄金在可预见的将来，还会再度被选作最佳履行货币职能的商品。自利心会引导每个人选择黄金而非其他货币作为通行的交换媒介。视自身参与及财产融入交换经济的程度，每个人都会选用黄金而非其他货币记账，因为黄金的普世接受性，

goods (to the extent that they are perceived as integrated in an exchange economy). Thus, the more widely a commodity is used as money, the better it will perform its monetary function. Driven by no more than narrow self-interest, man will always prefer a more general and, if possible, a universal medium of exchange to a less general or nonuniversal one. For the more common the money, the wider the market in which one is integrated, the more rational one's value and cost calculations (from the viewpoint of someone desiring economic integration and wealth maximization), and the greater the benefits that one can reap from division of labor.¹

¹On the free-market development of money, see Carl Menger, *Principles of Economics* (New York: New York University Press, 1976), pp. 257-85; "Geld," in Carl Menger, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. IV (Tübingen: Mohr, 1970).

Empirically, of course, the commodity that was once chosen as the best-because-most-universal-money is gold. Without government coercion gold would again be selected for the foreseeable future as the commodity best performing the function of money. Self-interest would lead everyone to prefer gold—as a universally used medium of exchange—to any other money. To the extent that every individual perceives himself and his possessions as integrated into an exchange

使这种记账法最能充分表达他的机会成本,从而在他最大化财富的努力当中,充当最好的向导。任何其他货币将被迅速逐出使用,因为任何在严格普世性及国际化上逊色于黄金的货币——一国或地区货币——会抵消拥有货币的首要目的。自利人发明货币,为的是将自身融入不断扩大及最终普遍的市场中,从而增加财富。在追逐自利的道路上,一国或地区货币将迅速被黄金消灭和排挤,因为唯有黄金使得经济彻底一体化,使得市场遍及全世界,从而履行货币作为共同交换媒介的最终职能^{【2】}。

【2】关于金本位参阅小罗克韦尔主编《金本位:一个奥地利视角》(莱克星顿:D·C·希思,1985年),荣保罗和路易斯·勒曼《支持黄金的理由》(旧金山:卡托学院,1983年)。

货币乃至更优货币的出现,以及最终一种世界货币的出现,让先前在交换过程中受双重巧合限制(如存在自由浮动汇率的竞争性货币)的生

economy, he would prefer accounting in terms of gold rather than in terms of any other money, because gold's universal acceptance makes such accounting the most complete expression of one's opportunity costs, and hence serves as the best guide in one's attempts to maximize wealth. All other monies would be driven out of use quickly, because anything less than a strictly universal and international money such as gold—national or regional monies, that is—would contradict the very purpose of having money in the first place. Money has been invented by self-interested man in order to increase his wealth by integrating himself into an ever-widening and ultimately universal market. In the way of the pursuit of self-interest, national or regional monies would quickly be out-competed and supplanted by gold, because only gold makes economic integration complete and markets worldwide, thereby fulfilling the ultimate function of money as a common medium of exchange.²

2On the gold standard, see Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr., ed., *The Gold Standard: An Austrian Perspective* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1985), Ron Paul and Lewis Lehrman, *The Case for Gold* (San Francisco: Cato Institute, 1983).

The emergence of money, of increasingly better monies, and finally of one universal money, gold, sets productive energies free that previously remained frustrated and idle due to

产引擎彻底解放。直接交换将生产者产品市场局限于双重需求巧合的个案。以黄金标价促使生产者市场不断扩容,促使需求有效性在全球尺度上免受双重巧合的束缚。生产相应增长——由于黄金而非其他货币而增长更多。货币价值随着生产增长而上升;货币的更高购买力降低了一个人对它的储备需求,降低了他的实际时间偏好率(原始利率),导致了愈来愈多的资本形成。经济发展启动了一个螺旋上升的过程。

这个发展为银行作为货币专营机构的出现奠定了基础。一方面,银行主动迎合不断增长的货币保管、运输及清算需求。另一方面,它们承担起促进资本家(储蓄者)与企业家(投资者)之间交换这个愈发重要的作用,使这些职能间近乎彻底的劳动分工成为实际可能。银行作为存管机构,尤其是储蓄及信贷机构,迅速承担起经济神经中枢的任务。经济资源和活动在时间与空间

double-coincidence-of-wants-restrictions in the process of exchanges (such as the existence of competing monies with freely fluctuating exchange rates). Under barter the market for a producer's output is restricted to instances of double want coincidences. With all prices expressed in terms of gold the producers market is oft-encompassing, and demand takes effect unrestricted by any absence of double coincidences on a worldwide scale. Accordingly, production increases—and increases more with gold than with any other money. With increased production the value of money in turn rises; and the higher purchasing power of money reduces one's reservation demand for it, lowers one's effective rate of time preference (the ordinary rate of interest), and leads to increased capital formation. An upward spiraling process of economic development is set in motion.

This development creates the basis for the emergence of banks as specialized money-handling institutions. On the one hand, banks come forward to meet the increasing demand for the safekeeping, transporting, and clearing of money. On the other hand, they fulfill the increasingly important function of facilitating exchanges between capitalists (savers) and entrepreneurs (investors), actually making an almost complete division of labor between these roles possible. As institutions of deposit and in particular as savings and credit institutions, banks quickly assume

上的分配协调，日益通过银行中介展开；银行的出现为这种协调提供了便利，意味着对经济增长的再一次刺激^{【3】}。

【3】 关于银行尤其是信贷银行及存管银行的不同职能，参阅罗斯巴德《银行的秘密》（纽约：理查森和斯奈德，1983年）。

唯一世界货币和唯一记账单位，符合每个经济体的利益，且财富最大化的追求者，在达成该目标前不会止步，而唯一银行或唯一垄断性银行系统则悖离这种利益。确切说，自利心要求每家银行运用同一世界货币——黄金——但是全部运用黄金的银行及银行系统间的自由竞争则必须存在。唯有当银行业能够自由进入，这个行业才会与其他行业一样富有成本效率。唯有当这种竞争涉及的服务，是依照同一商品货币供给，自由银行业才能切实履行货币与银行以下这些职能，即有利于经济融合而非分崩离析，拓展市场和劳动分工而非施压限制，合理化价值及成本核算而非盲目无绪，并因此增加经济财富而非减损

the rank of nerve centers of an economy. Increasingly the spatial and temporal allocation and coordination of economic resources and activities takes place through the mediation of banks; and in facilitating such coordination the emergence of banks implies still another stimulus for economic growth.³

3 On banking and in particular the different function of loan and deposit banking, see Murray N. Rothbard, *The Mystery of Banking* (New York: Richardson and Snyder, 1983).

While it is in everyone's economic interest that there be only one universal money and only one unit of account, and man in his pursuit of wealth maximization will not stop until this goal is reached, it is contrary to such interest that there be only one bank or one monopolistic banking system. Rather, self-interest commands that every bank use the same universal money—gold—and that there then be no competition between different monies, but that free competition between banks and banking systems, all of which use gold, must exist. Only so long as free entry into banking exists will there be cost efficiency in this as in any other business; yet only as long as this competition concerns services rendered in terms of one and the same money commodity will free banking actually be able to fulfill the very function of money and banking, i.e., of facilitating economic integration rather than disintegration, of widening

财富。货币之间竞争的观念是一个悖论。严格来讲，有着自由浮动汇率的种种竞争货币的货币体系，仍旧是一个（部分）直接交换的货币体系。困扰这个体系的问题，乃交换有赖于双重需求巧合。对于货币目的而言，它的存在是功能失调的【4】。自由寻求自我利益的人，会直接放弃它——当涉及货币本质时，认为自由市场不仅意味着竞争银行，而且意味着竞争货币，是根本的误解【5】。竞争货币不源于自由市场行动，而往往是强制所带来，是政府在合理经济行为道路上设置障碍的结果。

【4】参阅罗斯巴德《百分百金美元的理由》（梅里登，康涅狄格州：科布登出版社，1984年），第32-34页。

【5】这个概念混淆的最著名案例是哈耶克《货币的非国家化》（伦敦：经济事务研究所，1976年）；批评参阅罗斯巴德“哈耶克的非国家化货币”《自由至上论坛》XV第5-6页（1981年8月-1982年1月）

the market and expanding the division of labor rather than restricting them, of making value and cost accounting more rather than less rational, and hence of increasing rather than decreasing economic wealth. The notion of competition between monies is a *contradiction in adjecto*. Strictly speaking, a monetary system with rival monies of freely fluctuating exchange rates is still a system of (partial) barter, riddled with the problem of requiring double coincidences of wants in order for (some) exchanges to take place. The existence of such a system is dysfunctional of the very purpose of money.⁴ Freely pursuing his own self-interest, man would immediately abandon it—and it would be a fundamental misconception regarding the essence of money to think of the free market not only in terms of competing banks but also in terms of competitive monies.⁵ Competitive monies are not the outcome of free market actions but are invariably the result of coercion, of government imposed obstacles placed in the path of rational economic conduct.

⁴See Murray N. Rothbard, *The Case for a 100 Percent Gold Dollar* (Meriden, Conn.: Cobden Press, 1984), pp. 32–34.

⁵A highly prominent example for this misconception is F.A. Hayek, *Denationalization of Money* (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1976); for a critique see Murray N. Rothbard, “Hayek’s Denationalized Money,” *Libertarian Forum* XV, nos. 5–6 (August 1981–January 1982).

奠基于世界金本位的自由银行业在世界一体化市场框架中出现,协调促进跨区跨期交换最有成本效率方法的这个目标也随之实现。保管、运输、清算货币服务以及在定期契约中预支货币的价格,在自由进入制度中降至最低可能的水平。由于这些价格以一种世界货币表达,它们将真实反映“融入市场”服务的最小供应成本。

货币出现时必定是商品——如黄金——除了货币价值外还有商品价值,因此显然要耗费成本本地生产;与该事实相结合的银行竞争,提供了针对欺诈银行业的最大可能防御。

作为货币存管机构,银行——非常类似于存管其他可互换性商品的机构,还由于商品货币的独特功能,尤其——会企图签发“虚假”仓单,也即不被真实货币所担保的寄托凭证,只要这种银行钞票承担货币替代物的职能,并被市场参与者当成实际存入的真实货币的确凿等价物。在这种情况下,签发实质无法与真实货币替代物相区分的虚假或法令银行钞票,一家银行可以通过欺

With free banking based on a universal gold standard emerging, the goal of achieving the most cost efficient solution to coordinating and facilitating interspatial and intertemporal exchanges within the framework of a universally integrated market is accomplished. Prices for the service of safekeeping, transporting and clearing money, as well as for advancing money in time-contracts would drop to their lowest possible levels under a regime of free entry. And since these prices would be expressed in terms of one universal money, they would truly reflect the minimum costs of providing market-integrative services.

Moreover, bank competition combined with the fact that money must emerge as a commodity—such as gold—which in addition to its value as money has a commodity value and thus cannot be produced without significant cost-expenditure, also provides the best possible safeguard against fraudulent banking.

As money depositing institutions, banks—much like other institutions depositing fungible commodities yet more so in the case of banks because of the special role of the commodity money—are tempted to issue “fake” warehouse receipts, i.e., notes of deposit not covered by real money, as soon as such banknotes have assumed the role of money substitutes and are treated by market participants as unquestionable equivalents of actually deposited real money. In this situation, by issuing

诈及牺牲他人增加自身财富。与任何货币伪造者如出一辙，它可直接用这些假钞购买财货而致富。由于货币伪造的通胀后果，银行的真实财富，以及先接手假钞者的财富，通过这些交换增加；而同一时间的同一行动，造成那些后接手或从未收到新钱者的财富减少。或者，一家银行可以使用这种法币去扩张信贷，赚取利息，从而再次发生有利于银行的、欺诈性的收入及财富再分配^{【6】}。然而，这一次启动了繁荣-萧条周期：低利率水平上的新授信引起投资增长，促发与经济扩张密不可分的繁荣期；这个繁荣期必将转入萧条，因为刺激它的信贷不代表真实储蓄，相反是无中生有。因此，伴随着全新及扩张的投资结构，必将出现资本匮乏；所有投资项目要顺利完工，从而系统性不可能，反而要求紧缩先前不当投资的流动性^{【7】}。

fake or fiat banknotes that physically cannot be distinguished from genuine money substitutes, a bank can—fraudulently and at another's expense—increase its own wealth. It can directly purchase goods with such fake notes and thus enrich itself in the same way as any simple counterfeiter does. The bank's real wealth and the wealth of the early recipients of the money increases through these purchases, and at the same time and by the same action the wealth of those receiving the new money late or not at all decreases, due to the inflationary consequences of counterfeiting. Or a bank can use such fiat money to expand its credit and earn interest on it. Once again a fraudulent income and wealth redistribution in the bank's favor takes place.⁶ Yet in addition, this time a boom-bust cycle is also set in motion: Placed at a lowered interest rate, the newly granted credit causes increased investments and initially creates a boom that cannot be distinguished from an economic expansion; however, this boom must turn bust because the credit that stimulated it does not represent real savings but instead was created out of thin air. Hence, with the entire new and expanded investment structure under way, a lack of capital must arise that makes the successful completion of all investment projects systematically impossible and instead requires a contraction with a liquidation of previous malinvestments.⁷

【6】关于这个伪造过程，参阅罗斯巴德《银行的秘密》第4章；亦可参阅埃尔金·格罗斯克洛斯《货币：人的冲突》（诺曼：俄克拉荷马大学出版社，1934年），第178页与273页。

【7】关于奥地利学派商业周期理论参阅米塞斯《货币与信贷理论》（纽约，哈德森上的欧文顿：经济教育基金会，1971年）、《人的行动》第20章；哈耶克《货币理论与商业周期》（纽约：奥古斯都·M·凯利）；理查德·冯·施特里格尔《资本与生产》（维也纳：尤利乌斯·施普林格，1934年）；罗斯巴德《人经济和国家》（洛杉矶：纳什，1970年）第2卷第12章。

在金本位下，任何银行或银行体系（包括垄断体系）屈服于伪造诱惑的倾向，受到两个必要条件的约束。一方面，银行储户必须不对银行的诚信生疑——也即，他们的反欺诈警觉必须低下，否则银行挤兑会迅速揭露这些钞票的面目，使储户同步失去对钞票购买力的信任，降低对它的保留性需求，相反逃离到包含真实货币的“真实”价值，因此迫使伪造者破产。在没有法币法令的自由银行制度下，作为货币的黄金对潜在银

6On the counterfeiting process, see Rothbard, *The Mystery of Banking*, chap.IV; also Elgin Groseclose, *Money: The Human Conflict* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1934), pp. 178 and 273.

7On the Austrian business cycle theory, see Ludwig von Mises, *The Theory of Money and Credit* (Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Foundation for Economic Education, 1971); idem, *Human Action* (Chicago: Regnery, 1966), chap. XX; F.A. Hayek, *Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle* (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1975); *Prices and Production* (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1967); Richard von Strigl, *Kapital und Produktion* (Vienna: Julius Springer, 1934); Murray N. Rothbard, *Man, Economy, and State* (Los Angeles: Nash, 1970), vol.2, chap. 12.

Under the gold standard any bank or banking system (including a monopolist one) would be constrained in its own inclination to succumb to such temptations by two requirements essential for successful counterfeiting. On the one hand, the banking public must not be suspicious of the trustworthiness of the bank—that is, its anti-fraud vigilance must be low for otherwise a bank run would quickly reveal the notes at such a pace that the public loses confidence in the notes' purchasing power, reduces its reservation demand for them and flees instead towards “real” values, including real money, and thereby

行欺诈构成另一约束，因为每家银行面临非本行顾客或他行顾客的存在。假如在该情况下，额外的假钞被某家银行混入流通，总会面临非本行顾客要求立即兑现，并从他们手中终止流通的这个事实。这家银行除非痛苦地紧缩信贷，否则无法保证兑现。事实上，只有在额外法币唯一进入本行顾客的现金储存，并被排他性地用于和本行其他顾客交换，才能避免这种纠正性紧缩。然而，因为一家银行无法知道，这样一种特殊结果是否可以实现或怎样实现，上述信贷紧缩的威胁将成为任何银行欺诈挥之不去的经济威慑^[8]。

【8】如何看待卡特尔？各竞争银行难道不会组成卡特尔，在伪造货币上达成联合？再次强调，在自由银行制度下，这几乎不可能，因为自由银行制度的特点，完全欠缺形成卡特尔的经济刺激。只要没有进入限制，任何银行卡特尔注定被划分作自愿性的，并且遭遇任何自愿性卡特尔的类似问题：面临非卡特尔成员与/或新

drives the counterfeiter into bankruptcy. Under a system of free banking, however, with no legal tender laws and gold as money, an additional constraint on potential bank fraud arises, for then every bank is faced with the existence of nonclients or clients of different banks. If in this situation additional counterfeit money is brought into circulation by a bank, it must invariably reckon with the fact that the money may end up in nonclients' hands who demand immediate redemption, which the bank then would be unable to grant without at least a painful credit contraction. In fact, such a corrective contraction could only be avoided if the additional fiat money were to go exclusively into the cash reserves of the bank's own clients and were used by them exclusively for transactions with other clients. Yet since a bank would have no way of knowing whether or not such a specific outcome could be achieved, or how to achieve it, the threat of a following credit contraction would act as an inescapable economic deterrent to any bank fraud.⁸

8What about cartels? Could not the competing banks form a cartel and agree on a joint venture in counterfeiting? Again, under free banking this is most unlikely, because a system of free banking is characterized by the complete absence of any economic incentive for cartelization. With no restrictions of entry in existence, any such bank cartel would have to be classified as voluntary and would suffer from the same

进入者的威胁；还要认识到，与所有卡特尔协议一样，银行卡特尔将有利于低效的卡特尔成员，而不利于高效的卡特尔成员，其行动要想成功，完全缺少经济依据，并且任何组成卡特尔的尝试，将很快陷入低迷的经济效率。并且，只要利用假币扩张信贷，银行协调一致的行动将引发一场全面的繁荣-萧条周期。这也会阻止卡特尔的形成。关于自由银行理论参阅米塞斯《人的行动》第 434-438 页；罗斯巴德《银行的秘密》第 8 章。

贰、国家和货币与银行的垄断

目前的经济秩序，以国家货币而非世界货币为特征；以法币而非作为商品货币的黄金为特征；以垄断性中央银行而非自由银行业为特征；以伴随永久性银行欺诈，周而复始的收入及财富再分配，持续通货膨胀及循环商业周期，而非避免所有这些后果的百分百准备银行业为特征。

那么，与人凭借经济一体化实现财富最大化的自利心正好相反，压倒经济性利益的另一种反

problems as any voluntary cartel: Faced with the threat of non cartelists and/or new entrants, and recognizing that like all cartel agreements, a banking cartel would favor the less efficient cartel members at the expense of the more efficient ones, there is simply no economic basis for successful action, and any attempt to cartelize would quickly break down as economically inefficient. Moreover, insofar as the counterfeit money would be employed to expand credit, banks acting in concert would set off a full-scale boom-bust cycle. This, too, would deter cartelization. See on the theory of free banking Mises, *Human Action*, pp. 434-48; Rothbard, *The Mystery of Banking*, chap. VIII.

II. THE STATE AND THE MONOPOLIZATION OF MONEY AND BANKING

The present economic order is characterized by national monies instead of one universal money; by fiat money instead of a commodity such as gold; by monopolistic central banking instead of free banking; and by permanent bank fraud, and steadily repeated income and wealth redistribution, permanent inflation and recurring business cycles as its economic counterparts, rather than 100-percent-reserve banking with none of these consequences.

In complete contradiction, then, to man's self-interest of maximizing wealth through economic integration, different antieconomic

经济性利益，必须为目前货币秩序的出现负责。

一个人要么可以通过拓殖、生产及契约取得财产，要么通过掠夺剥削拓殖者、生产者及契约者取得财产，除此外别无他法。两者之于人类都是自然的方式。与生产及契约相伴的，总是非生产及非契约取得财产的过程。并且在经济发展的历程中，正如前一利益可导致生产性企业的形成，后一利益也可导致大规模剥削业，并带来政权或政府^{【9】}。

【9】与公共选择学派的主张相反，政府和私人企业从事的业务根本不同，正相反，它们的运营方式有天壤之别。两种制度类型源于不同的、敌对的利益。作为政府形成的基础，剥削掠夺中的“政治”利益，以既存财富乃至“经济”利益的存在为先决条件，即至少要有一人首先生产这些财富（反之则不成立）。但同时，政治性利益愈显赫成功，就愈破坏经济性利益。公共选择学派十分正确地指出每个人——一位政府雇员与一家经济性企业雇员一样——通常喜欢更高而非更低的收入，这

interests prevailing over economic ones must be responsible for the emergence of the contemporary monetary order.

One can acquire and increase wealth either through homesteading, producing and contractual exchange, or by expropriating and exploiting homesteaders, producers, or contractual exchangers. There are no other ways. Both methods are natural to mankind. Alongside an interest in producing and contracting there has always been an interest in nonproductive and noncontractual property and wealth acquisitions. And in the course of economic development, just as the former interest can lead to the formation of productive enterprises firms and corporations, so can the latter lead to large scale enterprises and bring about governments or states.⁹

9Contrary to the claim of the public choice school, states and private firms are not doing essentially the same sort of business, but instead are engaged in categorically different types of operations. Both types of institutions are the outcome of different, antagonistic interests. The “political” interest in exploitation and expropriation underlying the formation of states obviously requires and presupposes the existence of wealth, and hence an “economic” interest of at least one person in producing such wealth in the first place (while the reverse is not true). But at the same time, the more pronounced and successful political

个利益解释了为什么见到政府成长势头不输任何其他行业。

然而，这个发现——比起其他活生生的人，政治家和官僚不会更为利他或关心公益——难说新鲜，即便它时而被忽视。然而，对于公共选择真正新鲜的是，从这个正确洞察中得出的推论，即所有机构因此应被看作一模一样动机的产物，并被一样地分析处理——这个荒谬结论是错的。不顾及个人的主观信念，个人的行动融入政府或“正常”经济性企业的制度框架，并且在前一种或后一种框架中追求他财富最大化的利益，实际上产生了截然不同的结果。关于公共选择学派的代表性陈述，如“政府作为一家企业”，“政治性交换”本质上同于经济性交换，参阅布坎南和塔洛克《一致同意的计算》第19页；对于这一观点的批评及经济与政治手段的根本区别，参阅奥本海默《国家》（纽约：前卫出版社，1914年）第24-27页。罗斯巴德《权力与市场》第2章。

interests are, the more destructive of economic interests this will be. The public choice school is perfectly correct in pointing out that everyone—a government employee no less than an employee of an economic firm—normally prefers a higher to a lower income and that this interest explains why government should be expected to have no less of a tendency to grow than any other enterprise.

However, this discovery—that politicians and bureaucrats are no more altruistic or concerned about the public good than are people in other walks of life—is hardly new even if it has sometimes been overlooked. Yet what is in fact new with public choice is the inference drawn from this correct insight then, that all institutions should hence be regarded as an outgrowth of identical motivational forces and be treated analytically on a par with each other—is false to the point of being ridiculous. Regardless of a person’s subjective beliefs, integrating one’s actions into the institutional framework of either the state or a “normal” economic enterprise and pursuing one’s wealth maximizing interests here or there will in fact produce categorically different outcomes. On a representative statement of the public choice school regarding the idea of the “state as a firm” and of “political exchange” as essentially the same as economic exchange, see James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent* (Ann Arbor: University of

生产规模及发展所受限制，一方面来自于自愿性顾客需求，另一方面来自于其他生产者的竞争，从而不断逼迫每家想维持生意的企业，在最低可能成本上运营。生产性企业要形成规模，就必须以最有效方式满足顾客最迫切的需求。唯有自愿性消费者的购买才能支撑起它的规模。

对其他机构类型——政府——的限制，则截然不同^[10]。首先，认为它的兴起、发展与经济性企业具有同等意义，是有违常理的。无论如何延伸想象力，一个人都不能说，那些必须将（部分）资产上缴政府的人——拓殖者、生产者及契约交换者——需要这种服务。正相反，他们接受这项服务属于被迫，这实际上是根本没有需求的关键证据。另一方面，政府也不像生产性企业一样受到竞争的限制。与企业不同，政府不必以最

Michigan Press, 1965), p. 19; for a critique of this view and the fundamental difference between economic and political means, see Franz Oppenheimer, *The State* (New York: Vanguard Press, 1914), pp. 24–27; Murray N. Rothbard, *Power and Market* (Kansas City: Sheed Andrews and McMeel, 1977), chap. 2.

The size and growth of a productive enterprise is constrained on the one hand by voluntary consumer demand, and on the other hand by the competition of other producers that continuously forces each firm to operate with the lowest possible costs if it wishes to stay in business. For such an enterprise to grow in size, the most urgent consumer wants must be served in the most efficient ways. Nothing but voluntary consumer purchases support its size.

The constraints on the other type of institution—the state—are altogether different.¹⁰ For one thing, it is obviously absurd to say that its emergence and growth is determined by demand in the same sense as an economic firm. One cannot say by any stretch of the imagination that the homesteaders, the producers and the contractual exchangers who must surrender (part of) their assets to a state have demanded such a service. Instead, they are coerced into accepting it, and this is conclusive proof of the fact that the service is not at all in demand. On the other hand, the state is also not constrained in the same way by competition as is a

低成本方式而是代价高昂地维持运营,因为它能通过课税或管制,将高昂代价转嫁给竞争对手。纵然不顾无需求、亦无效率的事实,政府也步步崭露狰狞。

【10】关于以下国家理论可参阅罗斯巴德《为了新自由》、《自由的伦理》;霍普《财产权、无政府与国家》(奥佩登:西德出版社,1987年);《社会主义和资本主义的理论》;安东尼德·雅赛《国家》(牛津:布莱克威尔,1985年)。

一家剥削性组织的发展,不受成本及需求条件的限制,而受公众舆论的限制:非生产性及非契约性财产取得需要强制,而强制造就牺牲者。在一个人(或一群人)剥削一个人或大约两三人(或规模大致相当的一群人),用武力持续镇压抵抗是可以想象的。然而,在少数人掠夺剥削十倍、百倍、千倍规模人口的类似实际情况下,不可想象仅凭武力就能够解释对反抗的持续镇压。为此,该团体除了强制力量外,必须要有公众支持。多数人必须认同其运作的合法性。这种认同

productive firm. For unlike such a firm, the state must not keep its costs of operation at a minimum, but can operate at above-minimum costs, because it is able to shift its higher costs onto its competitors by taxing or regulating their behavior. Insofar as a state emerges, then, it does so in spite of the fact that it is neither in demand nor efficient.

10On the following theory of the state, see Murray N. Rothbard, *For a New Liberty* (New York: Macmillan, 1978); *The Ethics of Liberty* (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1982); Hans-Hermann Hoppe, *Eigentum, Anarchie und Staat* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1987); *A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism* (Boston: Kluwer, 1989); Anthony de Jasay, *The State* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985).

Instead of by cost and demand conditions, the growth of an exploiting firm is constrained by public opinion: Nonproductive and noncontractual property acquisitions require coercion, and coercion creates victims. It is conceivable that resistance can be lastingly broken by force in the case of one man (or one group of men) exploiting one or maybe two or three others (or a group of roughly the same size). It is inconceivable, however, to imagine that force alone can account for the breaking down of resistance in the actually familiar case of small minorities expropriating and exploiting populations ten, hundreds, or thousands of times their size. For this to happen a firm must have public

可从积极支持到消极顺从，然而，承认这点必然意味着，对任何实施非生产性及非契约型财产掠夺的企图，大多数人已然放弃积极或消极抵抗。不是表现出对这些行动的义愤填膺，或对参与者的鄙夷蔑视和不予协助（更不必说积极破坏），与之相反，大多数人必须积极或消极支持政府。支持政府的公众舆论必定抵消财产牺牲者的抵抗，从而使积极抵抗徒劳无功。政府本身乃至竭力确保及提升政治地位的每位政府雇员的目标，是且必然是凭借制造有利的公众舆论及合法性，最大化财富和收入的剥削性取得。

为此，政府有两种可行的互补措施。一方面是意识形态宣传，花费大量时间精力说服公众凡事不能只看表面：剥削实际上是自由；税收实际上是自愿；非契约关系实际上是“概念性”契约关系^[11]；没有人被任何人统治，我们只是自己

support in addition to coercive force. A majority of the population must accept its operations as legitimate. This acceptance can range from active enthusiasm to passive resignation. However, acceptance it must be in the sense that a majority must have given up the idea of actively or passively resisting any attempt to enforce nonproductive and noncontractual property acquisitions. Instead of displaying outrage over such actions, of showing contempt for everyone who engages in them, and of doing nothing to help make them successful (not to mention actively trying to obstruct them), a majority must actively or passively support them. State-supportive public opinion must counterbalance the resistance of victimized property owners such that active resistance appears futile. And the goal of the state, then, and of every state employee who wants to contribute toward securing and improving his own position within the state, is and must be that of maximizing exploitatively acquired wealth and income by producing favorable public opinion and creating legitimacy.

There are two complementary measures available to the state trying to accomplish this. On the one hand, there is ideological propaganda. Much time and effort is spent persuading the public that things are not really as they appear: Exploitation is really freedom; taxes are really voluntary: noncontractual relations are really “conceptually”contractual

统治自己；没有政府就没有法律也没有安全；且贫者将会灭绝，等等。

另一方面是再分配。不只是成为他人生产财富的寄生性消费者，政府将它部分强制掠夺的财富，再分配给政府机构以外的人，从而企图诱使他们承担支持政府之责。

但不是随便哪种再分配都能奏效。正如意识形态必须服务于政府目的，再分配亦如是。再分配须消耗成本，因此需要理由。政府采取再分配，可不只是为了行善，就好像馈赠礼物；也不仅仅是为从交换中赚取尽可能高的收入，就像贸易涉及的正常经济业务。之所以采取再分配，是为了保证剥削掠夺的存续及扩张。再分配必须服从这个战略目标。它的成本必须以更多政府收入及财富来正当化。掌管政府机构的政治性企业家，像普通商人一样，在这项任务中可能犯错，因为关于哪种再分配措施对目标最管用，他们的决策要先于实际结果做出。假如发生企业家错误，政府的收入实际不增反降，甚至可能危及自身的存在。政府的政治目的和政治性企业家才能的功

ones;11 no one is ruled by anyone but we all rule ourselves; without the state neither law nor security exists; and the poor would perish, etc.

On the other hand, there is redistribution. Instead of being a mere parasitic consumer of goods that others have produced, the state redistributes some of its coercively appropriated wealth to people outside the state apparatus and thereby attempts to corrupt them into assuming state-supportive roles.

But not just any redistribution will do. Just as ideologies must serve a—statist—purpose, so must redistribution. Redistribution requires cost-expenditures and thus needs a justification. It is not undertaken by the state simply in order to do something nice for some people, as, for instance, when someone gives someone else a present. Nor is it done simply to gain as high an income as possible from exchanges, as when an ordinary economic business engages in trade. It is undertaken in order to secure the further existence and expansion of exploitation and expropriation. Redistribution must serve this strategic purpose. Its costs must be justified in terms of increased state income and wealth. The political entrepreneurs in charge of the state apparatus can err in this task, as can ordinary businessmen, because their decisions about which redistributive measures best serve this purpose have to be made in anticipation of their actual results. And if entrepreneurial errors occur,

能，就是为了避免这种情况，相反选择某种增加政府收入的政策。

尽管再分配的具体形式或其具体结果无法预料，更不用说情况一变再变，政府的本质仍然要求它的再分配政策必须遵循一定秩序，显示出一定的结构规律性^{【12】}。

【11】关于通过“概念性同意”这个词，尤其是由布坎南传播的语义混淆，参阅霍普“公共财货理论的谬误与安防生产”《自由至上学报》9, no. 1 (1989年)；同上，第1章。

【12】参阅霍普《财产权、无政府与国家》第5章第3节；《社会主义和资本主义的理论》第8章。

作为最大化掠夺财富的剥削性企业，政府运用再分配措施的首要领域是安防生产，也即，警察、防务以及司法体系的生产。政府最终依赖于强制，因此没有武装力量，就寸步难行。任何为满足安防及防务需求，自然在市场中出现的竞争性武装力量，是对政府存在的威胁，必须被消灭

the state's income may actually fall instead of rising, possibly even jeopardizing its own existence. It is the very purpose of state politics and the function of political entrepreneurship to avoid such situations and to choose instead a policy that increases state income.

While neither the particular forms of redistributive policies nor their particular outcomes can be predicted, but rather change with changing circumstances, the nature of the state still requires that its redistributive policy must follow a certain order and display a certain structural regularity.¹²

11 On the semantic confusion spread through the term “conceptual agreement” in particular by James Buchanan, see Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “The Fallacies of the Public Goods Theory and the Production of Security,” *Journal of libertarian Studies* 9, no. 1 (1989); supra, chap. 1.

12 See Hoppe, *Eigentum, Anarchie, und Staat*, chap. 5.3; *A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism*, chap. 8.

As a firm engaged in the maximization of exploitatively appropriated wealth, the state's first and foremost area in which it applies redistributive measures is the production of security, i.e., of police, defense, and a judicial system. The state ultimately rests on coercion and thus cannot do without armed forces. Any competing armed forces—which would naturally emerge on the market in order to satisfy a

殆尽。政府平灭它是为将这项工作集于一身，从而成为某区域防务的垄断供应者及再分配者。同样，一个竞争性司法体系将对政府合法性主张构成紧迫威胁。再次强调，为了它本身的存在，司法体系也必须被垄断，且司法服务必须被囊括入再分配方案。

作为从事有组织侵犯机构的政府本质，也解释了下一个领域再分配活动的重要性：交通及通讯的重要性。没有对河流、海岸、海运航路、街道及道路、机场、邮政及电信体系的控制，就无法实现常态化的掠夺。因此，这些东西也必须成为再分配的目标。

教育领域具有类似的重要性。由于政府依赖公众舆论及其对政府行动合法性的承认，对政府而言，尽可能消除不利意识形态的竞争及传播国家意识形态是必要的。政府试图以再分配为基础提供教育服务来实现这一点。

在国家教育体系的推进下，另一再分配的关键领域是政府再分配权力本身，即政府假定的掠

genuine demand for security and protection services—are a threat to its existence and must be eliminated. To do this is to arrogate the job to itself and become the monopolistic supplier and redistributor of protection services for a defined territory. Similarly, a competing judicial system would pose an immediate threat to a state's claim to legitimacy. And again, for the sake of its own existence the judicial system must also be monopolized and legal services included in redistributive schemes.

The state's nature as an institution engaged in organized aggression also explains the importance of the next field of redistributive activities: that of traffic and communication. There can be no regular exploitation without monopolistic control of rivers, coasts, seaways, streets, railroads, airports, mail, and telecommunication systems. Thus, these things, too, must become the object of redistribution.

Of similar importance is the field of education. Depending as it does on public opinion and its acceptance of the state's actions as legitimate, it is essential for a state that unfavorable ideological competition be eliminated as far as possible and statist ideologies spread. The state attempts to accomplish this by providing educational services on a redistributive basis.

Furthered by a system of state education, the next crucial area for redistribution is that of redistributing state power itself, i.e., the right

夺、剥削及再分配非生产性占有资产的权利。带有明显的战略理由，去掉对进入政府本身与/或特定政府职位的限制，政府逐渐采纳了一种原则上将每个职位向人人开放，承诺在政府政治决策中平等及广泛参与权的组织结构。每个人——不只是特权贵族——接受政府的法定相关利益，从而减少对政府权力的抵抗^{【13】}。

包括法律及安防生产、交通、通讯及教育的垄断，以及政府统治本身的民主化，现代政府的所有特点都已得到辨别，除了一点：政府对货币和银行的垄断。尽管简短，其他所有特点——它们如何能够及如何必须被理解为履行战略职能——都已经得到解释：为什么以及以何种方式，它们不是由供求力量或单纯良好行为决定的一般生产性贡献，而是服务于稳定以至尽可能提升政府剥削掠夺收入及财富能力的再分配行动。

货币和银行垄断，是现代政府依赖的最后支柱。实际上，这大概是增加政府收入的最珍贵工

assumed by the state to expropriate, exploit and redistribute nonproductively appropriated assets. Instead of remaining an institution which restricts entry into itself and/or particular government positions, a state increasingly, and for obvious strategic reasons, adopts an organizational structure which in principle opens up every position to everyone and grants equal and universal rights of participation and competition in the determination of state policy. Everyone—not just a privileged nobility—receives a legal stake in the state in order to reduce the resistance to state power.¹³

With the monopolization of law and security production, traffic, communication and education, as well as the democratization of state rule itself, all features of the modern state have been identified but one: the state's monopolization of money and banking. For all but this one it has been explained, albeit briefly, how they can and must be understood as performing strategic functions: why and how they are not normal productive contributions determined by demand and supply forces or simply good deeds, but redistributive activities which serve the purpose of stabilizing and, if possible, increasing a state's exploitatively appropriated income and wealth.

The monopolization of money and banking is the ultimate pillar on which the modern state rests. In fact, it has probably become the most

具。再没有别的领域，能够像垄断货币和银行一样，让政府更直接地、更快捷地在再分配-开支和剥削-收入之间建立联系。

像每个人一样，偏好高而非低的收入，然而又不同于其他人，从事非生产性、非契约型财产掠夺业的政府，关于货币和银行的立场是明确的：其目标为政府垄断性控制的纯粹法定货币最好地满足。因为唯有这样，所有伪造货币的障碍被拆除（除了高通胀带来的货币体系的全面崩溃），政府才能以损害别人增加自身收入和财富，而无需付出成本及担忧破产^{【14】}。

【13】关于民主作为扩张的政府权力的手段，参阅茹弗内尔《论权力》（纽约：维京出版社，1949年），第9-10页。

【14】关于政府实现无限制伪造货币垄断的内在趋势，参阅罗斯巴德《银行的秘密》、《政府对我们的钱做了什么？》（加利福尼亚州圣拉斐尔：自由至上出版社，1985年）。

cherished instrument for increasing state income. For nowhere else can the state make the connection between redistribution-expenditure and exploitation-return more directly, quickly and securely than by monopolizing money and banking. And nowhere else are the state's schemes less clearly understood than here.

Preferring, like everyone, a higher to a lower income, yet unlike others, being in the business of nonproductive and noncontractual property acquisitions, the state's position regarding money and banking is obvious: Its objectives are served best by a pure fiat money monopolistically controlled by the state. For only then are all barriers to counterfeiting removed (short of an entire breakdown of the monetary system through hyperinflation) and the state can increase its own income and wealth at another's expense practically without cost and without having to fear bankruptcy.¹⁴

13 On democratization as a means of expanding state power, see Bertrand de Jouvenel, *On Power* (New York: Viking Press, 1949), pp. 9-10.

14 On the state's inherent tendency toward achieving an unrestricted counterfeiting monopoly, see Murray N. Rothbard, *The Mystery of Banking*; idem, *What Has Government Done to Our Money?* (San Rafael, Calif.: Libertarian Publishers, 1985).

然而，这个令人艳羡的事态，在其实现道路上障碍重重。一方面，存在这个不可更改的事实，即货币出现时只能是商品（始于法币乃不可能）^{【15】}。另一方面，尽管比起课税手段，以假币致富，无疑不太醒目，但它必定还是会引起注意，当然包括银行的注意，尤其当伪造屡屡发生时。所以对政府而言，制度性伪造货币无法侥幸成功，除非与引起公众舆论其他有利变化的再分配措施相结合。这个问题及政府的天然欲望，基本上决定了政府的行动步骤。

【15】关于货币不可能源于法定纸币，参阅回溯定理：米塞斯《货币及信贷理论》第 97-123 页；《人的行动》第 408-410 页；罗斯巴德《人、经济和国家》第 1 卷，第 231-237 页。

政府发现，自由市场过程已将黄金确立为货币，并导致自由银行体系。它的目标是破坏这个体系，随之拆除伪造货币的所有障碍。从技术上讲（忽视此时涉及到的心理困难），为实现这个目标所须采取步骤的顺序于是都规定好了：第一

However, there are obstacles in the way of attaining this enviable state of affairs. On one hand, there is the inexorable fact that money can emerge only as a commodity. (It is impossible to start out with fiat money).¹⁵ On the other hand, there is the problem that while enrichment through counterfeiting is no doubt less conspicuous than doing so by means of taxation, it is nonetheless a measure that is bound to be noticed, certainly by the banks, particularly if it occurs on a regular basis. And so it is also impossible for the state to get away with institutionalized counterfeiting unless it can be combined with redistributive measures which are capable of bringing about another favorable change in public opinion. This problem and the state's natural desire essentially determine the course of its actions.

¹⁵On the impossibility of money originating as a fiat paper money, see the regression theorem: Mises, *The Theory of Money and Credit*, pp. 97-123; *Human Action*, pp. 408-10; Rothbard, *Man, Economy, and State*, vol. I, pp. 231-37.

As the result of free market processes, the state finds gold established as money and a system of free banking. Its goal is the destruction of this system and with it the removal of all obstacles to counterfeiting. Technically (ignoring for the moment all psychological difficulties involved in this), the sequence of steps that must be taken in

步，政府必须垄断黄金铸造。在黄金命名上移花接木，改用法令标识取代通用重量单位，便于从心理上去除黄金国际化。这拆除了通往伪造货币的第一个重要障碍，因为这给予政府一种制度性手段，即通过货币贬值的系统过程自我致富。

第二步，必须系统性鼓励使用货币替代物而非实物黄金，并且颁行法币法令支持这种趋势。不必铸造黄金，只须印刷纸张。伪造货币过程的成本因此低廉得多。

然而，前面所提问题依然存在。只要自由银行体系处于运作，就无法阻止伪钞返回新发行者要求兑现，于是它无法履行义务，那么，至少紧缩性调整不可避免。为克服这个障碍，下一步政府必须垄断银行体系，或强迫竞争银行组成卡特尔，并接受政府专营中央银行的监管。一旦政府掌握垄断或卡特尔银行体系，就能发挥整个银行体系协作伪造货币过程的作用，避免这种风险。

order to accomplish this objective is then dictated: In a first step the minting of gold must be monopolized by the state. This serves the purpose of psychologically deinternationalizing gold by shifting the emphasis from gold as denominated in universal terms of weight to gold as denominated in terms of fiat labels. And it removes a first important obstacle toward counterfeiting because it gives the state the very institutional means of enriching itself through a systematic process of currency debasement.

Second, the use of money substitutes instead of actual gold must be systematically encouraged and such a tendency backed up by the enactment of legal tender laws. The counterfeiting process thereby becomes much less costly. Instead of having to remint gold, only paper tickets must be printed.

However, the problem already discussed earlier remains. As long as a system of free banking is in operation, the counterfeit notes cannot be prevented from returning to the new issuer with the request for redemption, and he then cannot—at least not without a contractive adjustment—fulfill his obligations. To overcome this obstacle, in the next step the state must monopolize the banking system or force the competing banks into a cartel under the tutelage of its own state-operated central bank. Once it is in command of a monopolized or cartelized

下一步，黄金必须国有化，也即政府必须要求所有银行将黄金寄托在中央银行，完全以货币替代物而非黄金从事业务。这样，黄金作为一种实际运用的交换媒介从市场上消失，日常交易日益以中央银行钞票的运用为特征。

最终，黄金已淡出视野并为政府独有，政府必然通过违背契约义务，并宣布钞票不可兑现，切断与黄金的最后联系。起初作为商品货币本位的黄金，使纸钞实际获得购买力成为可能；在黄金废墟之上，纯法币本位已获确立且眼下能维持运作，最终总算让政府获得它曾渴求的无限伪造货币的权力。

彻底自主伪造货币的目标，同样规定了心理方面必须采取的策略。显然，在实现最终目标的过程中，政府制造了牺牲者，因此也需要公众舆论。政府要企及伪造货币的绝对权力，必须附带再分配措施，才能取得战胜一切迎面抵抗力量的必要支持。它必须寻找盟友。

banking system, the state can put the coordinated and joint counterfeiting process of the entire banking system into effect that avoids this risk.

In the next step gold must be nationalized, i.e., the state must require all banks to deposit their gold at the central bank and conduct their business exclusively with money substitutes instead of gold. This way gold disappears from the market as an actually used medium of exchange and instead everyday transactions become increasingly characterized by the use of central banknotes.

Finally, gold being already out of sight and in the state's sole possession, the state must cut the last tie to gold by reneging on its contractual obligations and declaring its notes irredeemable. Built on the ruins of gold, which as a commodity money standard initially made it possible that paper notes could actually acquire any purchasing power, a pure fiat money standard has been erected and can now be kept in operation, at long last handing the state the unlimited counterfeiting power that it had been vying for.

The goal of a complete counterfeiting autonomy likewise dictates the strategy that must be pursued on the psychological front. Obviously, in approaching its ultimate goal the state creates victims and thus it is also in need of favorable public opinion. Its rise to absolute counterfeiting power must be accompanied by redistributive measures

考虑到政府对法律和秩序、交通、通讯、教育的垄断，以及组织结构的民主化——显然它们都是再分配措施，本身意味着损害别人而有利某人——若非全无可能，按明确的社会阶级区分受益者和损失者存在困难：受益（损）者是跨不同阶级的；在一个社会阶级内部也会有受益者和损失者；再分配模式会随时间推移而不断变化。在所有这些情况下，政府再分配开支及其回报的联系仅是间接的：例如特定的教育开支，是否得到政府收入增加的回报，只有以后才能知道；即便如此，也难以将结果明确归因。从另一方面说，在货币和银行垄断的情况下，在政府机构外部人中，谁会再分配政策受益与否，将一目了然；从社会学上说，受益者可由特定社会阶级轻易辨认。在这种情况下，政府给予再分配优惠及使自身致富是直接的及闭环的，归因是明确的：政府被迫让各银行及银行家社会阶级做合伙人，允许他们从事假币运营，从而与政府结党营私。

that generate the support necessary to overcome all upcoming forces of resistance. It must look for allies.

Regarding the state's monopolization of law and order, traffic, communication and education, and the democratization of its organizational structure—while it is clear that they are all redistributive measures and as such imply favoring one person at the expense of another—it is difficult if not impossible to identify the gainers and the losers with definite social classes: there can be gainers (or losers) across different classes; within one social class there can be gainers and losers; and the pattern of redistribution can shift over time. In all of these cases the link between the state's redistributive expenditures and their payoffs is only indirect: whether or not certain education expenditures, for instance, pay off in terms of increased state income will only become visible at a later date; and even then it will be difficult to attribute such an outcome to a definite cause. In the case of the monopolization of money and banking, on the other hand, who outside the apparatus of the state itself will be the benefactors of its redistributive policies and who the losers will be is clear at once; and sociologically the benefactors can easily be identified with a specific social class. In this case the connection between the state's handing out redistributive favors and its own enrichment is direct and close-circuited; and the attribution of

银行家将是首批意识到政府企图伪造货币的人。没有相反的特殊激励，他们本无理由支持这样的行动，却有各种理由尽快揭露及制止之。政府此时遇到的，将不只是反对：银行家，因为他们在经济生活中的崇高地位，尤其是因为他们源于便利跨区、跨期交换业务本质的，作为职业团体的长远相互联系，将成为政府可能遇到的最大反对势力。将他们安插在诈术诡计中的政府建议，是将这些潜在敌人，转变为天然同盟的必要激励。熟悉假币思想及其使人自肥的巨大潜力，同时也明白在自由竞争银行业及金本位下，决不可能从事伪造而不立即濒临破产，银行家面临几乎难以抵抗的诱惑。追随政府垄断货币及银行业，也意味着他实现迅速致富的梦想。一旦纯法币本位建立，不仅是政府如愿以偿。假设在央行承担最后救助伪造者职能的、部分准备银行业的货币制度下，政府赋予银行家在政府伪钞外伪造

causes obvious: The state is compelled to make banks and the social class of bankers its accomplices by allowing them to participate in its counterfeiting operations and so enrich themselves along with the state's own enrichment.

Bankers would be the first ones to become aware of the state's attempts at counterfeiting. Without special incentives to the contrary they would have no reason to support such actions and every reason to uncover and stop them as quickly as possible. And the state would not run into just any opposition here: bankers, because of their exalted position in economic life and in particular because of their far-reaching interconnectedness as a professional group resulting from the nature of their business as facilitators of interspatial and intertemporal exchanges, would be the most formidable opposition one might encounter. The incentive necessary to turn such potential enemies into natural allies is the state's offer to cut them in on its own fraudulent machinations. Familiar with the ideas of counterfeiting and its great potential for one's own enrichment, but knowing, too, that there is no chance of engaging in it without running the immediate risk of bankruptcy under free, competitive banking and a gold standard, bankers are faced with an almost irresistible temptation. Going along with the state's policy of monopolizing money and banking also means fulfilling one's own

货币的特权，银行极易心悦诚服地将这种货币体系的建立，视为最后目标及万用灵丹^{【16】}。

【16】关于银行精英积极参与联邦储备体系的建立，参见罗斯巴德《银行家的秘密》第15、16章。

从经济学上说，这个同盟，即政府作为主合伙人，银行体系为其附庸，将导致永久性通货膨胀（仅受的限制乃滥用它必然导致整个货币体系崩溃），信贷扩张及周而复始的繁荣-萧条周期，以及有利于政府及银行的、顺畅无阻的收入及财富再分配。

然而，更加重要的是同盟的社会含义：随着这个同盟的形成，与政府彼此利益紧密相联的统治阶级在市民社会中确立。政府通过合作，现在能将其强制力延伸到几乎每个社会领域。

dreams of getting rich fast. Not only the state comes into its own once a pure fiat money standard is established. Provided that they are accorded the privilege by the state to counterfeit in addition to its own counterfeited notes under a monetary regime of less than 100-percent-reserve banking, with the central bank functioning as a last resort counterfeiter banks can only too easily be persuaded to regard the establishment of such a monetary system as their ultimate goal and as a universal panacea.¹⁶

16 On the enthusiastic participation of the banking elite in the creation of the Federal Reserve System, see Rothbard, *Mystery of Banking*, chaps. XV, XVI.

Economically, this coalition between the state—as the dominant partner—and the banking system—as its affiliate—leads to permanent inflation (constrained only by the imperative of not overdoing it and causing a breakdown of the entire monetary system), to credit expansion and steadily recurring boom-bust cycles, and to a smooth uninterrupted income and wealth redistribution in the state's and the banks' favor.

Still more important, however, are the sociological implications of this alliance: With its formation a ruling class whose interests are tied in closely with those of the state is established within civil society. Through its cooperation the state can now extend its coercive power to practically

在政府-银行同盟建立前，政府与社会，也即在剥削统治阶级及受剥削生产者阶级之间的社会界限，是泾渭分明的。一边是生产所有经济财富的市民社会，另一边是寄生于他人生产上的政府及其代表。人们要么是市场社会成员，要么是政府成员，并且明白他们自身利益要么与前者联系，要么与后者联系。无疑，后来的再分配活动，损害他人而有利社会部分人，有助于将利己心从追求经济融合转移到支持剥削。然而，在这个阶段，社会阶级的堕落是非系统性的。它不是有广泛社会联结的社会阶级的坠落，而是零散的个人或组织的坠落。通过特定政府的再分配活动，以上利益仅仅与政府利益相当脆弱地联系，而没有直接的金钱纽带。

随着政府-银行联盟的形成，一切都发生改变。市场社会某些人及政府之间的现金纽带出现——没有什么比共同金钱利益，更能让人们紧密

every area of society.

Before the establishment of the state-banking alliance, the sociological separation between state and society, i.e., between an exploitative ruling class and a class of exploited producers, is almost complete and clearly visible. Here is a civil society that produces all economic wealth; and there is the state and its representatives who draw parasitically on what others have produced. People are members either of civil society or the state and see their own interests connected with either the former or the latter. To be sure, there are then redistributive activities going on which favor parts of society at the expense of others and which help divert interests from the pursuit of economic integration to that of supporting exploitation. Yet social corruption is unsystematic at this stage. It is not corruption of social classes which are connected society-wide, but rather corruption of various disparate and dispersed individuals or groups. And these interests are only connected to those of the state rather tenuously through certain specific redistributive state activities, rather than through a direct cash-connection.

With the formation of a state-banking alliance all this becomes different. A cash-connection between parts of civil society and the state exists—and nothing ties people more closely together than joint financial interests. Moreover, this connection is established between the state and

联系。并且，被认为与政府建立纽带的，不仅是有着紧密内在联系的社会阶级，而且是有最大影响力及权势的社会阶级。实际上，并非仅有银行，与政府及其剥削政策利益勾结。银行的主要顾客，商业势力及产业领袖，也深陷伪造货币的政府计划中。除了政府和银行，他们是大多数定期制造假钞的最早接手者。在伪钞逐渐播及整个经济体系之前就接手伪钞，从而改变相对价格，提高整体价格水平，并以欺诈性低利率接受信贷，他们也使自身变得更加富有，而让所有储蓄者、以及所有较迟或从未到手假钞者付出代价^{【17】}。

【17】关于政府-银行-商业联盟的形成，参阅盖布里尔·考尔科《保守主义的胜利》（芝加哥：自由出版社，1967年）；《铁道和管制》（纽约普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1965年）；詹姆斯·韦恩斯坦《自由国度的公司理想》（波士顿：灯塔出版社，1968年）；理查德·拉多什及罗斯巴德编《利维坦新史》（纽约：杜登，1972年）。

并且，这个在工业势力、银行及政府间的金钱联盟，为每次成功的事态发展所巩固。信贷扩

what can be identified not only as a closely interconnected social class, but as one of the most widely influential and powerful ones. In fact, it is not just the banks who join interests with the state and its policy of exploitation. The banks' major clients, the business establishment and the leaders of industry become deeply integrated in the state's counterfeiting schemes, too. For it is they who, apart from state and banks, are the earliest receivers of most of the regularly created counterfeit money. In receiving it before it gradually ripples through the economic system, and thereby changes relative prices as well as increases the overall price level, and in receiving credit at fraudulently lowered interest rates, they too enrich themselves at the expense of all savers and all later recipients or nonrecipients of this money.¹⁷

17On the formation of the state-banking-business coalition, see Gabriel Kolko, *The Triumph of Conservatism* (Chicago: Free Press, 1967); *Railroads and Regulations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965); James Weinstein, *The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968); Richard Radosh and Murray N. Rothbard, eds., *A New History of Leviathan* (New York: Dutton, 1972).

Moreover, this financial coalition between the industrial establishment, banks, and the state tends to be reinforced by each successive course of events. The credit expansion leads to increased

张导致投资增加，并且由于不被真实储蓄的增长所担保，将不可避免地导致纠正性紧缩。为了避免损失乃至破产，银行顾客将光临银行体系，增加对流动性（如货币）的要求。顺理成章地，银行为避免自身损失，急切帮助顾客摆脱困难——帮助愈多，他们愈牢固成为忠实顾客。自己做不到的，就向政府及中央银行求援。政府则得到又一次自肥良机，通过新一轮伪造手段，将急需的流动性准许和提供给银行体系以至商业势力。这个同盟是全新的；凭借挽救传统银行业及工业精英，使其面对经济竞争免于垮台，相反允许他们维持现状，甚至进一步增加已集中在手的财富，政府再次确立了它的支配性作用。有理由感激涕零于公众对政府及其宣传充沛有力的支持。

当然，政府与经济权力精英的同盟，决不意味着利益的彻底一致。不同的老牌工业企业也许有着不同甚至矛盾的利益；银行也是如此。类似地，银行及商业顾客的利益在许多方面不同。工

investment and—since it is not covered by an increase in genuine savings—will inevitably result in a corrective contraction. In order to avoid losses or even bankruptcy the bank's clients will approach the banking system with an increased demand for liquidity (i.e., money). Naturally, to avoid losses of their own the banks are eager to help their clients out—and the more so the more established they are as clients. Unable to do this on their own, they turn to the state and its central bank. And the state, then, being offered another chance at its own enrichment, accepts and provides the banking system, and by extension the business establishment, with the needed liquidity by means of a new round of counterfeiting. The alliance is renewed, and the state has reaffirmed its dominant role by having saved the established banking and the industrial elite from crumbling in the face of economic competition and allowing them instead to preserve the status quo or even further increase the wealth already concentrated in their hands. There is reason to be thankful and to reciprocate with invigorated public support for the state and its propaganda.

To be sure, this coalition between the state and the economic power elite by no means implies a complete identity of interests. The various established industrial enterprises may have different or even contrary interests; and the same is true for the banks. Similarly, the interests of均

业精英或银行的利益也不与政府完全一致。毕竟，银行与工业企业也处在通过生产及生产性交换赚钱的“正常”行业——无论如何可获得其他收入来源。在这一职能中，举例说，他们的利益很可能与政府的税收欲望相冲突。然而，货币和银行垄断体系的建立，仍然创造了一个由他们共享的利益：保留诸如掠夺收入的政府机构及政治手段（也即剥削）体制中的利益。不仅政府及其中央银行可能毁灭任何一家商业银行，并且直接毁灭几乎任何一家工业企业；企业愈老牌，威胁愈严重。政府也能帮助其中任何一家或全体增加财富，且富者愈富。因此，从反抗中失去愈多，且从妥协中获得愈多，经济权力精英渗入政府机构，以及让政府领袖保证商业世界金钱利益的动机就愈强烈。银行家和工业家成为政客；而政客在银行业及工业中获得地位。最终出现一种社会制度，愈发以政府及关系密切银行、商业领袖阶级，剥削其他每个人的现代世界为特征^{【18】}^{【19】}。

banks and business clients may in many respects be different. Nor do the interests of the industrial elite or the banks coincide completely with those of the state. For after all, banks as well as industrial enterprises are also in the “normal” business of making money through production and productive exchanges—whatever other sources of income acquisition may be available to them. And in this function their interests may well clash with the state’s desire for taxes, for instance. Nonetheless, the establishment of a system of monopolized money and banking still creates one interest common to all of them: an interest in the preservation of the state apparatus and the institution of political (i.e., exploitative) means of income appropriation as such. Not only could the state and its central bank destroy any commercial bank and, indirectly, practically any industrial enterprise; this threat is more severe the more established a business is. The state could also help any and all of them get richer, and more so if they are already rich. Hence, the more there is to lose from opposition and to gain from compliance, the more intensive will be the attempts by the economic power elite to infiltrate the state apparatus and have the state leaders assume financial interests in the business world. Bankers and industrialists become politicians; and politicians take positions in banking and industry. A social system emerges and is increasingly characteristic of the modern world in which the state and a

【18】在马克思主义传统中，这个社会发展阶段被命名为“垄断资本主义”、“金融资本主义”或“国家垄断资本主义”。

马克思分析的部分描述在整体上是有价值的。在揭示政府及商业的个人及金钱联系方面，他们通常比起绝大多数的“布尔乔亚经济学家”更真实地描绘了现代经济秩序的图景。然而，从分析上说，他们几乎在每一件事上犯错，并颠倒了真相。

传统的、正确的前马克思主义剥削观，是由查尔斯·孔德和查尔斯·迪努瓦耶所展示的激进自由放任自由主义。根据他们所说，敌对利益不存在于作为生产要素所有者的资本家及劳动者之间，而是存在于这两者之间，即一边是社会生产者如拓殖者、生产者、契约者，包括商人以及工人，另一边是非生产性与/或非契约性攫取财富者，如政府及政府利益集团，如封建地主。这个分别最初被圣西门弄混，他一度受孔德和迪努瓦耶的影响，并将市场商人与封建地主、其他政府特权集团归入剥削者之列。马克思从圣西门那里继承了这种混淆，

closely associated class of banking and business leaders exploit everyone else.18,19

18In the Marxist tradition this stage of social development is termed“monopoly capitalism,” “finance capitalism,” or “state monopoly capitalism.”

The descriptive part of Marxist analyses is generally valuable. In unearthing the close personal and financial links between state and business, they usually paint a much more realistic picture of the present economic order than do the mostly starry-eyed “bourgeois economists.” Analytically, however, they get almost everything wrong and turn the truth upside down.

The traditional, correct pre-Marxist view on exploitation was that of radical laissez-faire liberalism as espoused by, for instance, Charles Comte and Charles Dunoyer. According to them, antagonistic interests do not exist between capitalists as owners of factors of production and laborers, but between, on the one hand, the producers in society, i.e., homesteaders, producers and contractors,including businessmen as well as workers, and on the other hand, those who acquire wealth nonproductively and/or noncontractually, i.e., the state and stateprivileged groups, such as feudal landlords. This distinction was first confused by Saint-Simon, who had at some time been influenced by

将其混合成仅仅将资本家当成剥削者，所有工人被剥削，并通过李嘉图劳动价值论及其他剩余价值思想论证这一点。从根本上说，对当代马克思主义而言，这个剥削论依然典型，尽管庞巴维克对马克思剥削理论予以毁灭性地反驳，通过时间偏好（利息）解释了要素价格及产出价格的差异。时至今日，每当马克思主义者谈论垄断资本主义的剥削特点，他们认为根源是生产手段私有制的存续。即令他们承认政府机构相对垄断资本家阶级一定程度的独立性（如存在“国家垄断资本主义”版本），对他们来说，不是政府使资本主义剥削成为可能；而认为事实上政府就是资本主义，将个体资本家的狭隘利益转化成一般意义理想资本家的利益（理想的总资本家），后者解释了剥削的存在。

实际上正如所解释的，事实恰恰相反：本质上说政府才是剥削组织，资本家仅在他们停止做资本家，反而与政府通力合作的程度上，才能从事剥削。与其说这是

Comte and Dunoyer, and who classified market businessmen along with feudal lords and other stateprivileged groups as exploiters. Marx took up this confusion from Saint-Simon and compounded it by making only capitalists exploiters and all workers exploited, justifying this view through a Ricardian labor theory of value and his theory of surplus value. Essentially, this view on exploitation has remained typical for Marxism to this day despite Böhm-Bawerk's smashing refutation of Marx's exploitation theory and his explanation of the difference between factor prices and output prices through time preference (interest). To this day, whenever Marxist theorists talk about the exploitative character of monopoly capitalism, they see the root cause of this in the continued existence of the private ownership of means of production. Even if they admit a certain degree of independence of the state apparatus from the class of monopoly capitalists (as in the version of "state monopoly capitalism"), for them it is not the state that makes capitalist exploitation possible; rather it is the fact that the state is an agency of capitalism, an organization that transforms the narrow-minded interests of individual capitalists into the interest of an ideal universal capitalist (the *ideelleGesamtkapitalist*), which explains the existence of exploitation.

In fact, as explained, the truth is precisely the opposite: It is the state that by its very nature is an exploitative organization, and capitalists can

国家垄断资本主义，可更恰当地将现行体系称之为“国家资助的垄断性社会主义”或“布尔乔亚社会主义”。

关于代表性的马克思主义研究，参阅鲁道夫·希法亭《金融资本》（伦敦：劳特利奇与基肯·保罗，1981年）；列宁《帝国主义：资本主义的最后阶段》（莫斯科：外语出版社，1947年）；保罗·M·斯威齐《资本主义发展理论》（纽约：月评出版社，1942年）；保罗·A·巴兰与保罗·M·斯威齐《垄断资本》（纽约：月评出版社，1966年）；厄内斯特·曼德尔《马克思经济理论》（伦敦：默林，1962）；《晚期资本主义》（伦敦：新左书局，1975年）；赫伯特·迈斯纳编《无前景的布尔乔亚经济学》（东柏林：迪茨，1976年）；关于马克思主义对古典自由主义经济分析的歪曲参阅罗斯巴德“左与右”，载于《反自然的平等主义等论文集》；关于对马克思剥削理论的反驳，参阅庞巴维克《卡尔·马克思及其体系的终结》，保罗·M·斯威齐编（纽约：奥古斯都M.凯利，1948年）。

【19】认识到由货币和银行垄断带来的，政府利益与经济权力精英利益的融合，不等于说在这种同盟内部

engage in exploitation only insofar as they stop being capitalists and instead join forces with the state. Rather than speaking of state monopoly capitalism, then, it would be more appropriate to call the present system “state financed monopoly socialism,” or “bourgeois socialism.”

For representative Marxist studies, see Rudolf Hilferding, *Finance Capital* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981); V.I. Lenin, *Imperialism Last Stage of Capitalism* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947); Paul M. Sweezy, *The Theory of Capitalist Development* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1942); Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, *Monopoly Capital* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966); Ernest Mandel, *Marxist Economic Theory* (London: Merlin, 1962); *Late Capitalism* (London: New Left Books, 1975); Herbert Meissner, ed., *Bürgerliche Ökonomie ohne Perspektive* (East Berlin: Dietz, 1976); on the perversion of the classical liberal class analysis through Marxism, see Murray N. Rothbard, “Left and Right” in *Egalitarianism As a Revolt Against Nature and Other Essays* (Washington, D.C.: Libertarian Review Press, 1974); on the refutation of the Marxist theory of exploitation, see Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, *Karl Marx and the Close of His System*, ed. Paul M. Sweezy, (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1948).

19 To recognize the far-reaching integration of state interests and

不会发生冲突。正如前述，例如政府也以民主化其构成的必要性为特点。且民主进程会带来平等主义或表面对政府厚待银行及大企业的民粹反感。然而，正是政商联系的金钱本质，使之一般不大可能发生。因为这不仅对于经济权力精英施加了直接威胁；同时意味着政府收入的严重财务损失，即令它没有威胁到政府本身的稳定。因此，对于此双方都存在一种强大激励，在这种情绪被广为人知前，联合将其从政治进程中滤除掉，并且动用他们手中的所有资源，限制可供公众讨论的政治选择范围，以系统性排除对他们共同伪造勾当的审查。

关于这点参阅——尽管它们有着典型的左翼概念混淆——以下富含信息的研究，如 C·赖特·米尔斯《权力精英》（纽约：1965 年）；G·威廉·多姆霍夫《谁统治美国？》（纽约：1967 年）；E·E·沙特施奈德《半主权人》（纽约：霍尔特，1960 年）；彼得·巴克莱奇

those of the economic power elite, which is brought about by the monopolization of money and banking, is not to say that there cannot be conflicts arising within this coalition. As mentioned earlier, the state is also characterized, for instance, by the necessity of democratizing its constitution. And the democratic process could well bring egalitarian or populist sentiments to the surface which were opposed to the state's favorable treatment of banks and big business. However, it is precisely the financial nature of the state-business connection that makes such an occurrence unlikely. For not only would this pose an immediate threat to the economic power elite; it would also imply severe financial losses in state income, even if it did not threaten the stability of the state as such. Hence a powerful incentive exists for both sides to join forces in filtering any such sentiment out of the political process before it ever becomes widely heard and to ensure with all resources at their command that the range of political alternatives admitted to public discussion is so restricted as to systematically exclude any scrutinizing of their joint counterfeiting racket.

See on this also such—in spite of their characteristic leftist misconceptions—informative studies as C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: 1965); G. William Domhoff, *Who Rules America?* (New York: 1967); E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New

和莫尔顿·拜拉茨《权力与贫困》（纽约：1970年）；C·奥费《资本主义国家的结构性问题》（法兰克福/M. 苏尔坎普, 1972年）。

叁、国际政治与 国际货币秩序

人的经济性利益，也即他凭借生产和交换增进收入和财富的利益，导致通用的商品货币即黄金以及自由银行体系的出现。

人的政治利益（也即他通过剥削增进收入和财富，而让生产者及契约者付出代价的利益）导致国家形成、金本位解体以及货币与银行业的垄断。

然而，一旦政府确立为剥削及伪造垄断者，又会出现新问题。因为即令在特定区域中，它的垄断地位是有保障的，在不同区域运作的政府间竞争依然存在。正是这种竞争，对于任何一国政府的剥削能力施加了严厉限制。一方面，它开启了人们针对政府用脚投票和弃国离境的可能性，假如他们觉察到其他区域提供了剥削更少的生产条件。或假如他国政府被视为压迫较弱，渴求

York: Holt 1960); Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, *Power and Poverty* (New York: 1970); C. Offe, *Strukturprobleme des Kapitalistischen Staates* (Frankfurt/M. Suhrkamp, 1972).

III. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ORDER

Man's economic interests, i.e., his interests in improving his income and wealth by means of producing and exchanging, lead to the emergence of a universally used commodity money—gold—and a system of free banking.

Man's political interests (i.e., his interests in improving his income and wealth through exploitation at the expense of producers and contractors) lead to the formation of states, the destruction of the gold standard and the monopolization of money and banking.

Yet once a state is established as a monopolist of exploitation and counterfeiting new problems emerge. For even if its monopolistic position is secured within a given territory, competition between states operating in different territories still exists. It is this competition which imposes severe limits on any one government's exploitative powers. On one hand, it opens up the possibility that people will vote against a government with their feet and leave its territory if they perceive other

“接管”的一国属民，与这些外国竞争者的合作可能增加。这两种可能性，对各国政府而言都构成了问题。因为各国政府实际上都靠人口维持，任何人口损失因此就是政府收入的损失。同样，任何政府对他国国内事务的关心，必定被认为是威胁，尤其是当它受后者属民的支持时，因为在剥削业中，只有尚存可剥削之物，一个人才能发家致富，明显的，任何给予另一国政府的支持，留给本国政府的就将减少。

另一方面，在各国竞争的情况下，每一家政府的伪造能力受到严重限制。实际上，各政府通过银行业垄断或卡特尔已在国内解决的问题，在国际层面上再度出现，直接类似于自由银行体系所蕴含的伪造障碍。这种情况，以不同国家具有自由浮动汇率的纸币为特征；假如一国政府伪造货币远超另一国政府，该国本币注定相对于外币贬值，对于这样的政府而言，这意味着它的收入相对于另一国降低（与各自国民关系不大）。它的力量随之相对另一国减弱。该国更易受到竞争国的（军事或经济）攻击。理所当然，以上情况

territories as offering less exploitative living conditions. Or if other states are perceived as less oppressive, the likelihood increases of a state's subjects collaborating with such foreign competitors in their desire to "take over." Both of these possibilities pose a crucial problem for each state. For each literally lives off a population, and any population loss is thus a loss of potential state income. Similarly, any state's interest in another's internal affairs must be interpreted as a threat, in particular if it is supported by the latter's own subjects, because in the business of exploitation one can only prosper as long as there is something that can be exploited and, obviously, any support given to another state would reduce what remains left over for itself.

On the other hand, with several competing states each individual state's counterfeiting power becomes severely limited. In fact, on the international level a problem reemerges which is directly analogous to the obstacle to counterfeiting which was implied by a system of free banking, and which the states solved internally through the monopolization or cartelization of banking. The situation is characterized by different national paper monies with freely fluctuating exchange rates, If one state counterfeits more extensively than another, its currency is bound to depreciate in terms of the other, and for such a state this means (whatever different things it may mean for its various subjects) that its

的发生不符合国家利益,因此一国政府伪造货币的欲望,必定相应受到抑制。当然伪造货币仍然永无绝期,因为这是每一国政府的切身利益,但没有一家政府,对通胀程度的决策是完全自主的,相反它必须时刻密切关注竞争国的通胀政策,灵活调整自身行动,以适应他国政府的行动。

为了最大化剥削收入,克服两种对于国内权力的外在限制,理所当然符合一国政府的利益。组成卡特尔好像是一个可行的方法。然而,它由于以下原因必定失败——因缺少垄断性执行机构——各国卡特尔只能是自愿性的,并因此对那些更强大、采取弱通胀型伪造政策的政府缺少吸引力,参与这样的卡特尔将损害其自身,而有利于较不成功及高通胀型的政府。那么对这个问题的唯一稳妥办法:一国政府必须以扩张领土为目标,消灭它的竞争国,以图最终将自身建成世界政府。与之呼应,它必定谋求在更多区域内使用本国纸币,最终使之成为它所拥有的世界中央银

income has declined in relation to that of another state. With this its power vis-à-vis that of another state is decreased. It becomes more vulnerable to a competing state's attacks(military or economic). Naturally, it is in no state's interest to see this happen, and hence one's counterfeiting desire must be restrained accordingly. Counterfeiting still continues permanently, of course, because it is in every state's own interest; but no state is truly autonomous in its decision about how much to inflate and instead must at all times pay close attention to the inflationary policies of its competitors and flexibly adjust its own actions to theirs.

In order to maximize its exploitatively acquired income, it is in a state's natural interest to overcome both of these external restrictions on internal power. Cartelization would seem a possible solution. However, it must fail as such because—due to the lack of a monopolistic enforcement agency—interstate cartels could only be voluntary and would hence appear less attractive to a state the more powerful it already is and the less inflationary its counterfeiting policy. By joining any such cartel a state would harm itself to the advantage of less successful and more inflationary states. There is only one stable solution for the problem then: A state must aim to expand its territory, eliminate its competitors and, as its ultimate goal, establish itself as a world government. And

行控制下的世界货币。唯有实现这些目标，一国政府才能实现自己的目标。在这条道路上如此障碍重重，条件严苛，以至于对未臻完美的方法，也有必要心满意足。然而，假如一个人想要解释过去的发展和未来的趋势，只要有政府存在，这种利益就在作怪，且必须这样理解（必竟各国政府也花了好几个世纪，实现它们目前在国内的伪造货币权力！）

要实现两个综合目标的第一个，意味着战争。战争与国家密不可分^{【20】}。政府不仅是一家剥削性组织，并且它的领导人因此对于非生产性及非契约性财产取得原则上不加反对——否则它们就是不务本业，或该国政府将解体消失。那么，他们基本不反对依靠战争手段掠夺扩张领土，也是毫不奇怪的。实际上，战争是事后停火的逻辑前提：其本国国内制度化的剥削体系，正是合法停火也即先前征服的结果。此外，作为政府代表所握有的手段，愈来愈可能将侵略野心付诸实施。掌握着课税工具，甚至拥有更利于实现目标的、伪造本国货币的绝对权力，政府可让别人为它的战争付出代价。假如一个人不必为自己

parallel to this must be its attempts to make its paper currency used in wider territories and ultimately make it the world currency under the control of its own world central bank. Only if these goals are achieved will a state come into its own. There are many obstacles on this path, and these may prove so severe as to make it necessary to settle for less than such a perfect solution. However, as long as there is a state in existence, such an interest is operative and must be understood as such if one is to correctly interpret past developments as well as future tendencies (after all it also took the states several centuries to reach their present internal counterfeiting powers!).

The means for accomplishing the first of its two integrated goals is war. War and state are inextricably connected.²⁰ Not only is a state an exploitative firm and its leading representatives can thus have no principled objection to nonproductive and noncontractual property acquisitions—otherwise they would not do what they do or the state would simply fall apart and dissolve. And it cannot be surprising then that they should also have no fundamental objection to a territorial expansion of exploitation by means of war. In fact, war is the logical prerequisite of a later cease-fire: and its own internal, institutionalized system of exploitation is nothing but a—legitimate—cease-fire, i.e., the result of previous conquests. In addition, as the representatives of the

的冒险承担代价，而能够强迫别人这么做，或假若他可以完全无中生有地创造所需资金，比起他不能这么做时，他理所当然地将更倾向于成为风险承担者及鲁莽好战者。

【20】关于国家与战争的紧密关系参阅埃克哈特·克里彭多夫《国家与战争》（法兰克福/M.：苏尔坎普，1985年）；另可见查尔斯·堤利“有组织犯罪：制造战争与制造国家”载于彼得·埃文斯等编《找回国家》；罗伯特·希格斯《危机和利维坦》。

任何正常企业要资助自己的战争，完全依靠自愿性交易赚取的收入，只要一名顾客不满它的战争政策，而相应减少购买，它就因此即刻面临财务影响。尽管不依赖需求，并因此天生比正常企业更具侵略性，政府在寻求对外侵略时，仍无法完全免于束缚。正如政府尽管缺少需求依然形成，战争尽管缺少需求也同样爆发。但政府的形

state they are also in command of the very means which make it increasingly likely that one's aggressive desires can actually be put into effect. In command of the instrument of taxation and, even better for this purpose, of absolute internal counterfeiting powers the state can let others pay for its wars. And naturally, if one does not have to pay for one's risky ventures oneself but can force others to do so, or if one can simply create the needed funds out of thin air, one tends to be a greater risk-taker and more trigger-happy than one would otherwise be.

20 On the intimate relationship between state and war, see the important study by Ekkehart Krippendorff, *Staat and Krieg* (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1985); also Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in Peter Evans, et al. eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Robert Higgs, *Crisis and Leviathan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

While independent of demand and hence by nature a more aggressive institution than any normal business that would have to finance its wars with income gained exclusively through voluntary transactions and that would thus face immediate financial repercussions if only a single one of its clients reduced his purchases in response to his dissatisfaction with this business' war policy, the state is still not entirely

成和发展受到公众舆论的限制,政府的战争努力也同样如此。显然,要从国家间战争中脱颖而出,政府必须在相对意义上,掌握充足的经济资源,使战争行动得以维持。然而这些资源只被生产性人口所提供。因此,要确保赢得战争的必要手段,避免战时面临生产滑坡,再次表明公众舆论是限制政府外交政策的关键变量。只有当存在对国家战争的普遍支持,战争才能维持和取胜。假设对外侵略承诺以成功告终,且其成本能精准确定,银行业及商业既存势力的支持也易于争取。当然,该阶级并非人人乐于参战,因为某人可能在待征服区域存在既得利益,这些利益将在国家冲突事件中受损;或某人更愿C国而非B国被攻击;或某人也许原则上反对战争。一般而言,伴随着本国胜利,商业和银行精英更牢固地成为更广大区域的统治阶级,伴随相应扩张的财务剥削能力,这些期待对经济精英尤其是银行精英密切关注战争选项来说,构成最有力的理由。

free of all constraints in its pursuit of foreign aggression. Just as states emerge although there is no demand for them, so wars occur without having been demanded. But as the emergence and the growth of states is constrained by public opinion, so also are the state's war endeavors. For obviously, in order to come out of an interstate war successfully, a state must be in command of sufficient—in relative terms—economic resources which alone make its actions sustainable. However these resources can only be provided by a productive population. Thus, to secure the means necessary to win wars and to avoid being confronted with slackening productive outputs while at war, public opinion again turns out to be the decisive variable constraining a state's foreign policy. Only if popular support for the state's war exists can it be sustained and possibly won. The support from the banking and business establishment can be won easily, provided the foreign aggression promises a successful end and its cost can be established with a sufficient degree of accuracy. Not everyone of this class will be ready to join in, of course, because one may have vested interests in the to-be-conquered territory that will be damaged in the event of an interstate conflict; or one may wish that country C rather than B would be attacked; or one may even in principle be opposed to war. Generally, the expectation that along with one's own state's victory the business and banking elite would become established

然而，光有他们的支持还不够。在战争中，一国政府比起和平时期，更依赖于人人工作和生产的意愿（战时不容闲人）。为确保广泛的热情，一切政府必须努力创造和支持国家主义意识形态。他们不得不将自己包装为国民政府，扮演优于别国国民价值观的本国国民价值观的旗手及捍卫者，以产生对特定政府的公众认同；为了愈来愈多转变及消除不同国度、各异种族、语言及文化群体的独立性，这个公众认同是必要的。

然而，为让人们日夜工作及生产战争所需的资源，要求某些更基本的条件：必竟，倘若别国也有本国商业精英的支持；并且也在领土之内创造出国民主义精神。须进一步假定，敌对国开始控制相应规模的、类似自然禀赋的人口及领土，决定成败的关键变量，就是有关社会的相对经济

as a ruling class over a larger territory, with correspondingly expanded possibilities for financial exploitation, is a most powerful reason for the economic—in particular the banking—elite to pay close attention to the war option.

Yet their support is by no means sufficient. In a war even more so than during peacetime a state is dependent on every single person's willingness to work and produce (there can no longer be any loafers during wartime). To ensure widespread enthusiasm, all states must help create and support nationalistic ideologies. They have to wrap themselves up as nation states and pose as the banner carriers and protectors of the superior values of one's own nation as distinct from those of others, in order to generate the public identification with one specific state which is necessary in order to then turn around and wipe out the independence of more and more distinct nations and separate ethnic, linguistic and cultural groups.

However, something more substantial is required in order to keep the population working and producing the resources needed for a war: After all, the other states assumedly have the support of their business elite; and they, too, have created a spirit of nationalism in their territories. Assuming further that the antagonistic states initially control populations of comparable size and territories with similar natural endowments, the

财富，经济发展与资本积累的相对程度。那些寄生于优越经济财富之上的政府，在国际战争中更有机会取胜。尽管要处于优势，显然在各自领土之内，必须先形成相对有利的财富及资本。政府对此没有积极贡献。正相反，作为从事非生产性及非契约性财产取得的机构，政府存在本身乃破坏财富及资本积累。然而，政府能够做出消极贡献。财富和资本要形成，唯有通过拓殖、生产及契约，对拓殖者、生产者及契约者相对更低的剥削程度，意味着资本形成的相对繁荣，在下一轮剥削中，这可以给予政府额外所需的资源，以取得对竞争国的军事胜利。因此，赢得战争所需的条件，是相对更高的国内自由主义程度。

初看起来，这就像是悖论，一国国内愈自由^{【21】}，该国政府就愈有可能发动对外侵略。国内的自由主义使社会更富裕；社会愈富裕，可榨取

decisive variable determining victory or defeat becomes the relative economic wealth of the societies involved, their relative degree of economic development and capital accumulation. Those states tend to be victorious in interstate warfare that can parasitically draw on superior economic wealth. Clearly though, in order to be in this position conditions relatively favorable to wealth and capital formation in their respective territories must previously have existed. States do not positively contribute to this. On the contrary, as institutions engaged in nonproductive and noncontractual property acquisitions, their very existence is destructive of wealth and capital accumulation. However, they can make a negative contribution. Wealth and capital comes into existence only through homesteading, producing and contracting, and a relatively lower degree of exploitation of homesteaders, producers and contractors means a relative boost to capital formation, which in the next round of exploitation can give the state the additional resources needed to succeed militarily over its foreign competitors. Thus, what is also required in order to win wars is a relatively high degree of internal liberalism.

Paradoxical as it may first seem, the more liberal^{21a} a state is internally, the more likely it will engage in outward aggression. Internal liberalism makes a society richer; a richer society to extract from makes

的愈多，一国政府也愈富有；愈富有的政府，造成愈来愈多的扩张主义战争。且政府愈富有，对外干预的倾向仍可进一步强化，假如它们成功在公众中创造“自由主义”的国民主义，也即，必须发动上述战争及对外征服的意识形态，是以全体公众本身的国内自由以及相对更高的生活水平为名义及依归。

实际上，关于国内自由主义作为成功帝国主义的要求及手段，依然有具体的东西可说。交战国家对生产性经济的需要，也解释了为什么条件不变时，那些调整国内再分配政策，以降低经济管制相对于税收重要性的政府，在国际政治领域中，更有机会胜过竞争国。为排斥或禁止两个及以上私人间的某些交易，政府所凭借的管制，与税收一样意味着取得非生产性与/或非契约性收入，从而两者都损害拓殖者、生产者或契约者。然而，尽管对产出的破坏性绝不亚于税收，管制的显著特征在于，为了强制而要求政府控制经济资源，却未同时带来自用资源的增加。实际上这等于说，管制要求政府支配及花费税收，但管制不为国家产生货币收入（结果却是，管制满足纯

the state richer, and a richer state makes for more and more successful expansionist wars. And this tendency of richer states toward foreign intervention is still further strengthened, if they succeed in creating a “liberationist” nationalism among the public, i.e., the ideology that above all it is in the name and for the sake of the general public’s own internal liberties and its own relatively higher standards of living that war must be waged or foreign expeditions undertaken.

In fact, something still more specific can be stated about internal liberalism as a requirement and means for successful imperialism. The need for a productive economy that a warring state must have also explains why it is that *ceteris paribus* those states tend to outstrip their competitors in the arena of international politics which have adjusted their internal redistributive policies so as to decrease the importance of economic regulations relative to that of taxation. Regulations through which states either compel or prohibit certain exchanges between two or more private persons as well as taxation imply a nonproductive and/or noncontractual income expropriation and thus both damage homesteaders, producers or contractors. However, while by no means less destructive of productive output than taxation, regulations have the peculiar characteristic of requiring the state’s control over economic resources in order to become enforceable without simultaneously

粹的权力欲，即当 A 非法化 B 和 C 的互惠交易，而自己却未获得物质利益)。另一方面，按照“从彼得到保罗”原则的课税及其收入再分配，政府至少依靠再分配行动收取“中介费”，增加了自身所能支配的经济手段。既然税收政策，以及无管制的税收，比起管制政策，以及附带税收的管制，向政府提供更多的金钱回报（并且有更多可以花费在战争努力上的资源！），政府为了避免国际失败，必定朝着相对去管制经济，以及相对纯课税国家的方向发展^{【22】}。

【21】“自由主义 (liberal)”这个词在此处及下文的用法，是在传统的欧洲意义上，而不是在作为“社会主义”或“社会民主”同义词的现代美国意义上（译者注：通译为自由派）。

【22】国内去除管制政策与对外侵略性增加之间的关系，里根政府提供了极典型的示范。

increasing the resources at its disposal. In practice, this is to say that they require the state's command over taxes, yet they produce no monetary income for the state (instead, they satisfy pure power lust, as when A, for no material gain of his own, prohibits B and C from engaging in mutually beneficial trade). On the other hand, taxation and a redistribution of tax revenue according to the principle "from Peter to Paul," increases the economic means at the government's disposal at least by its own "handling charge" for the act of redistribution. Since a policy of taxation, and taxation without regulation, yields a higher monetary return to the state (and with this more resources expendable on the war effort!) than a policy of regulation, and regulation with taxation, states must move in the direction of a comparatively deregulated economy and a comparatively pure tax-state in order to avoid international defeat.²²

21The term "liberal" is here and the following used in its traditional European sense and not in the present day U.S. sense as a synonym for "socialist" or "social-democratic."

22A highly characteristic example of this connection between a policy of internal deregulation and increased external aggressiveness is provided by the Reagan administration.

With the backdrop of these theoretical considerations about the nature of

以上述政府及国际政治本质的理论思考为背景,许多历史也就豁然开朗。持续数世纪之久、实际从未间断过的一系列国际战争,生动证明关于政府的天然侵略本质所言不虚。与之相仿,历史戏剧性说明了这些战争的后果,乃政府愈来愈相对集中:政府的侵略扩张,已经导致所有边界封闭,国家数量稳步下降,那些设法存活的政府,领土规模随之同步上升。世界政府尚未实现,但朝这个方向的发展趋势,却是不容否认的现实。更具体而言,历史阐明了国内自由主义对于帝国发展的至关重要性:首先,西欧国家在世界上的崛起得到解释。在西欧,自然权利及自由主义的意识形态,出现在希腊及斯多噶哲学乃至罗马法的悠久智识传统的基础上^[23]。正是在这里——与圣托马斯·阿奎那、路易斯·德·莫利纳、弗朗西斯科·苏亚雷斯、16世纪晚期西班牙经院哲学家、胡果·格老秀斯、塞缪尔·普芬道夫以及约翰·洛克等人的大名紧密相联——日益赢得对公众舆论的影响力;在这里,各国政府的国内剥削权力相应减弱。并且在近代欧洲的特色,乃是敌对小国及封邑林立,竞争激烈的国际体系近

the state and international politics, much of history falls into place. Lasting over centuries, practically uninterrupted series of interstate wars vividly confirm what has been stated about the inherently aggressive nature of states. Similarly, history dramatically illustrates the tendency towards increased relative concentration of states as the outcome of such wars: States' aggressive expansionism has led to the closing of all frontiers, and a steady decline in the number of states along with an equally steady increase in the territorial size of those states that managed to survive. No world state has yet been brought about, but a tendency in this direction is undeniably present. More specifically, history illuminates the central importance that internal liberalism has for imperial growth: First, the rise of the states of Western Europe to world prominence can be so explained. It is in western Europe that, built on the older intellectual traditions of Greek and Stoic philosophy as well as Roman law, the ideology of natural rights and liberalism emerged.²³ It was here that—associated with names such as St. Thomas Aquinas, Luis de Molina, Francisco Suarez and the late sixteenth century Spanish Scholastics, Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, and John Locke—it increasingly gained influence in public opinion; and where the various states' internal powers of exploitation were then correspondingly weakened. And their power was even further weakened by the fact that

乎无政府状态，这个事实进一步削弱了它们的权力。资本主义正是源于这种状况^{【24】}。因为政府衰落，拓殖者、生产者及契约者逐渐开始积累资本；前所未闻的经济增长率被记录在案；稳定增长的人口首次得以维持；并且，尤其是伴随着平稳增长的人口，整体生活水平开始渐进但持续地提高，最终导致所谓工业革命。汲取资本主义社会的优势财富，西欧弱小、自由的国家政府成为世界上最富有的政府。并且它们掌握的优势财富，导致帝国主义冒险的暴发，在历史第一次将欧洲国家建成真正的世界强权，并将它们的强权统治拓展到所有大陆。

与之相仿，英国在西欧国家的突出作用得到解释。作为最自由的国家，英国政府成为最成功的帝国主义者^{【26】}。英国（以及西欧）的相对衰弱，以及美国崛起为世界领先的帝国主义势力，也契合于这一理论图景。自由主义在无封建历史

pre-modern Europe was characterized by a highly competitive, almost anarchic international system, with a multitude of rivaling small scale states and feudal principalities. It was in this situation that capitalism originated.²⁴ Because the states were weak, homesteaders, producers and contractors increasingly began to accumulate capital; previously unheard of economic growth rates were registered; for the first time a steadily increasing population could be sustained; and, in particular with the population growth leveling off, gradually but continuously the general standard of living began to rise, finally leading to what is called the Industrial Revolution. Drawing on this superior wealth of capitalist societies the weak, liberal states of Western Europe became the richest states on earth. And this superior wealth in their hands then led to an outburst of imperialist ventures which for the first time in history established the European states as genuine world powers, extending their hegemonic rule across all continents.

Similarly, England's outstanding role among the West European states can be explained. The most liberal country of all, the British government became the most successful imperialist.²⁵ And the relative decline of England (and Western Europe) and the rise of the U.S. to the world's foremost imperialist power fits the theoretical picture as well. With no feudal past to speak of and British imperialism defeated,

可言、挫败了英帝国主义的美国，比起在欧洲任何一国更为彰显。政府权力处于最低谷，在人们的日常活动中，几乎注意不到。相应地，经济发展比起其他各国更加迅猛；生活水平提高；人口数量增长；生活水平及人口规模逐渐超越所有西欧国家。与此同时，始于 19 世纪后期，社会主义意识形态在欧洲舞台上粉墨登场，使英国及西欧在内部承受着随之而来的国家主义复兴。正是这无与伦比的经济财富——由一个几乎不受剥削的市场社会生产——让对内软弱的美国政府机构，缓慢成为最富有的、资源最多的政府，并将这些资源转换成对外侵略，适时将自己确立为世界霸权，在全球拥有“基地”，并且直接或间接地军事支配及霸权控制世界大部分区域（例外是苏联、中国及其卫星国）^[26]。19 世纪几乎展示了自由美国政府首屈一指的扩张。早在 1801 年，从美国海军被派往遥远的的黎波里斯执行惩罚任务始，美国政府实际上从未有一年不在世界某地干预^[27]；发动三场大的战争：美英战争（1812 年）；导致墨西哥失去半数领土的美墨战争（1846-1848 年）；导致美国占领古巴及菲律宾

liberalism was still more pronounced in the U.S. than anywhere in Europe. State power was at its weakest, hardly to be noticed in people's daily activities. Accordingly, economic growth was higher than in all other countries; standards of living went up; the population increased; and living standards and population size gradually surpassed those of all West European countries. At the same time, beginning in the late nineteenth century England and Western Europe suffered from reinvigorated internal statism brought about by the emergence of socialist ideologies on the European scene. It was this superior economic wealth—produced by a little exploited civil society—which allowed the internally weak U.S. Government apparatus to slowly become the richest, most resourceful state, and turn these resources toward foreign aggression and in time establish itself as the dominant world power, with “home bases” all around the globe and direct or indirect military dominance and hegemonic control over a large part of the world (with the exception of the Soviet Union and China and their respective satellites).²⁶The nineteenth century already displayed aggressive expansionism of the—liberal—U.S. government second to none. Since as early as 1801, when the U.S. Navy was sent on a punitive mission to the remote area around Tripolis, virtually no single year has passed without U.S. Government intervention somewhere in the world.²⁷ Three

的美西战争（1898 年）。与流行谬见相反，美国内战从本质上说，也是一场由相对自由的北方针对同盟国的扩张主义战争。然而，直至 20 世纪，当美国参加了一战与二战，才取得主宰世界的重大突破。两场大战戏剧性地证明美国优越于欧洲国家的力量。美国决定了谁赢谁输，并且两场大战最终都以更自由美国政府的胜利而告终——依靠轻税及较少管制的经济——压倒一切更社会主义独裁的、重税及严厉管制的欧洲国家（包括苏联）。随着二战结束，美国实现了对欧洲的霸权，并作为欧洲国家外部帝国的继承者，实现在全世界的霸权。自二战始，美国继而强化了它无与伦比的扩张，伴随在希腊、伊朗、朝鲜、危地马拉、印度尼西亚、黎巴嫩、老挝、古巴、刚果、英属圭亚那、多米尼加共和国、越南、智利、格林纳达及尼加拉瓜大小不一的军事干预

【28】。

major wars were waged: Against England (1812); against Mexico (1846–48), in which Mexico lost half its territory; and against Spain (1898), which resulted in the United States’ occupation of Cuba and the Philippines. Contrary to popular myth, the Civil War, too, was essentially an expansionist war waged by the relatively more liberal North against the Confederate states. However, the great breakthrough to world dominance did not occur until the twentieth century, when the U.S. entered World Wars I and II. Both wars dramatically proved the superiority of U.S. might over the European states. The U.S. determined the victors as well as the losers, and both wars ended with a victory of the more liberal U.S. government—resting on a less taxed and regulated economy—over all of the more socialist-authoritarian European states (including the Soviet Union) with their more heavily taxed and regulated economies. With the end of World War II the U.S. had reached hegemony over Europe and, as heir to the European states’ foreign empires, over large territories all around the world. Since World War II the U.S. has continued and even intensified its unrivaled expansionism with smaller or larger military interventions in Greece, Iran, Korea, Guatemala, Indonesia, Lebanon, Laos, Cuba, the Congo, British Guiana, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, Chile, Grenada, and Nicaragua.²⁸

23On the following see also Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “The

【23】关于下文参阅读霍普“税收的经济学和社会学”《经济学与人文学刊》第1号第2期（1990年）；上文第2章。

【24】关于“政治无政府主义”对资本主义起源的重要性参阅读让·贝希勒《资本主义的起源》（纽约：圣马丁，1976年）第7章。

【25】关于英帝国主义参阅读兰斯·E. 戴维斯与罗伯特·A. 哈登巴克《帝国的财富和追求：英帝国主义的政治经济1860-1912年》（剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，1986年）。

【26】关于此处及下文参阅读克里彭多夫《国家与战争》。

【27】参阅读克里彭多夫《美国战略》中的图表（法兰克福/M. 苏尔坎普，1970年），第43页后。

【28】关于20世纪的美国外交政策，参阅读莱昂纳德·P·李吉奥“美国外交政策及国民安全管理”，载于拉多什与罗斯巴德编《利维坦新史》；罗斯巴德《为了新自由》第14章。

最后，历史也提供了政府内部伪造货币权力与外部侵略政策间的直接联系，以及银行及商业精英与政府在扩张主义欲望上合谋的最生动说

Economics and Sociology of Taxation,” in *Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines* 1, no.2 (1990); supra chap. 2.

24 On the importance of “political anarchy” for the origin of capitalism, see Jean Baechler, *The Origins of Capitalism* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1976), chap. 7.

25 On British imperialism, see Lance E. Davis and Robert A. Huttenback, *Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire: The Political Economy of British Imperialism 1860–1912* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

26 See on this and the following E. Krippendorff, *Staat and Krieg*, pp. 97–116.

27 See the table in Ekkehart Krippendorff, *Die amerikanische Strategie* (Frankfurt/M. Suhrkamp, 1970), pp. 43ff.

28 On twentieth-century U.S. foreign policy, see Leonard P. Liggiio, “American Foreign Policy and National Security Management” in Radosh and Rothbard, *A New History of Leviathan*; Rothbard, *For a New Liberty*, chap. 14

Finally, history also provides the most vivid illustration of the direct link between a state’s internal powers of counterfeiting and its policy of external aggression, as well as the banking and business elite’s conspiracy with the state in its expansionist desires. The watershed mark

明。在这一过程中，导致美国崛起为世界主要霸权的水岭是第一次世界大战。没有 1913 年联储体系建立所实现的伪造货币权力，美国政府本不可能参加并成功赢得这场起初发生在欧洲内部的战争。美国政府本应缺少参战的资源。随着中央银行体系的到位，战争经济水到渠成，美国从而有可能更深介入这场战争，并扩大战争规模，使之成为历史上最具毁灭性的战争之一。正由于先前联储体系的成立，得到银行势力的热忱支持（尤其是洛克菲勒、摩根、库恩、勒布财团及合伙人），所以美国加入盟国一方的战争政策，在经济精英中找到最热心支持者（尤其是在身为英格兰银行财政代理及英法债券承销人的 JP 摩根及合伙人公司和主要军火商中，并且由威尔逊政府中的这些强大势力所代表，如 W. G. 麦卡杜，财政部长及威尔逊的女婿；P. M. 豪斯上校，威尔逊的亲密外交政策顾问；以及 B. 斯特朗，纽约联储主席^{【29】}）。

in the process leading to the rise of the U.S. as the world's premier power is World War I. The U.S. government could not have entered and successfully won this initially inner-European war without the absolute counterfeiting power that was achieved in 1913 with the establishment of the Federal Reserve System. It would have lacked the resources to do so. With a central banking system in place, a smooth transition to a war economy could be made and it became possible for the U.S. to get involved more deeply in the war and enlarge it to one of history's most devastating wars. And just as the prior establishment of the Federal Reserve System had been enthusiastically supported by the banking establishment (in particular by the houses of Rockefeller, Morgan, and Kuhn, Loeb and Co.), so the U.S. policy of entering the war on the Allied side found its most ardent supporters among the economic elite (notably in the firm of J.P. Morgan and Co. as the fiscal agent of the Bank of England and monopoly underwriter of British and French bonds as well as a major arms producer, and represented within the Wilson administration by such powerful forces as W.G. McAdoo, secretary of the Treasury and Wilson's son-in-law; Colonel P.M. House, Wilson's intimate foreign policy adviser; and B. Strong, governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York).²⁹

There is only one important element still missing from a complete

在现代国际秩序的完整重构中，只有一个重要因素仍然缺失：货币。军事性扩张领土符合政府的天然利益；并因此，可以预测政府相对集中的趋势。参与“货币帝国主义”也符合政府利益（也即将伪造货币权力延伸到更多区域）；因此，可以预见朝着单一世界纸币方向的发展趋势。两种利益及趋势是互补的。一方面，如无军事占领及统治的建立作为补充，通往伪造货币国际性卡特尔的任何步骤注定失败。内外经济压力将趋向于摧毁卡特尔。然而拥有军事优势，使得一个通货膨胀型卡特尔得以可能。另一方面，一旦军事统治造就这样的卡特尔，支配国无需进一步的战争及征服，就能将它的剥削权力扩张至其他区域。实际上，组成伪造货币的国际性卡特尔，允许支配国通过更复杂（也即更隐蔽）的手段，寻求战争及征服本身无法实现的目标。

支配国（也即能以武力粉碎他国，并被认为有能力这么做的、尤其在支配性政府治下的国家）首先将运用它的优势权力，执行通货膨胀的国际合作政策。其本国中央银行在伪造货币过程中起到带头作用，而受支配国的中央银行受令与

reconstruction of the present international order: money. It is in a state's natural interest to expand its territory militarily; and hence, one should expect a tendency toward a relative concentration of states. It is also in a state's interest to engage in "monetary imperialism" (i.e., to extend its counterfeiting power over larger territories); thus, a tendency toward a one-world paper currency should be expected. Both interests and tendencies complement each other. On the one hand, any step in the direction of an international counterfeiting cartel is bound to fail if it is not complemented by the establishment of military dominance and hierarchy. External and internal economic pressures would tend to burst the cartel. With military superiority, however, an inflation cartel becomes possible. On the other hand, once military dominance has made such a cartel possible, the dominant state can actually expand its exploitative power over other territories without further war and conquest. In fact, the international cartelization of counterfeiting allows the dominant state to pursue through more sophisticated (i.e., less visible) means what war and conquest alone might not be able to achieve.

In the first step a dominant state (a state, that is, which could crush another militarily and is perceived as capable of doing so, in particular by the dominated government) will use its superior power to enforce a policy of internationally coordinated inflation. Its own central bank sets

支配国一起通货膨胀。在实践中，支配国纸币被强加为外国中央银行的储备货币，他们被迫用该国纸币作为它们自身通胀行动的基础。

【29】此处参阅罗斯巴德《银行的秘密》第 230-247 页；关于摩根家庭推动威尔逊政府加入战争的作用详阅查尔斯·坦西尔《美国参战》（波士顿：小布朗）第 2-4 章。

不受实际需求而只受公众舆论的限制，对于支配国而言，相对容易实现这个目标。直接领土征服及本币直接在外国领土的推行，由于该国国民政府或外国公众舆论而却步。然而拥有摧毁任何特定外国政府的权力——尽管尚未强大到完全占领——对支配国来说，要成功实现货币帝国主义，自不费吹灰之力。

在内部，它有极大可能不遇任何阻力。该国政府本身对这个方案感到满意。因为一旦其本币被外国银行用作储备货币，成为各国纸币的金字塔基，那么它就有可能，几乎不费成本地剥削外

the pace in the counterfeiting process, and the central banks of dominated states are ordered to inflate along with the dominating state. In practical terms, the dominating state's paper currency is imposed as a reserve currency on foreign central banks, and they are pressured to use it as a basis for their own inflationary actions.

29See on this Rothbard, *Mystery of Banking*, pp 230-47; on the role of the Morgans in pushing the Wilson administration into war, in particular see Charles Tansill, *America Goes to War*(Boston: Little, Brown, 1938), chaps. II-IV

Constrained not by actual demand but only by public opinion, it is relatively easy for a dominant state to accomplish this goal. Direct territorial conquest and the direct implementation of its own currency in foreign territories can be prohibitive because of the state of national or foreign public opinion. Yet with the power to destroy any specific foreign government—even though it is not strong enough for a complete take-over—little is required in order for the dominant state to succeed in monetary imperialism.

Internally, it will most likely encounter no resistance whatsoever. The government itself will be satisfied with this solution. For once its own currency is employed as a reserve currency by foreign banks on which they then pyramid their various national paper monies,

国财产主及收入生产者，而不必担忧紧缩性后果。类似的，其本国银行及商业精英，乐于接受这种安排，因为他们也因此安全地参与对外剥削。银行尤其热衷于此。公众大多对此视而不见，或认为与国内问题相比，剥削外国人属于次要。

在外部，情况略微复杂。作为货币体制的后果，受支配国将资源丧失给支配国。但面对完全失去国内控制的可能性，受支配国自然愿意默许一种计划——不仅允许它维持权力，而且以支配国纸币创造为基础及依据膨胀本国货币，还在实际上，允许它对本国人口欺诈性掠夺的延续。实质上出于同样理由，银行及商业精英作为各自国家伪币的首批接受者，愿意接受这个方案。在该安排下，受支配区域的大多数公众——遭受本国政府及精英加上外国政府精英的双重剥削——再次对此一无所知，且无法将其确认为自身长期经济依赖及相对滞后于支配国的重要原因。

then it becomes possible for it to engage in an almost costless expropriation of foreign property owners and income producers without having to fear contractive consequences. Similarly, its own banking and business elite is ready to accept such an arrangement, because they, too, can thereby safely participate in foreign exploitation. Banks in particular are enthusiastic. And the public is largely ignorant of what is happening, or considers the exploitation of foreigners minor as compared to internal problems.

Externally, matters are only slightly more complicated. The dominated state loses resources to the dominating one as a consequence of monetary regime. But faced with the possibility of losing its internal control altogether, it naturally prefers acquiescing to a scheme which not only allows it to stay in power but to actually continue in its own fraudulent expropriations of its own population by inflating its currency on top of and in accordance with the dominating state's paper money creation. For essentially the same reason bank and business elites, as the first receivers of their respective state's counterfeit money, are willing to accept this solution. And the general public in the dominated territories, which through arrangement is subject to a double layer of exploitation of foreign states' elites on top of a national state and elite, is again largely unaware of all this and fails to identify it as one important cause of its

然而，这第一步所供方案并非完美。国际货币体系的特征，是某种支配性纸币，层层搭建在该纸币上的多国纸币，以及这些纸币间的自由浮动汇率。一方面，支配国意犹未尽，因为在这些情况下，仍留有本国货币可能相对他国货币贬值的充分空间，这种发展势头，对其成为支配性权力的作用构成威胁。因为汇率不完全由各国中央银行的通胀政策所决定。最终来说且条件不变，它们取决于货币购买力平价^[30]。且即使一家受支配国中央银行，乐意与支配国中央银行一起通货膨胀，其他因素（例如更低课税及管制水平等）仍然可以使其本币相对支配国货币增值。

另一方面，彼此自由浮动的多国货币的存在，如同先前解释的，使货币的本身目的功能失调。这是一种部分直接交换的体系。它制造了信息混乱，使理性经济计算不可能，相应导致支配国政府所寄生的生产体系本身的效率低下。

own prolonged economic dependency and relative stagnation vis-à-vis the dominant nation.

This first step, however, does not provide a perfect solution. The international monetary system is characterized by a dominant paper currency, and a multitude of national paper monies pyramiding on top of it, and freely fluctuating exchange rates between such currencies. On one hand, this is less than satisfactory for the dominant state, because under these circumstances ample room is left for the possibility of its own currency depreciating against others, and such a development would pose a threat to its own role as a dominant power. For exchange rates are not exclusively determined by the inflationary policies of various central banks. Ultimately and ceteris paribus, they are determined by purchasing power parity.³⁰ And even if a dominated central bank willingly inflates along with the dominating central bank, other factors (such as a lower level of taxation and regulation, for instance) can still make its currency appreciate against that of the dominant state.

On the other hand, the existence of a multitude of currencies freely fluctuating against each other is, as explained earlier, dysfunctional of the very purpose of money. It is a system of partial barter. It creates informational chaos, makes rational economic calculation impossible, accordingly leads to inefficiencies within the very system of production

因此,为确保它的支配性地位及最大化掠夺收入,在第二步当中,支配国总是想要创立一种国际性的——最终普世的——货币,该货币由本国中央银行垄断性控制,并且由本国中央银行直接发行,或者由本国中央银行间接支配国际或世界银行发行。

【30】关于购买力平价理论,参阅米塞斯《人的行动》第 452-458 页;罗斯巴德《人、经济与国家》第 715-722 页。

在通往这个目标的道路上存在障碍。然而,一旦成功完成第一步,就没什么看起来是不可克服的。自然在这一安排中,支配国将失去某些自由裁量权。但假如国际贸易中的计算混乱减少,本国经济更有效率的事实,则补偿了这一点。进一步说,两国的银行及商业精英,将坚定支持这样的货币制度,并决意运用他们与各自政府的密切关系以及国际关系,促进这一制度的采纳。因为毕竟,银行及工业企业也要通过生产与交换做生意赚钱。自由浮动汇率对于经济利益的追求是一种人为障碍。企业规模愈大,愈强烈将其视为功能失调,尤其因为对大企业而言,对外贸易是

which the dominant state parasitically rests.

Thus, in order to assure its dominant position and maximize exploitatively appropriated income, in a second step a dominant state will invariably try to institute an international—and ultimately universal—currency monopolistically controlled and issued either directly by its own central bank or indirectly by an international or world bank dominated by its central bank.

30On the purchasing power parity theory, see Mises, *Human Action*, pp.452–58; Rothbard, *Man, Economy, and State*, pp. 715–22.

There are some obstacles on the way to this goal. However, once the first step has been completed successfully, none of them would seem insurmountable. Naturally, the dominated state would lose some discretionary power under this arrangement. But this would be compensated for by the fact that its own economy would function more efficiently, too, if calculational chaos in international trade were reduced. Further, the banking and business elite in both countries would be adamantly in favor of such a monetary regime and would use their close ties to their respective state and international connections to promote its adoption. For, after all, banks and industrial firms are also in the business of making money through production and exchanges. Freely fluctuating exchange rates are an artificial impediment in their pursuit of this

举足轻重的。

事实上可预见到,对于接纳国际货币最强烈的抵制,不是来自于政府及经济精英,而是来自大众。只要国际货币意味着放弃一种习惯的货币,就会迎头撞上各政府长期以来积极培育的国民主义。这将成为问题,尤其当受支配国的公众,被直接要求接纳支配国货币——照单全收——这种货币体系所隐含的帝国主义本质,就危险地显露出来。然而拥有某种程度的外交及耐心宣传,这个问题似乎也得到解决。为了不引起国民主义或反帝国主义的情绪,必定根据既存的各国货币创造和定义一种有新名称的新货币。这种新货币必唯有相对各国货币(它们反过来按新货币定义)被多少高估,才能将所有各国货币驱出流通(依据格雷欣法则)^[31]。这必定伴随政府及经济精英,经常向大众呼吁健康的经济制度——而不顾一切国民主义感情——自由浮动的各国货币乃削弱理性经济计算的守旧制度,一个国际

economic interest. And they will be perceived as dysfunctional more intensively by larger businesses, because it is big business, in particular, for which foreign trade plays a more important role.

In fact, the most severe resistance to the adoption of an international currency is to be expected not from the states and the economic elites, but from the general public. Insofar as an international currency implies giving up an accustomed one, it runs against the very nationalism that all states eagerly bred for so long. This would be a problem especially if the public in the dominated countries were asked to adopt the dominant state's currency directly—name and all—because the underlying imperialist nature of such a monetary system would then become dangerously apparent. Yet with some degree of diplomacy and patient propaganda, this problem seems solvable, too. A new currency with a new name must be created and defined in terms of existing national monies in order not to arouse nationalistic or anti-imperialist sentiments. This new currency must only be somewhat overvalued against the various national monies(which in turn are defined in terms of the new currency) in order to drive all national monies out of circulation (in accordance with Gresham's law).³¹This must be accompanied by the states' and the economic elites' constant appeal to the general public's sound economic intuition that—regardless of all nationalistic

（尽可能普世）通用的货币，如由支配国中央银行领导下的国际银行体系愿意提供的货币，才最符合每个人的最佳利益。除非在公众舆论当中，朝着强化私有财产及良好货币取向、相应增加反政府警惕的方向出现一些强烈改观，没有什么可以阻止支配国取得国际性伪造货币的完全自主权。随着支配国中央银行控制下的单一世界货币及世界银行到位，朝着将自身建成全面世界政府这一终极目标的关键步骤也付诸实施，不仅将在世界范围内控制货币伪造，而且将控制税收及法令管制。

【31】关于格莱欣法则，参阅米塞斯《货币与信贷理论》第75、77页；罗斯巴德《权利与市场》第29-31页。

鉴于对货币帝国主义的解释及其军事扩张（从国家主义观点）的“自然”补充，国际政治

feelings—freely fluctuating national monies are an anachronistic institution which cripples rational economic calculation, and that it is in everyone's best interest to have an internationally (and if possible universally) used money such as the international banking system under the leadership of the dominant state's central bank is willing to provide. Barring any drastic change in public opinion in the direction of a strengthened private property and sound money orientation and a correspondingly increased antistate vigilance, nothing will prevent the dominant state from achieving this complete international counterfeiting autonomy. And with a world money and world bank in place, and controlled by the dominant state's central bank, a decisive step is taken toward reaching its ultimate goal of establishing itself as a full-scale world government, with world-wide control not only over counterfeiting, but also over taxation and legal regulation.

31 On Gresham's law see Mises, *Theory of Money and Credit*, pp. 75, 77; *Human Action*, pp. 781-83; Rothbard, *Power and Market*, pp. 29-31.

In light of this explanation of monetary imperialism and its function as a “natural” (from a statist viewpoint, that is) complement of military expansionism, the remaining pieces from the history of international

历史的剩余部分也一目了然。与大英帝国崛起为首屈一指帝国主义国家携手并进的，是英镑帝国主义。当时在伪造货币道路上，不能完全免于所有国内障碍，英国支配的国家被迫将储备以英镑头寸的形式保留在伦敦，英格兰银行愿意将它们兑现成黄金。通过这种方式，这些国家将本国货币层层叠加在英镑之上，英国可以在黄金之上膨胀英镑钞票，而不用担心黄金的流出。当英国衰弱，美国政府崛起，成为世界头号军事强权，英镑帝国主义逐渐被美元帝国主义所取代。在二战结束时，美国统治扩展至全球大部分区域，在布雷顿森林协定中，美元被基本确认为世界储备货币，在美元之上，其他各国膨胀各自的纸币^[32]。一度，美国仍然正式维持用黄金兑现外国中央银行的美元，这多少限制了它本身的通胀权力。然而，这无法阻止在黄金之上的稳步美元伪造的发生。美国作为军事统治国际强权的地位（同时以一系列军事条约正式化，最著名当属北约），允许它逼迫外国政府兑现要求权时只能小心翼翼，这样就能膨胀本国美元而不引起紧缩性后果。当其伪造货币政策刺激外国政府，胆敢廉价取得黄

politics fall into place. Hand in hand with the rise of Great Britain to the rank of the foremost imperialist nation state went a sterling imperialism. Not entirely free at the time of all internal obstacles in the way of counterfeiting, British-dominated countries were compelled to keep their reserves in the form of sterling balances in London, where the Bank of England would redeem them in gold. This way, these countries would pyramid their national currencies on top of the pound, and Britain could inflate sterling notes on top of gold without having to fear an outflow of gold. With Britain's decline and the concurrent rise of the U.S. government to the position of the world's leading military power, sterling imperialism has gradually been replaced by a dollar imperialism. At the end of World War II, with U.S. domination extended over most of the globe, and essentially ratified in the Bretton Woods agreement, the dollar became the world reserve currency on top of which all other states have inflated their various national paper monies.³² For a while, the U.S. officially still maintained the pretense of redeeming foreign central banks' dollars in gold, and this somewhat limited its own inflationary potential. However, it did not prevent steady dollar counterfeiting on top of gold from occurring. The position of the U.S. as a militarily dominant international power (in the meantime formalized through a number of military pacts, most notably the NATO) allowed it to compel foreign

金时，正是美国政府的优势军事实力，最终让它放弃所有借口，宣布本国纸币不可兑现。从那时起，联邦储备体系获得自主伪造货币的地位，充当整个国际银行体系的最后救助者^{【33】}。

【32】关于与布雷顿森林体系一起建立的美元本位，参阅亨利·黑兹利特《从布雷顿森林体系到世界通货膨胀》（芝加哥：莱格尼里，1984年）。

【33】自从1971年金本位终结后，被创造出来货币，超过以往世界各国有史以来积累的货币。

美元本位的帝国主义本质，尤其是通过国际货币基金(IMF)、国际复兴与发展银行(IBRD)以及国际清算银行(BIS)这样的工具发挥作用^{【34】}。货币与信贷被大笔一挥地创造出来，首先从美国支配的机构付给外国政府，外国政府基于美元膨

governments to exercise their right to ask for redemption only sparingly if at all, so that its own dollar inflation could take place without setting off contractive consequences. And when its counterfeiting policy had incited foreign governments to become all too daring in their attempts to obtain gold at bargain prices, it was the U.S. government's superior military might that finally allowed it to give up all pretense and declare its notes irredeemable. Since then the Federal Reserve System has acquired the position of an autonomous counterfeiter of last resort to the entire international banking system.³³

32 On the dollar standard established with the Bretton Woods system, see Henry Hazlitt, *From Bretton Woods to World Inflation* (Chicago: Regnery, 1984).

33 Since 1971, at which time the gold standard was finally suspended, more money has been created than had previously been accumulated by all nations of the world since the beginning of time.

The imperialist nature of this dollar standard takes effect in particular through such instruments as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the Bank for International Settlement (BIS).³⁴ Money and credit, created by the stroke of a pen, is passed from these U.S.-dominated institutions first to foreign governments which

胀本国货币,并接着将这笔钱付给本国卡特尔银行体系,本国银行再添一笔伪造货币,接着付给各国各个商业势力,由此涟漪扩散到经济边沿。平行于货币流动的,是收入和财富从边沿再分配到一国商业及银行精英以及各国政府,以及从受支配区域再分配到美国政府以及作为世界金融中心的美国银行和商业势力的逆向过程。

从社会学观点,假如这个合二为一的过程被加在近代的封建社会上,后果将如何,尤其令人感兴趣。这些国家,主要分布在亚非拉,其典型特征是封建地主阶级,或者转化为金融或工业巨头的封建地主,他们控制政府机构,大多居住在首都及政府所在地;以及大量人身依附的无地农民,通过支付地租维持政府、封建精英和首都^[35]。美元帝国主义在这里意味着维护封建统治,支持及参与寄生封建阶级及首都对穷困农民及乡村的剥削,有利于前者对任何自由主义土地改革运动的镇压。事实上,典型的第三世界循环周期即

inflate their national currencies on top of it and in turn pass this money onto their own cartelized banking system which, adding a further dose of counterfeiting, then hand it on to the various states' favorite business establishments whence it ripples to the economic periphery. Parallel to this flow of money goes a reversed process of income and wealth redistribution from the periphery onto national business and banking elites and the various nation states as well as from the dominated territories to the U.S. government and the U.S. banking and business establishment as the ultimate center of world finance.

From a sociological point of view, the consequences are particularly interesting if these two integrated processes are superimposed on pre-modern, feudal societies. Such countries, primarily in Africa, Asia, Central and South America, are typically characterized by a class of feudal landlords, or feudal landlords-turned-financial-or-industrial-magnates controlling the state apparatus and mostly residing in the capital-city-and-seat-of-government; and by a class of largely landless, dependent peasants dispersed over the countryside and sustaining the state, the feudal elite, and the capital city through the payment of land rents.³⁵ Dollar imperialism here means upholding feudal rule, supporting and participating in the exploitation of an impoverished peasantry and the countryside by a parasitic feudal caste

政府压迫、革命运动、内战到重新压迫，以及旷日持久的经济依赖和大规模贫困，在一定程度上是由美国支配的国际货币体系引发和维持的。

自从 1971 年以来，通往货币扩张主义的第二步再接再厉。大约 160 种自由浮动货币实际上并不构成问题，因为绝大多数货币，由于内在原因，并无相对美元增值，并因此加强各自政府相对于美国政府权力的危险，或者它们在国际贸易中作用微乎其微，它们的存在所带来的计算混乱微不足道。然而，因为各国货币的相对强势及其在国际贸易中的重要作用，主要的西欧国以及日本是一个问题。因此，在美国主导下，创造一种世界货币，有利于理性化经济计算，同时捍卫美国支配地位及继续提高其本身通胀权力，这个努力方向已经确定。特别提款权（SDRs）的创造，起初以 16 国，后来以 5 个主要出口国定义，由 IMF 签发，是朝着美国支配的单一世界货币及单

and the capital city, and contributing in the latter's suppression of any liberationist land reform movement. In fact, the typical Third World cycle of ruthless government oppression, revolutionary movements, civil war, renewed suppression, and prolonged economic dependency and mass poverty is to a significant extent caused and maintained by the U.S.-dominated international monetary system.

Since 1971, in particular, increased efforts have been undertaken in the direction of the second step in the process of monetary expansionism. Not all of the roughly 160 freely fluctuating currencies actually pose a problem, because most of them are in no danger for internal reasons of appreciating against the dollar and thereby strengthening the respective states' power vis-à-vis that of the U.S. government, or they play such a minor role in international trade that the calculational chaos which is introduced by their existence is largely insignificant. However, because of the relative strength of their currencies and their important role in international trade, the major west European states as well as Japan are a problem. Hence it is to these states and currencies in particular that U.S.-led attempts to create a world currency that helps rationalize economic calculation and at the same time safeguard U.S. domination and further increase its own inflationary powers have been directed. The creation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), defined initially in terms of

一世界银行的一步^{【36】}。成立于 1973 年的三边委员会，作为大卫·洛克菲勒委员会分支（TC），它的活动为实现这个目标提供了另一重要推动。由来自于北美、西欧、日本的 300 名影响力巨大的政治人物、银行家、商人，以及知识分子、记者组成，三边委员会使得世界纸币及世界中央银行的创立成为关注焦点^{【37】}。在朝着这一终极目标的中间步骤——三边委员会，以及另一些与三边委员会成员实际上重叠、并为一目标努力的政治性银行-工业家协会，如欧洲行动委员会、欧洲货币联盟委员会、欧共体银联、ECU 银行公会、巴塞尔委员会以及威尔顿庄园集团的热忱支持下，在调整欧洲货币方面取得巨大进展。1979 年，在欧洲经济共同体支持下发行的欧洲货币单位（ECU）迎来新生。以十种欧洲货币的加权平均定义，并受到诸如欧洲倾向体系、欧洲投资银行以及全球银行间金融电信协会，以及欧洲货币合作基金的支持，ECU 承担着愈来愈重要的规则。因为作为平均，它与各国货币相比较为稳定，尤其是多国银行及企业发现，用 ECU 作为会计单位及清算中介，吸引力不断增加：与十几种货币

sixteen and later five leading export nations, and issued by the IMF, was a move toward a one-world currency and a one-world bank under U.S. domination.³⁶ Another important push toward this goal was provided through the activities of the Trilateral Commission (TC), founded in 1973 as an offshoot of David Rockefeller's Council on Foreign Relations. Composed of some 300 highly influential politicians, bankers, businessmen, as well as intellectuals and journalists from North America, Western Europe and Japan, the TC has made the establishment of a world paper currency and a world central bank its primary concern.³⁷ Fervently supported by the TC as an intermediate step toward this ultimate goal as well as by several other politician banker-industrialist associations with a substantial overlap of membership with the TC and devoted to the same ends, such as the Action Committee for Europe, the Association for the Monetary Union of Europe, the Banking Federation of the European Community, the ECU Banking Association, the Basel Committee and the Wilton Park Group, great advances have been made in aligning the European monetary front. In 1979, the newly created European Currency Unit (ECU), issued under the aegis of the European Economic Community, first appeared. Defined as a weighted average of ten European currencies, and assisted by organizations such as the European Monetary System, the European

相比，只使用三种货币——ECU、日元和美元——进行的经济计算，混乱程度降低。1998年，根据正式政府协议，欧洲中央银行成立，ECU成为取代欧洲各国货币的全欧货币^{【38】}。

【34】关于这些制度的帝国主义本质参阅盖布里尔·考尔科《战争政治，世界与美国外交政策 1943-1945年》（纽约：兰登书屋，1968年）第242-340页。

【35】参阅保罗·巴兰《发展政治经济学》（纽约：月评出版社，1957年），第5-6章。

【36】参阅黑兹利特《从布雷顿森森到世界通货膨胀》

【37】三边委员会显赫美国成员的样本包括：大卫·爱博夏尔，总统顾问；弗兰克·C.卡卢奇，国家安

Investment Bank, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications, and the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, the ECU has assumed a more and more important rule. Since as an average it is less volatile than the various national currencies, multinational banks and corporations in particular have found it increasingly attractive to use the ECU as a unit of account and a medium of settlement: economic calculation is less haphazard with only three currencies—the ECU, the yen, and the dollar—than with a dozen. In 1998, according to official intergovernmental agreements, the European Central Bank was established and the ECU became the all-European currency supplanting all national monies.³⁸

34 On the imperialist nature of these institutions, see also Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War, the World and United States Foreign Policy 1943-1945* (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 242-340.

35 See Paul A. Baran, *Political Economy of Growth* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957), chaps. V-VI.

36 See Hazlitt, *From Bretton Woods to World Inflation*.

37 A sample of prominent U.S. members of the Trilateral Commission includes David M. Abshire, counselor to the President; Frank C. Carlucci, national security advisor; J.C. Whitehead, Deputy Secretary of State; Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve

全顾问； J.C. 怀特海德，副国务卿； 艾伦·格林斯潘，美联储主席； 温斯顿·洛德，驻华大使； 乔治·布什，总统； 保罗·A. 沃尔克，美联储前主席； 亚历山大·黑格，前国务卿； 吉恩·柯克帕特里克，前驻联合国常任代表； 大卫·A. 斯托克曼，管理预算局前主管； 卡斯帕·温伯格，前国防部长； W. 迈克尔·布卢门撒尔，前财政部长； 兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基，前国家安全顾问； 哈罗德·布朗，前国防部长； 詹姆斯·E. 米·卡特，前总统； 理查德·N. 珀，负责经济与货币事务的前副国务卿； 沃尔特·蒙代尔，前副总统； 安东尼·M. 罗门，负责货币事务的前财政部次长； 赛勒斯·万斯，前国务卿； 安德鲁·杨，前联合国大使； 莱恩·E. 克兰，美国劳联与产联主席； 弗洛拉·刘易斯，纽约时报； 托马斯·约翰逊，洛杉矶时报； 乔治·威尔，ABC电视台和新闻周刊。

【38】此处亦可参阅杰弗里·塔克“门格尔和米塞斯对奥地利货币理论的贡献以及一个现代应用”（手稿1988年），在私企教育协会第13届年会（克利夫兰，俄亥俄州）上介绍； 荣保罗“未来世界货币秩序”，荣保罗投资意向函的特别报告（1988年）。明确支持欧洲中央银行、ECU以及最终单一世界货币思想的显赫欧洲人士包括：G. 涅利，菲亚特总裁，三边委员会； J. 弗拉西

System; Winston Lord, Ambassador to China; George Bush, President; Paul A. Volcker, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve System; Alexander Haig, former Secretary of State; Jean Kirkpatrick, former Ambassador to the U.N.; David A. Stockman, former head of OMB; Caspar Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense; W. Michael Blumenthal, former Secretary of the Treasury; Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security advisor; Harold Brown, former Secretary of Defense; James E. (Jimmy) Carter, former President; Richard N. Cooper, former Undersecretary of State for Economic and Monetary Affairs; Walter Mondale, former Vice President; Anthony M. Solomon, former Undersecretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs; Cyrus Vance, former Secretary of State; Andrew Young, former Ambassador to the U.N.; Lane E. Kirkland, head of AFL-CIO; Flora Lewis, New York Times; Thomas Johnson, Los Angeles Times; George Will, ABC television and Newsweek.

38 See on this also Jeffrey Tucker, “The Contributions of Menger and Mises to the Foundations of Austrian Monetary Theory Together With One Modern Application,” (manuscript 1988), presented at the 13th annual conference of The Association for Private Enterprise Education, Cleveland, Ohio; and Ron Paul, “The Coming World Monetary Order,” A Special Report from the Ron Paul Investment Letter (1988). Prominent

厄, 国际清算银行主席, 三边委员会; G. 茨杰拉德, 前爱尔兰首相, 三边委员会; L. 拉纳, 西班牙国家电信公司主席, 三边委员会; G. 恩, 欧共体主席及卢森堡前首相, 三边委员会; N. 格森, 哥本哈根大学经济学教授, 三边委员会; U. 涅利, 菲亚特副总裁; E·巴拉迪尔, 法国财政部长; N. 雷迪, 狄龙阅读投资; J. 拉汉, 英国前首相; K. 斯滕斯, 西德前首相; P. 菲, 阿姆斯特丹大学经济学教授; E. 维侬, 前欧盟委员会委员; J. 洛尔, 前欧共体主席; W. 森伯格, 国际清算银行总裁; L·费比乌斯, 法国前首相; J.R. 尔图, 罗纳普朗克总裁; R.D. 米尔, 法兰西银行前总裁; V. 季斯卡·德斯坦, 法国前总统; Ch. 古德哈特, 伦敦经济学院银行学教授; P·Guimbretiere, 欧共体 ECU 项目总监; W. 古思, 德意志银行总裁; E. 希斯, 前英国首相; M. 柯恩斯塔姆, 佛罗伦萨欧洲大学学院院长; N. 劳森, 英国财政大臣; L.M. 勒韦克, 里昂信贷银行总裁; L. 卢基尼, 意大利工业联合会主席; F. 莫德, 英国企业和消费者事务大臣; P. 芒特, 法国国民信贷银行主席; H.L. 默克尔, 博世主席, 西德; F·密特朗, 法国总统; J. 莫奈, 欧共体创建人; P.X. 奥托利, 道达尔古油总裁与欧共体前委员; D. Rambure, 里昂信贷银行; H. 施米特, 西德前总理与时代

Europeans explicitly supporting the idea of a European Central Bank, the ECU, and finally a one-world currency include: G. Agnelli, Chairman of FIAT, TC; J. Defflassieux, Chairman of the BIS, TC; G. FitzGerald, former Prime Minister of Ireland, TC; L. Solana, President of Compania Telefonica Nacional de Espana, TC; G. Thorn, President of the European Community and former Prime Minister of Luxembourg, TC; N. Thygesen, Professor of Economics, Copenhagen University, TC; U. Agnelli, Vice President of FIAT; E. Balladour, Financial Minister of France; N. Brady, Dillon Read Investments; J. Callaghan, former Prime Minister of Britain; K. Carstens, former President of West Germany; P. Coffey, Professor of Economics University of Amsterdam; E. Davignon, former European Commissioner; J. Delors, former President of the European Community; W. Dusenber, President of BIS; L. Fabius, former Prime Minister of France; J.R. Fourt, President of Rhone-Poulence; R. d. La Jemere, former Governor of the Banque de France; V. Giscard d'Estaing, former President of France; Ch. Goodhart, Professor of Banking, London School of Economics; P. Guimbretiere, Director of the European Community's ECU project; W. Guth, President of the Deutsche Bank; E. Heath, former British Prime Minister; M. Kohnstamm, former President of European University Institute, Florence; N. Lawson, British Chancellor of the Exchequer; L.M. Leveque, President of Credit

周报编辑; P. 希伊, 英美烟草公司主席; J. 索尔维, 索尔维主席, 比利时; H. J. 沃格尔, 西德社民党主席; J. 泽斯特拉, 荷兰银行前总裁。

随着计算混乱在欧洲的迎刃而解, 且卡特尔就其本质更有利高通胀国而不利低通胀国, 从而抑制及削弱了欧洲硬通货国, 以便维持及延续美国对欧洲的霸权, 此时实际要做的已经所剩无几。基本只有三家中央银行及货币, 以及美国对于欧日的支配地位, 最有可能被选作美国支配世界中央银行的代表是 IMF 或 BIS: 在它的庇护下, 最初定义为一篮子美元、ECU 及日元的“菲尼克斯”(或无论它叫什么) 将崛起为单一世界纸币——除非, 作为唯一对政府发展构成限制的公众

Lyonnais; L.Lucchini, President of Confindustria Italy; F. Maude, British Minister for Corporate and Consumer Affairs; P. Mentre, Chairman of Credit National, France; H.L. Merkle, Chairman of Bosch GmbH, West Germany; F. Mitterand, President of France; J. Monet, founder of the European Community; P.X.Ortoli, President of Total Oil and former Commissioner of the European Community; D. Rambure, Credit Lyonnais; H. Schmidt, former Chancellor of West Germany and Editor of die ZEIT; P. Sheehy, Chairman of BAT Industries; J. Solvay, Chairman of Solvay, Belgium; H.J. Vogel, Chairman of the German Social Democratic Party; J. Zijlstra, former President of the Nederlandse Bank.

With the European calculational chaos solved, then, and in particular with the European hard currency countries neutralized and weakened within a cartel that by its very nature favors more against less inflationary countries so as to protect and prolong U.S. hegemony over Europe, little indeed would remain to be done. With essentially only three central banks and currencies and U.S. dominance over Europe and Japan, the most likely candidates to be chosen as a U.S-dominated World Central Bank are the IMF or the BIS: and under its aegis then, initially defined as a basket of the dollar, the ECU, and the yen, the “phoenix” (or whatever else its name may be) will rise as a one-world paper currency—unless, that is, public opinion as the only constraint on

舆论，发生实质性转变，公众开始理解本书中所解释的这一课：经济理性以及公正、道德，要求实现全世界金本位、百分百准备自由银行以及全世界自由市场；那种世界政府、单一世界中央银行及单一世界纸币——与代表普世价值的假象相反——实际上意味着剥削、假币欺诈以及经济毁灭^{【39】}。

【39】我对国际货币体系的动态理解，受到米塞斯研究院的杰弗里·塔克的重要影响——通过频繁与之探讨，且允许我接触其相关研究。不用说，所有不足均归于我。

government growth undergoes a substantial change and the public begins to understand the lesson explained in this book: that economic rationality as well as justice and morality demand a worldwide gold standard and free, 100-percent reserve banking as well as free markets worldwide; and that world government, a world central bank and a world paper currency—contrary to the deceptive impression of representing universal values—actually means the universalization and intensification of exploitation, counterfeiting-fraud and economic destruction.³⁹

³⁹Jeffrey Tucker of the Ludwig von Mises Institute had an important influence on my understanding of the dynamics of the international monetary system—through frequent discussions as well as through granting me access to his own related research. Needless to say, all shortcomings are entirely my own.

第四章 马克思主义 与奥地利学派 阶级分析

《自由至上学刊》9, no. 2 (1990年秋) 初版。再版于《马克思的安魂曲》尤里·N. 尔采夫编(阿拉巴马州奥本: 米塞斯学院, 1993年)。

本章我将完成以下任务: 首先, 介绍一系列构成马克思主义历史理论核心的命题, 并主张其基本正确。接着阐明, 马克思主义如何从错误起点得出正确命题。最后证明, 米塞斯-罗斯巴德传统的奥地利学派, 能正确无误却截然不同地解释这些命题的有效性。

让我从马克思主义信念体系着手^[1]:

(1) “人类历史是阶级斗争史。^[2]”即人数相对较少的统治阶级与人数较多的被剥削阶级的斗争史。剥削的主要形式是经济性的: 统治阶级掠夺被剥削者的部分产出, 正如马克思所说“它掠夺社会剩余产品并用于自己的消费目的。”

Marxist and Austrian Class Analysis

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I will do the following in this chapter: First, I will present a series of theses that constitute the hard-core of the Marxist theory of history. I claim that all of them are essentially correct. Then I will show how these true theses are derived in Marxism from a false starting point. Finally, I want to demonstrate how Austrianism in the Mises-Rothbard tradition can give a correct but categorically different explanation of their validity.

Let me begin with the hard-core of the Marxist belief system:1

(1) “The history of mankind is the history of class struggles.”² It is the history of struggles between a relatively small ruling class and a larger class of the exploited. The primary form of exploitation is economic: The ruling class expropriates part of the productive output of the exploited or, as Marxists say, “it appropriates a social surplus

(2) 统治阶级为维持本身的剥削地位，最大化剥夺剩余产品的共同利益而沆瀣一气。它不会主动放弃权力或剥削收入。相反，权力或收入的任何损失，必须通过斗争才能扭转；斗争成败最终依赖于被剥削者的阶级意识，也即剥削者是否以及在何种程度上意识到本身状况，并且清醒地与其他阶级成员联合起来，共同反对剥削。

(3) 阶级统治主要在关涉财产权转让的具体安排——按马克思术语——即在特定“生产关系”中表现出来。为维护这些安排或生产关系，统治阶级组建与掌管政府这个强迫镇压机构。政府通过管理“阶级公正”体系，强行复制特定的阶级结构，还协助创造及扶持旨在增加阶级统治合法性的意识形态上层建筑。

(4) 在内部，统治阶级之间的竞争过程造成

product and uses it for its own consumptive purposes.”

(2) The ruling class is unified by its common interest in upholding its exploitative position and maximizing its exploitatively appropriated surplus product. It never deliberately gives up power or exploitation income. Instead, any loss in power or income must be wrestled away from it through struggles, whose outcome ultimately depends on the class consciousness of the exploited, i.e., on whether or not and to what extent the exploited are aware of their own status and are consciously united with other class members in common opposition to exploitation.

(3) Class rule manifests itself primarily in specific arrangements regarding the assignment of property rights or, in Marxist terminology, in specific “relations of production.” In order to protect these arrangements or production relations, the ruling class forms and is in command of the state as the apparatus of compulsion and coercion. The state enforces and helps reproduce a given class structure through the administration of a system of “class justice,” and it assists in the creation and the support of an ideological superstructure designed to lend legitimacy to the existence of class rule.

(4) Internally, the process of competition within the ruling class

日益中央集权的趋势。多极剥削体系逐渐被寡头或垄断体系所取代。硕果仅存的剥削中心日渐稀少，并逐步融于等级秩序之中。在外部（即关于国际体系），这个集权过程将（愈演愈烈地）导致帝国主义国家间战争及剥削统治的领土扩张。

（5）最终，随着剥削统治的集权扩张逐渐接近统治世界之极限，阶级统治与“生产力”的进一步发展提高渐成水火之势。经济停滞和危机更加显著，为被剥削阶级革命意识的出现创造了“客观条件”。建立无阶级社会的条件成熟，“国家消亡”，执掌一切、人压迫人的政府被取而代之，结果迎来空前的经济繁荣。

【1】下文参阅马克思及恩格斯《共产主义者宣言（1848年）》；马克思《资本论》第3卷（1867年；1885年；1894

generates a tendency toward increasing concentration and centralization. A multipolar system of exploitation is gradually supplanted by an oligarchic or monopolistic one. Fewer and fewer exploitation centers remain in operation, and those that do are increasingly integrated into a hierarchical order. Externally (i.e., as regards the international system), this centralization process will (and all the more intensively the more advanced it is) lead to imperialist interstate wars and the territorial expansion of exploitative rule.

(5) Finally, with the centralization and expansion of exploitative rule gradually approaching its ultimate limit of world domination, class rule will increasingly become incompatible with the further development and improvement of “productive forces.” Economic stagnation and crises become more and more characteristic and create the “objective conditions” for the emergence of a revolutionary class consciousness of the exploited. The situation becomes ripe for the establishment of a classless society, the “withering away of the state,” the replacement of government of men over men by the administration of things³ and, as its result, unheard-of economic prosperity.

¹See on the following Karl Marx and Frederic Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (1848); Karl Marx, *Das Kapital*, 3 vols.

年)；至于现代马克思主义者，参阅欧内斯特·曼德尔《马克思经济理论》(伦敦：默林，1962年)、《晚期资本主义》(伦敦：新左书局，1975年)；保罗·巴兰与保罗·斯威齐《垄断资本》(纽约：月评出版社，1966年)；从非马克思主义角度参阅莱斯泽克·克拉科夫斯基《马克思主义主流》(牛津：克拉伦敦出版社，1995年)；G. 魏特《今日苏维埃意识形成》(法兰克福/M：费希尔，1962年)第2卷。

【2】马克思和恩格斯《共产主义者宣言》(第1节)

【3】《共产主义者宣言》(第2节前2段)；恩格斯《论权威》载于《马克思和恩格斯选集》两卷本(东柏林：迪茨，1953年)第1卷第606页；恩格斯《社会主义从空想到科学》，载于《马克思和恩格斯选集》第2卷第139页。

我将证明，以上命题可以有完善的理由。然而不幸的是，描述这一切的马克思主义，却从显然荒谬的剥削理论中得到结论；它对这些命题有效性的损害，远胜其他意识形态体系。

什么是马克思主义剥削理论？按马克思的说

(1867; 1885; 1894) ; as contemporary Marxists, Ernest Mandel, *Marx's Economic Theory* (London: Merlin,1962) ; idem, *Late Capitalism* (London: New Left Books, 1975) ; Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, *Monopoly Capital* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966) ; from a non-Marxist perspective, Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) ; G. Wetter, *Sovietideologie heute* (Frankfurt/M.:Fischer, 1962) , vol. 1; W. Leonhard, *Soviet ideologie heute* (Frankfurt/M.: Fischer,1962) , vol. 2.

2Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (section 1) .

3*The Communist Manifesto* (section 2, last 2 paragraphs) ; Frederic Engels, *Von der Autorität*, in Karl Marx and Frederic Engels, *Ausgewählte Schriften*, 2vols. (East Berlin: Dietz, 1953) , vol. I, p. 606; idem, *Die Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der Utopie zur Wissenschaft*, *ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 139.

All of these theses can be given a perfectly good justification, as I will show. Unfortunately, however, it is Marxism, which subscribes to all of them, that has done more than any other ideological system to discredit their validity in deriving them from a patently absurd exploitation theory.

What is this Marxist theory of exploitation? According to Marx,

法，奴隶制度、封建制度这样的前资本主义社会体系，是以剥削为特征的。这点毫无争议。奴隶终究不是自由劳动者，不能说受奴役对他有益。相反，在遭受奴役时，他的效用降低而奴隶主的掠夺财富增加。奴隶的利益与奴隶主的利益确实是敌对的。至于封建主向农奴——劳作于他（也即农奴本人）拓殖的土地之上——榨取地租，情况也是如此。领主之所得即农奴之损失，这也毫无争议，即奴隶制与封建制一样，都确实阻碍了生产力的发展。当免受奴隶制或农奴制压迫时，奴隶或农奴都将更有生产力。

标新立异的马克思主义思想，认为剥削在资本主义下（假如奴隶换成自由劳工），或假如农民决定支付地租以换取对他人拓殖土地的耕耘，本质没有任何改变。诚然，马克思《资本论》第1卷著名的第24章，以“所谓原始积累”为题，对资本主义的出现给予历史描述，他的观点是，许多甚至绝大部分原初资本主义的财产来自于掠夺、圈地和征服。与之类似，第25章“殖民主义现代理论”着重强调了，在将资本主义输出到今天所谓第三世界的过程中，强制和暴力发挥的重

such precapitalist social systems as slavery and feudalism are characterized by exploitation. There is no quarrel with this. For after all, the slave is not a free laborer, and he cannot be said to gain from his being enslaved. Rather, in being enslaved his utility is reduced at the expense of an increase in wealth appropriated by the slave master. The interest of the slave and that of the slave owner are indeed antagonistic. The same is true as regards the interests of the feudal lord who extracts a land rent from a peasant who works on land homesteaded by himself (i.e., the peasant). The lord's gains are the peasant's losses. It is also undisputed that slavery as well as feudalism indeed hamper the development of productive forces. Neither slave nor serf will be as productive as they would be without slavery or serfdom.

The genuinely new Marxist idea is that essentially nothing is changed as regards exploitation under capitalism (if the slave becomes a free laborer), or if the peasant decides to farm land homesteaded by someone else and pays rent in exchange for doing so. To be sure, Marx, in the famous chapter 24 of the first volume of his *Kapital*, titled "The So-called Original Accumulation," gives a historical account of the emergence of capitalism which makes the point that much or even most of the initial capitalist property is the result of plunder, enclosure, and conquest. Similarly, in chapter 25, on

要作用。须承认，这一切总体正确；到目前为止，为这样的资本主义贴上掠夺标签，是无可厚非的。然而，应注意马克思事实上以诡计弄人。对大部分资本主义财富形成的潜在野蛮，他在从事历史调查及引发读者愤恨的过程中，实际上离题万里。他使人忘记命题实际上迥然不同：换言之，即令一个人身处可谓“清白”的资本主义（其中资本原始取得完全只是垦荒拓殖的结果），劳作积蓄，雇佣劳力与以上资本共同使用的这位资本家，从事的依然是剥削。马克思甚至认为，这个命题的证明，对其经济分析的贡献最大。

那么，他是如何证明了清白资本主义的剥削特征？

这个证明包含的观察是，要素价格尤其是资本家付给劳动者的工资低于产品价格。例如，付给劳动者的工资，代表能在 3 天内生产的消费财

the“Modern Theory of Colonialism,” the role of force and violence in exporting capitalism to the, as we would nowadays say, Third World is heavily emphasized. Admittedly, all this is generally correct, and insofar as it is there can be no quarrel with labeling such capitalism exploitative. Yet one should be aware of the fact that here Marx is engaged in a trick. In engaging in historical investigations and arousing the reader’s indignation regarding the brutalities underlying the formation of many capitalist fortunes, he actually side-steps the issue at hand. He distracts from the fact that his thesis is really an entirely different one: namely, that even if one were to have “clean” capitalism so to speak (one in which the original appropriation of capital were the result of nothing else but homesteading), work and savings, the capitalist who hired labor to be employed with this capital would nonetheless be engaged in exploitation. Indeed, Marx considered the proof of this thesis his most important contribution to economic analysis.

What, then, is his proof of the exploitative character of a clean capitalism?

It consists in the observation that the factor prices, in particular the wages paid to laborers by the capitalist, are lower than the output prices. The laborer, for instance, is paid a wage that represents

货，但他实际为这份工资工作了 5 天，消费者财货产量超过他所得报酬。额外两天的产出，即马克思术语中的剩余价值，被资本家掠夺，因此照他的说法，这里存在剥削^[4]。

这个分析错在哪里^[5]？答案是明显的，只要问为什么劳动者能够认可这种交易！他的认可是因为他的工资所得代表着当前财货——而他本身的劳动服务代表的仅仅是未来财货——他给予当前财货更高的评价。他也完全可以决定不将自己的劳动服务售予资本家，自己筹划其产品的完整价值。但这当然意味着，他在可获得任何消费品之前，将不得不等待更长时间。出售他的劳动服务，证明了他偏好现时更少数量的消费者财货，胜过未来某刻更多的消费者财货。另一方面，为什么资本家愿意和劳动者达成交易？为什么他愿意将现时财货（货币）给予劳动者，用于换取唯有以后才能收获成果的服务？显然，假如他决心在一年内收获同样数额（100 美元）的货币，他不会在眼下付出例如 100 美元。既然如此，为什么不简单持有这笔钱等上一年，收取在整段时期内实际掌握这笔钱所能获得的额外利益？正相反，

consumption goods which can be produced in three days, but he actually works five days for his wage and produces an output of consumption goods that exceeds what he receives as remuneration. The output of the two extra days, the surplus value in Marxist terminology, is appropriated by the capitalist. Hence, according to Marx, there is exploitation.⁴

What is wrong with this analysis?⁵ The answer becomes obvious, once it is asked why the laborer would possibly agree to such a deal! He agrees because his wage payment represents present goods—while his own labor services represent only future goods—and he values present goods more highly. After all, he could also decide not to sell his labor services to the capitalist and then reap the full value of his output himself. But this would of course imply that he would have to wait longer for any consumption goods to become available to him. In selling his labor services he demonstrates that he prefers a smaller amount of consumption goods now over a possibly larger one at some future date. On the other hand, why would the capitalist want to strike a deal with the laborer? Why would he want to advance present goods (money) to the laborer in exchange for services that bear fruit only later? Obviously, he would not want to pay out, for instance, \$100 now if he were to receive the same amount in one year's time. In that case,

他必须期待在将来收到多于 100 美金的一笔钱，才会以付给劳动者薪酬的形式，放弃现时的 100 美金。他必须期待能够赚取利润，或更确切说是利息回报。他同样受时间偏好的束缚，也即行动者一向偏好较早的财货胜过较迟的财货，只不过，是用另一种方式。因为假如一个人可在未来获得更多金钱，而在当前牺牲较少金钱，那为什么这位资本家不比实际储蓄更多？假如每位资本家都期待额外的利息回报，为什么他不比实际雇佣更多工人？答案再次昭然若揭：因为资本家同时也是消费者，两者难以分离。储蓄额和投资额受此必然性的限制，即他也与劳动者一样，需要现时财货的供应，其“数量必须大到足以使下述欲望全部得到满足，即在等待期当中，被认为比那些更长生产期带来利益更为重要的欲望。”

【4】参阅马克思《资本论》第1卷；最简洁的介绍见马克思《工资、价格、利润》（1865年）。实际上，为证明更具体的马克思主义论点，即劳动所有者（而非其他原始生

why not simply hold on to it for one year and receive the extra benefit of having actual command over it during the entire time? Instead, he must expect to receive a larger sum than \$100 in the future in order to give up \$100 now in the form of wages paid to the laborer. He must expect to be able to earn a profit, or more correctly an interest return. He is also constrained by time preference, i.e., the fact that an actor invariably prefers earlier over later goods, in yet another way. For if one can obtain a larger sum in the future by sacrificing a smaller one in the present, why then is the capitalist not engaged in more saving than he actually is? Why does he not hire more laborers than he does, if each one of them promises an additional interest return? The answer again should be obvious: because the capitalist is a consumer, as well, and cannot help being one. The amount of his savings and investing is restricted by the necessity that he, too, like the laborer, requires a supply of present goods “large enough to secure the satisfaction of all those wants the satisfaction of which during the waiting time is considered more urgent than the advantages which a still greater lengthening of the period of production would provide.”⁶

⁴See Marx, *Das Kapital*, vol. I; the shortest presentation is his *Lohn, Preis, Profit* (1865). Actually, in order to prove the more specific Marxist thesis that exclusively the owner of labor services is

产要素如土地的所有者)完全是受剥削的,还需要另一步论证。因为假如要素及产出的价差真的构成剥削关系,这只会表明,从劳动所有者那里雇佣劳动服务的资本家,也从土地所有者那里剥削了劳动或土地,或同时剥削劳动与土地。当然,凭借将劳动论证为唯一价值源头的尝试,据说在这里弥补了缺失环节的,正是劳动价值论。我将略去反驳这一理论的任务。今天,甚至在自称的马克思主义者当中,不承认劳动价值论失败的人也已所剩无几。确切说,为了有利论证,例如由自称“分析马克思主义者”约翰·罗尔默(见《剥削和阶级通论》,马萨诸塞州剑桥:哈佛大学出版社,1982年;《价值、剥削和阶级》,伦敦:哈伍德学术出版社,1985年)所建议的,剥削理论与劳动价值论可以在分析上互相分离,且无论劳动价值论是否正确,都能证明成立“一般商品剥削理论”。我将证明马克思主义剥削理论是荒谬的,即令其支持者得以免除对劳动价值论的证明,甚至,即令劳动价值论是正确的。即便一般商品剥削理论也逃不脱马克思主义剥削理论乃绝对错误这个结论。

exploited (but not the owner of the other originary factor of production: land), yet another argument would be needed. For if it were true that the discrepancy between factor and output prices constitutes an exploitative relation, this would only show that the capitalist who rents labor services from an owner of labor, and land services from an owner of land would exploit either labor, or land, or labor and land simultaneously. It is the labor theory of value, of course, which is supposed to provide the missing link here by trying to establish labor as the sole source of value. I will spare myself the task of refuting this theory. Few enough remain today, even among those claiming to be Marxists, who do not recognize the faultiness of the labor theory of value. Rather, I will accept for the sake of argument the suggestion made, for instance, by the self-proclaimed “analytical Marxist” John Roemer (*A General Theory of Exploitation and Class* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982]; idem, *Value, Exploitation and Class* [London: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1985]) that the theory of exploitation can be separated analytically from the labor theory of value; and that a “generalized commodity exploitation theory” can be formulated which can be justified regardless of whether or not the labor theory of value is true. I want to demonstrate that the Marxist theory of exploitation is nonsensical even

【5】下述参阅庞巴维克《社会主义-共产主义剥削理论》（伊利诺斯州南霍兰：自由至上出版社，1975年）；作者同上，《庞巴维克精典短文》（伊利诺斯州南霍兰：自由至上出版社，1962年）

【6】米塞斯《人的行动》第407页；亦可参阅罗斯巴德《人、经济与国家》第300-301页。

马克思剥削理论错在不理解时间偏好现象是人的行动的普遍范畴^[7]。劳动者没有得到“全部价值”与剥削无关，而仅仅反映，人不可能不贴现就用未来财货换得现时财货的这个事实。以奴隶和奴隶主的关系为例，后者所得乃前者所失；与之相反，自由劳动力与资本家的关系是交相利的。劳动者接受这个协议，是因为给定他的时间偏好，他选择更少的现时财货而舍弃更多的未来财货；而资本家接受这个协议，是因为给定他的

if one were to absolve its proponents from having to prove the labor theory of value and, indeed, even if the labor theory of value were true. Even a generalized commodity exploitation theory provides no escape from the conclusion that the Marxist theory of exploitation is dead wrong.

5See on the following Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, *The Exploitation Theory of Socialism-Communism* (South Holland, Ill.: Libertarian Press, 1975) ; idem, *Shorter Classics of Böhm-Bawerk* (South Holland, Ill.: Libertarian Press, 1962) .

6Ludwig von Mises, *Human Action* (Chicago: Regnery, 1966) , p. 407; see also Murray N. Rothbard, *Man, Economy, and State* (Los Angeles: Nash, 1970) , pp. 300-01.

What is wrong with Marx's theory of exploitation, then, is that he does not understand the phenomenon of time preference as a universal category of human action.⁷ That the laborer does not receive his "full worth" has nothing to do with exploitation but merely reflects the fact that it is impossible for man to exchange future goods against present ones except at a discount. Contrary to the case of slave and slave master where the latter benefits at the expense of the former, the relationship between the free laborer and the capitalist is a mutually beneficial one. The laborer enters the agreement because, given his

时间偏好，他有着相反的偏好次序，即选择更多数量的未来财货而舍弃更少数量的现时财货。他们的利益不是敌对的，而是和谐的。若无资本家对利息回报的预期，劳动者处境变差，相比他愿意等待的时间，他不得不等候更长时间；若无劳动者对现时财货的偏好，资本家处境变差，相比他想要采取的方法，他不得不依靠迂回程度和效率都较低的生产方法。不像马克思所说，资本主义工资制度是生产力进一步发展的阻碍。假如不允许劳动者出售劳动服务以供资本家购买，产出只能低而不会高，从而在相对更低水平的资本积累上开展生产。

【7】关于利息的时间偏好理论，另见注释5、6中引用的著作；亦可参阅法兰克·菲特《资本、利息与租金》（堪萨斯城：熙德·安德鲁斯与麦克米尔，1977年）。

在社会主义生产制度下，与马克思的宣告恰好相反，生产力发展非但没有达到新的高峰，反而戏剧性滑坡^[8]。显然，资本积累必须通过拓殖、

time preference, he prefers a smaller amount of present goods over a larger future one; and the capitalist enters it because, given his time preference, he has a reverse preference order and ranks a larger future amount of goods more highly than a smaller present one. Their interests are not antagonistic but harmonious. Without the capitalist's expectation of an interest return, the laborer would be worse off having to wait longer than he wishes to wait; and without the laborer's preference for present goods the capitalist would be worse off having to resort to less roundabout and less efficient production methods than those which he desires to adopt. Nor can the capitalist wage system be regarded as an impediment to the further development of the forces of production, as Marx claims. If the laborer were not permitted to sell his labor services and the capitalist to buy them, output would not be higher but lower, because production would have to take place with relatively reduced levels of capital accumulation.

7 See on the time preference theory of interest in addition to the works cited in notes 5 and 6; also Frank Fetter, *Capital, Interest and Rent* (Kansas City: Sheed Andrews and McMeel, 1977).

Under a system of socialized production, quite contrary to Marx's proclamations, the development of productive forces would not reach new heights but would instead sink dramatically.⁸ For obviously,

生产与/或储蓄，由特定个人在特定时点和地点上带来。每种情况下，都促进了资本积累，导致了未来产量增加的预期。他赋予资本的价值，反映出他赋予一切未来收入的价值，这些收入归功于合作并根据他的时间偏好率贴现。假若在集体拥有生产要素的情况下，不再允许行动人排他性控制他积累的资本，乃至他源于资本利用的未来收入，而将部分控制权赋予非拓殖者、非生产者及非储蓄者，那么对他来说，期望收入的价值乃至资本品价值下降。他的有效时间偏好率上升，对稀缺资源的拓殖、维持已有资源的储蓄以及新资本品的生产都将下降。生产期、生产结构的迂回过程也将缩短，最终导致相对贫困。

假如马克思资本主义剥削理论，及其关于如何结束剥削及建立共同繁荣的思想，到这个荒谬论点为止就全属虚假，那么任何发端于此的历史理论，显然也是虚假的。或倘若这个结论正确，

capital accumulation must be brought about by definite individuals at definite points in time and space through homesteading, producing and/or saving. In each case it is brought about with the expectation that it will lead to an increase in the output of future goods. **The value** an actor attaches to his capital **reflects the value** he attaches to all expected future incomes **attributable to its cooperation and discounted by his rate of time preference**. If, as in the case of collectively owned factors of production, an actor is no longer granted exclusive control over his accumulated capital and hence over the future income to be derived from its employment, but partial control instead is assigned to nonhomesteaders, nonproducers, and nonsavers, the value for him of the expected income and hence that of the capital goods is reduced. His effective rate of time preference will rise and there will be less homesteading of scarce resources, and less saving for the maintenance of existing resources and the production of new capital goods. The period of production, the roundaboutness of the production structure, will be shortened, and relative impoverishment will result.

If Marx's theory of capitalist exploitation and his ideas on how to end exploitation and establish universal prosperity are false to the point of being ridiculous, it is clear that any theory of history which can be derived from it must be false, too. Or if it should be correct, it must

必定也源于错误的推导。为免冗长解释马克思主义论证从资本剥削理论到前述历史理论的所有缺陷，我将取终南捷径，尽可能简洁地勾勒出正确的——奥地利学派的，米塞斯-罗斯巴德的——剥削理论；对这个理论如何从古典历史理论汲取有意义的东西，给出解释概括；顺便阐明古典理论及马克思主义理论的关键差异，并指出奥地利学派与马克思主义在智识方面的紧密联系，这个联系源于的确存在剥削与统治阶级的共同信念^[9]。

【8】以上参阅霍普《社会主义与资本主义的理论》、“为什么社会主义必定失败”《自由市场》（1988年7月）、“税收的经济学与社会学”《经济学与人文学刊》（1990年）、前面第2章。

【9】米塞斯对于剥削与阶级理论的贡献是非系统性的。然而，尽管是含蓄的，他关于阶级分析的社会与历史解释贯穿写作。这里尤其要注意他的深刻分析，即政府与银行精英合作摧毁金本位，目的是将通胀权力强化为具有欺诈

have been derived incorrectly. Instead of going through the lengthier task of explaining all of the flaws in the Marxist argument as it sets out from its theory of capitalist exploitation and ends with the theory of history which I presented earlier, I will take a shortcut here. I will now outline in the briefest possible way the correct—Austrian, Misesian-Rothbardian—theory of exploitation; give an explanatory sketch of how this theory makes sense out of the class theory of history; and highlight along the way some key differences between this class theory and the Marxist one and also point out some intellectual affinities between Austrianism and Marxism stemming from their common conviction that there does indeed exist something like exploitation and a ruling class.⁹

8See on the following Hans-Hermann Hoppe, *A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism* (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989); idem, “Why Socialism Must Fail,” *Free Market* (July 1988); idem, “The Economics and Sociology of Taxation,” *Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines* (1990); supra chap. 2.

9Mises’s contributions to the theory of exploitation and class are unsystematic. However, throughout his writings he presents sociological and historical interpretations that are class analyses, if only implicitly. Noteworthy here is in particular his acute analysis of

剥削性质的，自私自利的收入财富再分配手段。如参阅他《货币稳定与周期政策》（1928年）；《论货币与信贷的操纵》珀西·格里夫斯编（纽约多布斯费里：自由市场书局，1978年）、《社会主义》（印第安纳波利斯：自由基金，1981年），第20章；《集团利益的冲突等论文集》（纽约：自由至上研究中心，不定期论文丛No. 7，1978年）。然而米塞斯的确没有使阶级分析与剥削理论系统化，因为他最终误将剥削仅仅当成正确经济推理所能排斥的智识错误。他未能充分意识到剥削同时也是、甚至更可能是道德激励问题，这样的问题能无视所有经济推理而存在。罗斯巴德在米塞斯的奥地利学派经济学结构中添进自己的洞察，使得权力及权力精英的分析成为经济理论和历史解释的组成部分；他系统发展了奥地利学派反对剥削的理由，使之包括除经济理论之外的伦理，也即与效率理论为邻的正义理论，这样就同时能将统治阶级抨击为非道德的。至于罗斯巴德的权力、阶级和剥削理论，详见《权力与市场》（堪萨斯城：熙德安德鲁斯与麦克米尔，1977年）；《为了新自由》（纽约：麦克米伦，1978年）；《银行的秘密》（纽约：理查森和斯奈德，1983年）；《美国大萧条》（堪萨斯城：熙德与沃德，1975年）。关于奥地利学派阶级分析的19世纪重要先驱，参阅伦纳德·里奇奥

the collaboration between government and banking elite in destroying the gold standard in order to increase their inflationary powers as a means of fraudulent, exploitative income and wealth redistribution in their own favor. See for instance his *Monetary Stabilization and Cyclical Policy* (1928) in idem, *On the Manipulation of Money and Credit*, ed. Percy Greaves (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Free Market Books 1978); idem, *Socialism* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1981), chap. 20; idem, *The Clash of Group Interests and Other Essays* (New York: Center for Libertarian Studies, Occasional Paper Series No. 7, 1978). Yet Mises does not give systematic status to class analysis and exploitation theory because he ultimately misconceives of exploitation as merely an intellectual error which correct economic reasoning can dispel. He fails to fully recognize that exploitation is also and probably even more so a moral-motivational problem that exists regardless of all economic reasoning. Rothbard adds his insight to the Misesian structure of Austrian economics and makes the analysis of power and powerelites an integral part of economic theory and historical-sociological explanations; and he systematically expands the Austrian case against exploitation to include ethics in addition to economic theory, i.e., a theory of justice next to a theory of efficiency, such that the ruling class can also be attacked as immoral. For

“查尔斯·迪诺耶尔与法国古典自由主义”《自由至上学报》1, no. 3 (1977年); 拉尔夫·雷克“古典自由主义剥削理论”《自由至上学报》2, no. 1 (1977年); 马克·温伯格“三位19世纪早期法国自由主义者的社会分析: 萨伊、孔德与迪诺耶尔”《自由至上学报》2, no. 1 (1978年); 约瑟夫·T·萨勒诺“法国自由学派评论”《自由至上学报》2, no. 1 (1978年); 大卫·M·哈特“古斯塔夫·莫利纳里与反政府自由传统”第2部分, 《自由至上学报》5, nos. 3-4 (1981年)。

奥地利学派剥削理论的起点, 理应是平实简明的。实际上, 它已经通过对马克思主义理论的分析而建立: 剥削是以奴隶与奴隶主、农奴与封建主之间的关系为标识。但在清白资本主义中是不可能找到剥削的。这两者间的原则区别是什

Rothbard's theory of power, class and exploitation, see in particular his *Power and Market* (Kansas City: Sheed Andrews and McMeel, 1977); idem, *For a New Liberty* (New York: Macmillan, 1978); idem, *The Mystery of Banking* (New York: Richardson and Snyder, 1983); idem, *America's Great Depression* (Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, 1975). On important nineteenth-century forerunners of Austrian class analysis, see Leonard Liggio, "Charles Dunoyer and French Classical Liberalism," *Journal of Libertarian Studies* 1, no. 3 (1977); Ralph Raico, "Classical Liberal Exploitation Theory," *Journal of Libertarian Studies* 1, no. 3 (1977); Mark Weinburg, "The Social Analysis of Three Early 19th Century French Liberals: Say, Comte, and Dunoyer," *Journal of Libertarian Studies* 2, no. 1 (1978); Joseph T. Salerno, "Comment on the French Liberal School," *Journal of Libertarian Studies* 2, no. 1 (1978); David M. Hart, "Gustave de Molinari and the Anti-Statist Liberal Tradition," 2 parts, *Journal of Libertarian Studies* 5, nos. 3 and 4 (1981).

The starting point for the Austrian exploitation theory is plain and simple, as it should be. Actually, it has already been established through the analysis of the Marxist theory: Exploitation characterized the relationship between slave and slave master and serf and feudal lord. But no exploitation was found possible under a clean capitalism.

么？答案是：承认或否认拓殖原理。在封建制度下农民之所以受剥削，是因为他对本人拓殖土地没有排他性控制权，而奴隶之所以受剥削，是因为他对本人拓殖身体没有排他性控制权。若与之相反，每个人都对自己身体有排他性控制权（也即自由劳动者），并且根据拓殖原理行动，这里就不可能有剥削存在。声称一个拓殖无主财货的人，或者在未来生产中利用这些财货的人，或储蓄前述拓殖或生产财货以增加未来财货供应的人，因此剥削了别人，在逻辑上是荒谬绝伦的。在这个过程中，没有任何东西从别人手里夺走，并且实际创造出额外财货。那么，声称各拓殖者、储蓄者及生产者之间非剥削掠夺财货或服务的协议，可能含有任何欺骗诡计，也同样荒谬绝伦。相反，但凡偏离了拓殖原理，就会产生剥削。剥削就是无论何时，一个人能够成功宣称部分或完全控制他未曾拓殖、储蓄或生产的，并且也未曾从先前生产者-所有者那里契约式取得的稀缺资源。剥削是由后来的非拓殖者、非生产者、非储蓄者与非契约者，对拓殖者、生产者与储蓄者的掠夺；剥削是由那些凭空产生要求权及无视别人

What is the principle difference between these two cases? The answer is: the recognition or nonrecognition of the homesteading principle. The peasant under feudalism is exploited because he does not have exclusive control over land that he homesteaded, and the slave because he has no exclusive control over his own homesteaded body. If, contrary to this, everyone has exclusive control over his own body (is a free laborer, that is) and acts in accordance with the homesteading principle, there can be no exploitation. It is logically absurd to claim that a person who homesteads goods not previously homesteaded by anybody else, or who employs such goods in the production of future goods, or who saves presently homesteaded or produced goods in order to increase the future supply of goods, could thereby exploit anybody. Nothing has been taken away from anybody in this process and additional goods have actually been created. And it would be equally absurd to claim that an agreement between different homesteaders, savers and producers regarding their nonexploitatively appropriated goods or services could possibly contain any foul play, then. Instead, exploitation takes place whenever any *deviation* from the homesteading principle occurs. It is exploitation whenever a person successfully claims partial or full control over scarce resources which he has not homesteaded, saved or produced, and which he has not

劳动与契约的人，剥夺那些基于劳动与契约产生财产要求权的人^{【10】}。

不消说，这样定义的剥削实际上是人类历史的一个组成部分。一个人可以取得与增加财富，要么通过拓殖、生产、储蓄或契约，要么通过掠夺拓殖者、生产者、储蓄者或契约者。除此外别无他法。两种方法之于人类都是自然的。与拓殖、生产以及契约相伴的，一向总是非生产性与非契约性取得财产。在经济发展过程中，正如生产者与契约者能够形成公司、企业及商社，剥削者也能够结合成大型剥削机构、政权与政府。统治阶级（也许内部再次划分等级）起初是由这样的剥削机构成员组成。随着一个统治阶级在给定地域建立起来，并从被剥削生产者阶级那里掠夺经济资源，所有历史的核心确实是剥削者与被剥削者的斗争。那么正确地说，历史本质上是统治者努力最大化剥削掠夺收入，与被统治者努力反抗及

acquired contractually from a previous producer-owner. Exploitation is the expropriation of homesteaders, producers and savers by late-coming nonhomesteaders, nonproducers, nonsavers and noncontractors; it is the expropriation of people whose property claims are grounded in work and contract by people whose claims are derived from thin air and who disregard others' work and contracts.¹⁰

Needless to say, exploitation thus defined is in fact an integral part of human history. One can acquire and increase wealth either through homesteading, producing, saving, or contracting, or by expropriating homesteaders, producers, savers or contractors. There are no other ways. Both methods are natural to mankind. Alongside homesteading, producing and contracting, there have always been nonproductive and noncontractual property acquisitions. And in the course of economic development, just as producers and contractors can form firms, enterprises and corporations, so can exploiters combine to large-scale exploitation enterprises, governments and states. The ruling class (which may again be internally stratified) is initially composed of the members of such an exploitation firm. And with a ruling class established over a given territory and engaged in the expropriation of economic resources from a class of exploited producers, the center of all history indeed becomes the struggle between exploiters and the

逆转这一趋势之成败起伏。这种对历史的评价，是奥地利学派及马克思主义者都赞同的，这也是为什么奥地利学派与马克思主义历史研究存在智识联系。两者均反对那种仅认为行动或互动，在经济上与在道德上完全等价的历史学；两者都反对虽不采纳这种价值中立立场，却认为一个人本身随意引入之主观价值判断，必然与历史叙事为伍的历史学。确切说，历史必须依据自由与剥削、寄生与经济贫困、私有财产及其破坏讲述——否则历史就是被虚构的^{【11】}。

【10】这一点也可参阅霍普《社会主义与资本主义的理论》；“经济效率的正义”《奥地利学派经济学通讯》第1期（1988年）：本书第9章；“私有财产伦理的最后基础”《自由》（1988年9月）：本书第10章。

【11】关于这个命题也可参阅阿克顿勋爵《自由主义历史文集》（印第安纳波利斯：自由基金，1985年）；弗兰茨·奥

exploited. History, then, correctly told, is essentially the history of the victories and defeats of the rulers in their attempt to maximize exploitatively appropriated income and of the ruled in their attempts to resist and reverse this tendency. It is in this assessment of history that Austrians and Marxists agree, and it is why a notable intellectual affinity between Austrian and Marxist historical investigations exists. Both oppose a historiography which recognizes only action or interaction, economically and morally all on a par; and both oppose a historiography that instead of adopting such a value neutral stand thinks that one's own arbitrarily introduced subjective value judgments have to provide the foil for one's historical narratives. Rather, history must be told in terms of freedom and exploitation, parasitism and economic impoverishment, private property and its destruction—otherwise it is told false.¹¹

10 See on this also Hoppe, *A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism*; idem, “The Justice of Economic Efficiency,” *Austrian Economics Newsletter* 1 (1988); infra chap. 9; idem, “The Ultimate Justification of the Private Property Ethics,” *Liberty* (September 1988): infra chap. 10.

11 See on this theme also Lord (John) Acton, *Essays in the History of Liberty* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985); Franz

本海默《社会学体系》，第2卷：《国家》（斯图加特：G. 费希尔，1964年）；亚历山大·罗斯托《自由与支配》（纽约普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1986年）。

生产性企业之盛衰，取决于自愿支持之有无；而统治阶级，不因有无需求而存废。一个人再延伸想象力，也不能够说拓殖者、生产者、储蓄者与契约者本来需要被人掠夺。他们必定在强迫下接受这种掠夺，这确证了剥削组织完全缺少需求。一个人也不能够说，拒绝与统治阶级交易就能让其衰败，就与他能让生产性企业衰败一样。由于统治阶级通过非生产性、非契约性交易取得收入，因此不受抵制的影响。确切说，使剥削性组织的盛衰成为可能的，唯有特定的公众舆论状态，用马克思主义术语表达，就是阶级意识的特定状态。

剥削者创造牺牲者，而牺牲者成为潜在敌人。在一群人剥削数量大致相当的另一群人时，持续镇压抵抗是有可能的。然而，将剥削扩大至几倍

Oppenheimer, *System der Soziologie*, vol. II: *Der Staat* (Stuttgart: G. Fischer, 1964) ; Alexander Rüstow, *Freedom and Domination* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986) .

While productive enterprises come into or go out of existence because of voluntary support or its absence, a ruling class never comes to power because there is a demand for it, nor does it abdicate when abdication is demonstrably demanded. One cannot say by any stretch of the imagination that homesteaders, producers, savers and contractors have demanded their expropriation. They must be coerced into accepting it, and this proves conclusively that the exploitation firm is not in demand at all. Nor can one say that a ruling class can be brought down by abstaining from transactions with it in the same way as one can bring down a productive enterprise. For the ruling class acquires its income through nonproductive and noncontractual transactions and thus is unaffected by boycotts. Rather, what makes the rise of an exploitation firm possible, and what alone can in turn bring it down is a specific state of public opinion or, in Marxist terminology, a specific state of class consciousness.

An exploiter creates victims, and victims are potential enemies. It is possible that this resistance can be lastingly broken down by force in

于其人数的另一群人，光靠武力是行不通的。为此，剥削性组织也必须要有公众支持。大多数人必定认同剥削行动的合法性。这种认同可从积极支持到消极顺从。但认同必须在这种意义上，即面对任何非生产性与非契约性取得财产的企图，大多数人必定已经放弃积极或消极抵抗的思想。阶级意识必然低下、滞后及模糊。唯有这种状态延续，剥削性组织才可能继续繁荣，即便并无实际需求存在。除非且只要通过意识形态运动，表达废除一切剥削的无阶级社会思想，使受剥削掠夺者对本身处境形成清晰观念，并与其他阶级成员联合起来，才能打破统治阶级的权力。除非且只要被剥削公众清醒汇聚成这样一种运动，对一切非生产性或非契约性财产取得，都相应表达共同愤慨，对涉身这种行为的人表露出鄙夷蔑视，决不助纣为虐（更别说积极阻挠），这种权力才能够最终崩溃。

the case of a group of men exploiting another group of roughly the same size. However, more than force is needed to expand exploitation over a population many times its own size. For this to happen, a firm must also have public support. A majority of the population must accept the exploitative actions as legitimate. This acceptance can range from active enthusiasm to passive resignation. But it must be acceptance in the sense that a majority must have given up the idea of actively or passively resisting any attempt to enforce nonproductive and noncontractual property acquisitions. The class consciousness must be low, undeveloped and fuzzy. Only as long as this state of affairs lasts is there still room for an exploitative firm to prosper even if no actual demand for it exists. Only if and insofar as the exploited and expropriated develop a clear idea of their own situation and are united with other members of their class through an ideological movement which gives expression to the idea of a classless society where all exploitation is abolished, can the power of the ruling class be broken. Only if, and insofar as, a majority of the exploited public becomes consciously integrated into such a movement and accordingly displays a common outrage over all nonproductive or noncontractual property acquisitions, shows a contempt for everyone who engages in such acts, and deliberately contributes nothing to help make them

西欧与美国封建与专制统治的逐渐废除，与愈来愈资本主义的社会崛起，伴随着空前的经济发展与人口增长，都是被剥削者不断增强的阶级意识所导致的，他们一起受到自然权利及自由主义意识形态的塑造。对此，奥地利学派与马克思主义者是一致赞同的^{【12】}。然而，他们对下一个评价则互相分歧：自19世纪后三十年，且自一战以来尤其显著，阶级意识的迷失导致逆自由主义过程以及剥削的稳步增长。实际上，按照奥地利学派的观点，从“拓殖者-生产者-储蓄者-契约者对抗非拓殖者-生产者-储蓄者-契约者”的正确剥削模型到“工薪族对抗资本家”的错误剥削模型，这种偷梁换柱主要归咎于马克思主义^{【13】}。

【12】关于这点参阅罗斯巴德“左与右：展望自由”；《反自然的平等主义等论文集》。

successful (not to mention actively trying to obstruct them) , can its power be brought to crumble.

The gradual abolition of feudal and absolutist rule and the rise of increasingly capitalist societies in Western Europe and the U.S., and along with this unheard-of economic growth and rising population numbers were the result of an increasing class consciousness among the exploited, who were ideologically molded together through the doctrines of natural rights and liberalism. In this Austrians and Marxists agree.¹² They disagree, however, on the next assessment: The reversal of this liberalization process and steadily increased levels of exploitation in these societies since the last third of the nineteenth century, and particularly pronounced since WW I, are the result of a loss in class consciousness. In fact, in the Austrian view Marxism must accept much of the blame for this development by misdirecting attention from the correct exploitation model of the homesteader-producer-saver-contractor vs. the non-homesteader-producer-saver-contractor to the fallacious model of the wage earner vs. the capitalist, thus muddling things up.¹³

¹²See on this Murray N. Rothbard, “Left and Right: The Prospects for Liberty,” in idem, *Egalitarianism As a Revolt Against Nature and Other Essays* (Washington, D.C.: Libertarian Review

【13】所有的社会主义宣传与之相反，尽管如此，马克思主义将资本家与劳动者描述成敌对阶级的虚假性，也在特定经济观察中得到证实：从逻辑上说，可以有无限不同的分类法，将人们分为阶级。根据正统实证主义方法（我认为错误但为便于讨论愿意接受），有助于我们更好预测的分类体系，是更优的分类体系。然而，将人们分类成资本家还是劳动者（或作为资本家或劳动者各种程度的代表），以预测一个人在基本政治、社会和经济议题上采取什么立场，在实践上是没有用处。与之相反，人们要么是税收生产者及被管制者，要么是税收消费者及管制者（或作为税收生产者或消费者不同程度的代表）的正确分类法，的确还算是强大的预测指标。大多数社会学者忽视这点，因为他们几乎普遍享有马克思主义的先入之见。但日常经验压倒性地证实我的论点：某人是否为公共雇员（以及他的级别与薪酬），公共部门以外个人收入及财富是否在多大程度上由公共部门采购与/或管制行动决定；根据他们被分类成直接或间接税收消费者还是税收生产者，人们对基本政治议题的反应将有系统性区别！

Press, 1974) .

13All socialist propaganda to the contrary notwithstanding, the falsehood of the Marxist description of capitalists and laborers as antagonistic classes also comes to bear in certain empirical observations: Logically speaking, people can be grouped into classes in infinitely different ways. According to orthodox positivist methodology (which I consider false but am willing to accept here for the sake of argument) , that classification system is better which helps us predict better. Yet the classification of people as capitalists or laborers (or as representatives of varying degrees of capitalist- or laborer-ness) is practically useless in predicting what stand a person will take on fundamental political, social and economic issues. Contrary to this, the correct classification of people as tax producers and the regulated vs. tax consumers and the regulators (or as representatives of varying degrees of tax producer- or consumer-ness) is indeed also a powerful predictor. Sociologists have largely overlooked this because of almost universally shared Marxist preconceptions. But everyday experience overwhelmingly corroborates my thesis: Find out whether or not somebody is a public employee (and his rank and salary) , and whether or not and to what extent the income and wealth of a person outside of the public sector is

统治阶级当权者，因强迫及操纵公众舆论（即被剥削阶级低下的觉醒意识）而凌驾于规模数倍的被剥削阶级之上，从加诸私法上的公法体系的创立过程中，找到自身最基本的制度表达。通过采纳适合本身运作的宪法，统治阶级彰显自身的独特性并维持统治地位。一方面，使政府机构内部运作以及与被剥削者之间的关系正式化，宪法形成一定程度的法律稳定性。被囊入宪法及公法的私法概念愈为人熟悉，愈深受欢迎，愈有助于创造有利的公众舆论。另一方面，任何宪法与公法也正式化了统治阶级相对拓殖原理的例外状态。它正式化了政府代理人从事非生产性与非契约性财产取得的权力，以及私法对公法的最终附庸地位。

determined by public sector purchases and/or regulatory actions; people will systematically differ in their response to fundamental political issues depending on whether they are classified as direct or indirect tax consumers or as tax producers!

The establishment of a ruling class over an exploited one many times its size by coercion and the manipulation of public opinion (i.e., a low degree of class consciousness among the exploited), finds its most basic institutional expression in the creation of a system of public law superimposed on private law. The ruling class sets itself apart and protects its position as a ruling class by adopting a constitution for their firm's operations. On the one hand, by formalizing the internal operations within the state apparatus as well as its relations vis-à-vis the exploited population, a constitution creates some degree of legal stability. The more familiar and popular private law notions are incorporated into constitutional and public law, the more conducive this will be to the creation of favorable public opinion. On the other hand, any constitution and public law also formalizes the exemplary status of the ruling class as regards the homesteading principle. It formalizes the right of the state's representatives to engage in nonproductive and noncontractual property acquisitions and the ultimate subordination of private to public law.

阶级公正，也即一套规则适用于统治者，另一套规则适用于被统治者的双重性，体现为公法与私法的双重性，体现在公法支配及渗透到私法当中。并非像马克思主义者所认为的那样，因为私法权利受到法律认可，所以阶级公正得到确立。确切说，阶级公正演变成，不管什么时候，按公法行动并受公法庇护的一群人，与按附庸的私法行动并受私法庇护的另一群人之间，存在法律差别。那么，更具体而言，马克思国家理论的基本假设尤其错误。政府的剥削性，不是因为它保护资本家的财产权，而是因为它本身被免除了生产性或契约性财产取得的束缚^{【14】}。

尽管马克思主义有根本误解，却因其正确将政府解释为剥削者（例如相对于将政府视为普通企业一员的公共选择学派）^{【15】}，而对政府的运作逻辑亦有一些重要见解。首先，它认识到再分配主义政府政策的策略功能。作为剥削机构，政府始终热衷于压抑被统治阶级的觉醒意识。财产与收入再分配——分而治之政策——作为政府手

Class justice, i.e., a dualism of one set of laws for the rulers and another for the ruled, comes to bear in this dualism of public and private law and in the domination and infiltration of public law over and into private law. It is not because private-property rights are recognized by law, as Marxists think, that class justice is established. Rather, class justice comes into being precisely whenever a legal distinction exists between a class of persons acting under and being protected by public law and another class acting under and being protected instead by some subordinate private law. More specifically then, the basic proposition of the Marxist theory of the state in particular is false. The state is not exploitative because it protects the capitalists' property rights, but because it itself is exempt from the restriction of having to acquire property productively and contractually.¹⁴

In spite of this fundamental misconception, however, Marxism, because it correctly interprets the state as exploitative (contrary, for instance, to the Public Choice School, which sees it as a normal firm among others),¹⁵ is on to some important insights regarding the logic of state operations. For one thing, it recognizes the strategic function of redistributionist state policies. As an exploitative firm, the state must at all times be interested in a low degree of class consciousness among

段，能够在公众中制造分歧，破坏被剥削阶级统一意识的形成。并且，再分配政府权力本身作为一种手段，通过民主化国家宪法，通过向人人开放每个统治职位，通过让人人有权参与政府人事及政策决定，减少了对剥削的反抗。其次，的确像马克思主义者认为的那样，政府是一个意识形态宣传及欺骗中心：剥削实际上是自由；税收实际上是自愿奉献；非契约关系实际上“概念性”契约关系；没有人受任何人的统治，我们都是自我统治；无政府就既无法律也无安全；且穷人将灭绝，等等。所有这一切，都是意识形态上层建筑的一部分，意图使经济剥削的下层基础合法化^{【16】}。最后，在注意到政企，尤其政府与银行精英的紧密联系方面，马克思主义者也是正确的——尽管对此解释有误。布尔乔亚势力对政府的兴趣由来，不是将政府作为私有产权及契约主义的保障者来认同，而是正确将政府视为私有产权的对立面。企业愈成功，政府剥削的潜在威胁愈大，然而，若能得到政府的特殊保护，免受资本主义竞争压力，则潜在收益也愈大。这就是为什么商业势力对政府感兴趣及有意渗透其中。统治精英

the ruled. The redistribution of property and income—a policy of *divide et impera*—is the state’s means with which it can create divisiveness among the public and destroy the formation of a unifying class consciousness of the exploited. Furthermore, the redistribution of state power itself through democratizing the state constitution and opening up every ruling position to everyone and granting everyone the right to participate in the determination of state personnel and policy is a means for reducing the resistance against exploitation as such. Second, the state is indeed, as Marxists see it, the great center of ideological propaganda and mystification: Exploitation is really freedom; taxes are really voluntary contributions; noncontractual relations are really “conceptually” contractual ones; no one is ruled by anyone but we all rule ourselves; without the state neither law nor security would exist; and the poor would perish, etc. All of this is part of the ideological superstructure designed to legitimize an underlying basis of economic exploitation.¹⁶ And finally, Marxists are also correct in noticing the close association between the state and business, especially the banking elite—even though their explanation for it is faulty. The reason is not that the bourgeois establishment sees and supports the state as the guarantor of private property rights and contractualism. On the contrary, the establishment correctly perceives

反过来，也因为商业势力的金钱力量，而有意与之密切合作。特别是政府对银行精英的兴趣由来，乃作为剥削组织，天然希望拥有彻底的伪造货币自主权。

【12】弗兰茨·奥本海默《社会学体系》第2卷，第322-333页介绍了如下事态：

“政府的基本规范就是权力。也即，从它的起源方面来看：暴力转化成权力。暴力是塑造社会的最强力量之一，但它本身不是社会互动形式。它必定是在这个词的肯定意义上成为规则，也即，从社会学上讲，它必定允许‘主观互惠’体系的发展，这唯有通过对于运用暴力的自我约束体系，以及用于交换其僭称权利的特定义务假定；暴力以这种方式转化成权力，统治关系形成‘公平互惠’的表达，不仅为统治者所接受，而且在不过于严厉的压迫状况下，

the state as the very antithesis to private property that it is and takes a close interest in it for this reason. The more successful a business, the larger the potential danger of governmental exploitation, but the larger also the potential gains that can be achieved if it can come under government's special protection and is exempt from the full weight of capitalist competition. This is why the business establishment is interested in the state and its infiltration. The ruling elite in turn is interested in close cooperation with the business establishment because of its financial powers. In particular, the banking elite is of interest because as an exploitative firm the state naturally wishes to possess complete autonomy for counterfeiting.

14 Franz Oppenheimer, *System der Soziologie*, vol. II. pp. 322-23, presents the matter thus:

The basic norm of the state is power. That is, seen from the side of its origin: violence transformed into might. Violence is one of the most powerful forces shaping society, but is not itself a form of social interaction. It must become law in the positive sense of this term, that is, sociologically speaking, it must permit the development of a system of “subjective reciprocity,” and this is only possible through a system of self-imposed restrictions on the use of violence and the assumption of certain obligations in exchange for its arrogated rights; in this way

也为其臣民所接受。在该基本规范之外，现在第二个及第三个规范呈现为：关于私法、继承法、刑法、债法及宪法的规范，它们全都具有基本权力及支配规范的特征，全被设计成以这种方式影响政府结构，将经济剥削扩张到与延续合法规制相容的最大化水平。”

这个洞见是基本的，即“法律有两种本质不同的源头”，一方面，来自平等合作的法，也即所谓“自然权利”，即便它不是自然的权利，另一方面，来自暴力转化成管制权力的法，不平等的法。

关于公法与私法的关系，参阅哈耶克《法律、立法与自由》第3卷（芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1973-1979年），尤其是第1卷第6章及和第2卷第85-88页。

【15】参阅布坎南与塔洛克《一致同意的计算》第19页。

【16】参阅霍普《财产权、无政府与国家》、《社会主义与资本主义的理论》。

violence is turned into might, and a relationship of domination emerges which is accepted not only by the rulers, but under not too severely oppressive circumstances by their subjects as well, as expressing a “just reciprocity.” Out of this basic norm secondary and tertiary norms now emerge as implied in it: norms of private law, of inheritance, criminal, obligational and constitutional law, which all bear the mark of the basic norm of power and domination, and which are all designed to influence the structure of the state in such a way as to increase economic exploitation to the maximum level which is compatible with the continuation of legally regulated domination.

The insight is fundamental that “law grows out of two essentially different roots.” On the one hand, out of the law of the association of equals, which can be called a “natural right,” even if it is no natural right, and on the other hand, out of the law of violence transformed into regulated might, the law of unequals.

On the relation between private and public law, see also F.A. Hayek, *Law, Legislation and Liberty*, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973-79), esp. vol. I, chap. 6 and vol. II, pp. 85-88.

15 See James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), p. 19.

16 See Hans-Hermann Hoppe, *Eigentum, Anarchie, und Staat*

将银行精英安插于伪造机制中，让他们在部分准备银行制度下，基于政府的伪钞额外制造伪钞，政府能轻而易举实现以上目标，并建立起政府垄断货币制度以及中央银行控制的卡特尔银行业。通过与银行体系乃至与银行主要客户之间伪造货币的直接关联，统治阶级实际上将政府机构触角延伸至市民社会的神经中枢——至少在表面上，与马克思主义者所描绘的银行业、商业精英与政府合作的图景，没有多大不同^{【17】}。

统治阶级内部及不同统治阶级之间的竞争，带来了不断加强的集中趋势。就此而言，马克思主义是正确的。但错误的剥削论，再次导致它误判这个趋势，将其视为内在于资本主义竞争之中。然而准确说，只要人们置身于清白资本主义，竞争就不是零和互动。拓殖者、生产者、储蓄者与契约者之所得，不是建立在他人代价上。他们的

(Opladen:Westdeutscher Verlag, 1987) ; idem, *A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism*.

By offering to cut the banking elite in on its own counterfeiting machinations and allowing them to counterfeit on top of its own counterfeited notes under a regime of fractional reserve banking, the state can easily reach this goal and establish a system of state monopolized money and cartelized banking controlled by the central bank. And through this direct counterfeiting connection with the banking system and by extension the banks' major clients, the ruling class in fact extends far beyond the state apparatus to the very nerve centers of civil society—not that much different, at least in appearance, from the picture that Marxists like to paint of the cooperation between banking, business elites and the state.¹⁷

Competition within the ruling class and among different ruling classes brings about a tendency toward increasing concentration. Marxism is right in this. However, its faulty theory of exploitation again leads it to locate the cause for this tendency in the wrong place. Marxism sees such a tendency as inherent in capitalist competition. Yet it is precisely so long as people are engaged in a clean capitalism that competition is *not* a form of zero-sum interaction. The homesteader, the producer, saver and contractor do not gain at another's

收入丝毫不损别人的物质财产，或者说，这实际上意味着共赢（如同在一切契约交换的情况下）。因而绝对财富的增长，要归功于资本主义。然而，不能认为在资本主义制度下，存在通往相对集中的系统性趋势^{【18】}。相反，零和互动的特征，不仅是统治者与被统治者之间的关系，也是彼此竞争的统治者之间的关系。以非生产性、非契约性财产取得为定义的剥削，得要有所可供剥削之物才有可能。然而，若在剥削业内在存在竞争，可供剥削之物将荡然无存。因此，剥削要求对特定区域及人口的垄断；剥削者之间的竞争本质是消灭殆尽，且必然带来剥削组织的相对集中化以及每个剥削性组织内部集中化的趋势。各国政府而非资本主义企业的发展，最能说明这种趋势：现在比起数世纪前，剥削统治更多地域的政府数量明显下降。在每个政府机构内部，中央政府权力事实上总在不断扩张，而以地区与地方政府分支的权力缩小为代价。同理，在政府机构之外也存在相对集中的趋势。现在应该清楚，不是因为资本主义的任何固有特征，而是因为统治阶级凭借政府-银行-商业同盟的建立，尤其是中央银行体系的建立，

expense. Their gains either leave another's physical possessions completely unaffected or they actually imply mutual gains (as in the case of all contractual exchanges). Capitalism thus can account for increases in absolute wealth. But under its regime no systematic tendency toward relative concentration can be said to exist.¹⁸ Instead, zero-sum interactions characterize not only the relationship between the ruler and the ruled, but also between competing rulers. Exploitation defined as nonproductive and noncontractual property acquisitions is only possible as long as there is anything that can be appropriated. Yet if there were free competition in the business of exploitation, there would obviously be nothing left to expropriate. Thus, exploitation requires monopoly over some given territory and population; and the competition between exploiters is by its very nature eliminative and must bring about a tendency toward relative concentration of exploitative firms as well as a tendency toward centralization within each exploitative firm. The development of *states* rather than capitalist firms provides the foremost illustration of this tendency: There are now a significantly smaller number of states with exploitative control over much larger territories than in previous centuries. And within each state apparatus there has in fact been a constant tendency toward increasing the powers of the central government at the expense of its

将统治扩张到市民社会中。政府权力如果凝聚集集中，那么，银行业及工业的相对集中与卡特尔化与之同步发生，就再自然不过。政府权力扩张，相关银行业与商业势力，通过非生产性与/或非契约性剥削手段，将经济竞争对手置于死地或劣势的权力也随之扩张。企业集中化正是经济生活“国家化”的倒影^{【19】}。

【17】霍普“银行业、国民政府与国际政治”《奥地利经济学评论》4（1990年）、本书第三章；罗斯巴德《银行的秘密》第15-16章。

【18】详阅罗斯巴德《人、经济与国家》第10章，尤其是“大卡特尔的麻烦”这一节；米塞斯《社会主义》第22-26章。

【19】关于这点，参阅盖布里尔·考尔科《保守主义的胜

regional and local subdivisions. Yet outside the state apparatus a tendency toward relative concentration has also become apparent for the same reason. Not, as should be clear by now, because of any trait inherent in capitalism, but because the ruling class has expanded its rule into the midst of civil society through the creation of a state-banking-business alliance and in particular the establishment of a system of central banking. If a concentration and centralization of state power then takes place, it is only natural that this be accompanied by a parallel process of relative concentration and cartelization of banking and industry. Along with increased state powers, the associated banking and business establishment's powers of eliminating or putting economic competitors at a disadvantage by means of nonproductive and/or noncontractual expropriations increases. Business concentration is the reflection of a "state-ization" of economic life.¹⁹

17See Hans-Hermann Hoppe, "Banking, Nation States and International Politics," *Review of Austrian Economics* 4 (1990); *supra* chap. 3; Rothbard, *The Mystery of Banking*, chaps. 15-16.

18See on this in particular Rothbard, *Man, Economy, and State*, chap. 10, esp. the section "The Problem of One Big Cartel"; also Mises, *Socialism*, chaps. 22-26.

19See on this Gabriel Kolko, *The Triumph of Conservatism*

利》（芝加哥：自由出版社，1967年）；詹姆斯·韦恩斯坦《自由国度的公司理想》；罗纳德·拉多什与罗斯巴德编《利维坦的新历史》；伦纳德·里奇奥与詹姆斯·J·马丁《帝国的分水岭》（科罗拉多州科泉：拉尔夫·迈尔斯，1976年）。

政府权力扩张以及竞争性剥削中心消亡，其主要手段是战争和军事统治。国家间竞争意涵着通往战争与帝国主义的趋势。作为剥削中心，它们的利益本质上是敌对的。并且，每个政府在国内掌握课税工具与伪造货币的绝对权力，对统治阶级而言，让别人为他们的战争掏钱是可能的。假如一个人不必为自己的冒险承担代价，却能够强迫别人这么做，那么他理所当然会变本加厉地鲁莽冒险，并以扣动扳机为乐^[20]。与大多数所谓布尔乔亚社会科学针锋相对，马克思主义在事实上是正确的：历史当中确实运作着一种通向帝国主义的趋势；并且最帝国主义的势力确实是最发达的资本主义国家。然而它的解释却又再一次错误。作为免除资本主义财产取得规则束缚的机构，政府天然具有侵略性。资本主义与帝国主义密切相关联的历史证据，看似与之并不契合。从以下事

（Chicago: FreePress, 1967）；James Weinstein, *The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State*（Boston: Beacon Press, 1968）；Ronald Radosh and Murray N. Rothbard, eds., *A New History of Leviathan*（New York: Dutton, 1972）；Leonard Liggio and James J. Martin, eds., *Watershed of Empire*（Colorado Springs, Colo.: Ralph Myles, 1976）。

The primary means for the expansion of state power and the elimination of rival exploitation centers is war and military domination. Interstate competition implies a tendency toward war and imperialism. As centers of exploitation their interests are by nature antagonistic. Moreover, with each of them—internally—in command of the instrument of taxation and absolute counterfeiting powers, it is possible for the ruling classes to let others pay for their wars. Naturally, if one does not have to pay for one's risky ventures oneself, but can force others to do so, one tends to be a greater risk taker and more trigger happy than one would otherwise be.²⁰ Marxism, contrary to much of the so-called bourgeois social sciences, gets the facts right: there is indeed a tendency toward imperialism operative in history; and the foremost imperialist powers are indeed the most advanced capitalist nations. Yet the explanation is once again faulty. It is the *state* as an institution exempt from the capitalist rules of property acquisitions that is by nature aggressive. And the historical evidence of

实中却极易找到解释，即为了在国家间战争中脱颖而出，一国政府必须掌握（相对意义上）足够的经济资源。其他条件不变，拥有充足资源的政府将会取胜。作为剥削性机构，政府天然破坏财富与资本主义积累。财富完全由市民社会生产；政府的剥削力愈弱，社会积累的财富与资本愈多。因此，初看好像矛盾，一国国内政府愈弱并且愈自由，资本主义就愈发达；从发达资本主义经济中榨取的财富使该国政府愈富有；愈富有的政府赢得愈来愈多的扩张主义战争。正是这种联系，解释了为什么起初是西欧国家、尤其是大英帝国，一度成为最领先的帝国主义势力，为什么20世纪这一职能落在美国身上。

银行与商业势力通常身为军事力量与帝国主义扩张的忠实支持者，对于一向由马克思主义者指出的这些观察现象，类似存在一种直截了当但又一次完全非马克思主义的解释。并不是因为资本主义市场的扩张需要剥削，而是因为受国家保

a close correlation between capitalism and imperialism only seemingly contradicts this. It finds its explanation, easily enough, in the fact that in order to come out successfully from interstate wars, a state must be in command of sufficient (in relative terms) economic resources. *Ceteris paribus*, the state with more ample resources will win. As an exploitative firm, a state is by nature destructive of wealth and capital accumulation. Wealth is produced exclusively by civil society; and the weaker the state's exploitative powers, the more wealth and capital society accumulates. Thus, paradoxical as it may sound at first, the weaker or the more liberal a state is internally, the further developed capitalism is; a developed capitalist economy to extract from makes the state richer; and a richer state then makes for more and more successful expansionist wars. It is this relationship that explains why initially the states of Western Europe, and in particular Great Britain, were the leading imperialist powers, and why in the 20th century this role has been assumed by the U.S.

And a similarly straightforward yet once again entirely non-Marxist explanation exists for the observation always pointed out by Marxists, that the banking and business establishment is usually among the most ardent supporters of military strength and imperial expansionism. It is not because the expansion of capitalist markets

护及恩惠的商业要取得扩张，需要将这种保护延伸到国外；比起国内有过之而无不及地，通过非契约性与非生产性财产取得来阻碍国外竞争者。具体说，假如这样能保证与之结盟的本国政府，取得对他国的军事统治地位，商业势力就支持帝国主义。那么，从军事实力的立场出发，就有可能建立所谓**货币帝国主义**。支配国将运用它的强大权力，强制实施国际合作的通货膨胀政策。支配国中央银行在伪造货币过程中定出步调，受支配国中央银行根据指令，以支配国货币充当储备和进一步通货膨胀的基础。通过这种方式，支配国政府，以及作为伪造储备货币先到手者的关系银行及商业势力，能够一起参与对外国财产主及收入生产者几乎无成本的掠夺。外国政府及精英凌驾于本国政府与精英上的双重剥削，被强加于受支配地区的被剥削阶级，导致旷日持久的经济依赖，以及相对于支配国的经济停滞。正是这种极度非资本主义的情况，标识着美国与美元的重要地位，并引起对于美国经济剥削与美元帝国主义的正确指控^{【21】}。

requires exploitation, but because the expansion of state protected and privileged business requires that such protection be extended also to foreign countries and that foreign competitors be hampered through noncontractual and nonproductive property acquisitions in the same way or more so than internal competition. Specifically, it supports imperialism if this promises to lead to a position of military domination of one's own allied state over another. For then, from a position of military strength, it becomes possible to establish a system of—as one may call it—*monetary imperialism*. The dominating state will use its superior power to enforce a policy of internationally coordinated inflation. Its own central bank sets the pace in the process of counterfeiting, and the central banks of the dominated states are ordered to use its currency as their own reserves and inflate on top of them. This way, along with the dominating state and as the earliest receivers of the counterfeit reserve currency its associated banking and business establishment can engage in an almost costless expropriation of foreign property owners and income producers. A double layer of exploitation of a foreign state and a foreign elite on top of a national state and elite is imposed on the exploited class in the dominated territories, causing prolonged economic dependency and relative economic stagnation vis-à-vis the dominant nation. It is this—very

【20】关于政府与战争的关系，参阅克里彭多夫《政府与战争》；查尔斯·提利《有组织犯罪：战争制造与国家制造》，彼得·埃文斯等编《找回国家》；另阅罗伯特·希格斯《危机与利维坦》。

【21】关于军事及货币帝国主义理论的更深刻版本，参阅霍普《银行业、国民政府与国际政治》（本书第3章）。

最终，剥削权力的不断凝聚集中，导致了经济停滞，从而为其最终消亡，并产生空前经济繁荣的无阶级社会的建立，创造出客观条件。

然而，与马克思主义的主张相反，这不是任何历史规律的结果。实际上，马克思主义者想象中势不可挡的历史规律并不存在^{【22】}。这也不像马克思所认为的，是利润率随资本结构有机构成增加（不变资本相对于可变资本比例的增加）而下

uncapitalist—situation that characterizes the status of the United States and the U.S. dollar and that gives rise to the—correct—charge of U.S. economic exploitation and dollar imperialism?²¹

20On the relationship between state and war see Ekkehart Krippendorff, *Staat Und Krieg* (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1985) ; Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Peter Evans et al., eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) ; also RobertHiggs, *Crisis and Leviathan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987) .

21On a further elaborated version of this theory of military and monetary imperialism see Hoppe, *Banking, Nation States and International Politics* (suprachap. 3) .

Finally, the increasing concentration and centralization of exploitative powers leads to economic stagnation and thereby creates the objective conditions for their ultimate demise and the establishmentof a classless society capable of producing unheard-of economicprosperity.

Contrary to Marxist claims, this is not the result of any historical laws, however. In fact, no such things as inexorable historical laws as Marxists conceive of them exist.²² Nor is it the result of a tendency for the rate of profit to fall with an increased organic composition of

降的结果。正因为劳动价值论无可挽回的错误，利润率下降趋势的规律也是错误的。价值、利息与利润的源头，不是劳动的耗费，而是行动的代价，也即受时间偏好与不确定性（不完善知识）束缚的行动人，利用稀缺资源以求实现目标。没有理由认为，资本有机构成的变动，会与利息与利润的变动有系统关联。

【22】关于这点详见米塞斯《理论与历史》，尤其是第2部分。

相反，刺激更强阶级觉醒形成的危机可能性（即推翻统治阶级的主观条件）增加，是因为——运用马克思所喜词汇之一——我先前所提到的关于剥削的辩证法：剥削破坏财富形成。因此，在剥削机构（政府）的竞争中，更少剥削或更自由者倾向于战胜更残酷剥削者，因为它们掌握更充足的资源。帝国主义过程对受其控制的社会，起初具有促进自由的相对作用。相对更加资本主

capital (an increase in the proportion of constant to variable capital, that is), as Marx thinks. Just as the labor theory of value is false beyond repair, so is the law of the tendential fall of the profit rate, which is based on it. The source of value, interest and profit is not the expenditure of labor but of acting, i.e., the employment of scarce means in the pursuit of goals by agents who are constrained by timepreference and uncertainty (imperfect knowledge). There is no reason to suppose, then, that changes in the organic composition of capital should have any systematic relation to changes in interest and profit.

22See on this in particular Ludwig von Mises, *Theory and History* (Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises institute, 1985), esp. part 2.

Instead, the likelihood of crises which stimulate the development of a higher degree of class consciousness (i.e., the subjective conditions for the overthrow of the ruling class) increases because—to use one of Marx’s favorite terms—of the dialectics of exploitation which I have already touched on earlier: Exploitation is destructive of wealth formation. Hence, in the competition of exploitative firms (of states), less exploitative or more liberal ones tend to outcompete more exploitative ones because they are in

义的社会模式，被输出到相对更少资本主义（更多剥削）的社会。生产力的发展受到刺激：经济一体化加深，劳动分工扩展，真正的世界市场得以建立。人口指数相应增加，关于经济未来的期望升至前所未有的高度^{【23】}。然而，随着剥削统治在帝国主义扩张过程中站稳脚跟，国家间竞争减少乃至消亡，对支配国内部剥削掠夺的外部限制逐渐消失。国内剥削、税收及管制开始增长，统治阶级与统治世界的最终目标更近一步。经济停滞开始，且这个——世界范围的——更高预期受到挫折。并且这种——高期望与滞后于这些期望的经济现实——是革命潜力出现的经典状况^{【24】}。新危机的出现，极度需要意识形态的解决方法，还出现更广泛的觉醒，即政府统治、税收及管制非但不解决问题，实际上构成了需要克服的问题。处在这种经济停滞、危机与意识形态幻灭的情况当中^{【25】}，假如以系统及深刻的自由至上哲学形式，伴随它的对应经济学即奥地利学派经济学，提出某种积极的解决方法；假如这种意识形态凭借积极运动得到宣传，那么将革命潜力付诸行动的期望就将前途光明。反国家主义力量将乘势而上，

command of more ample resources. The process of imperialism initially has a relatively liberating effect on societies coming under its control. A relatively more capitalist social model is exported to relatively less capitalist (more exploitative) societies. The development of productive forces is stimulated: economic integration is furthered, division of labor extended, and a genuine world market established. Population figures go up in response, and expectations as regards the economic future rise to unprecedented heights.²³ With exploitative domination taking hold, and interstate competition reduced or even eliminated in a process of imperialist expansionism, however, the external constraints on the dominating state's power of internal exploitation and expropriation gradually disappear. Internal exploitation, taxation and regulation begin to increase the closer the ruling class comes to its ultimate goal of world domination. Economic stagnation sets in and the—worldwide—higher expectations become frustrated. And this—high expectations and an economic reality increasingly falling behind these expectations—is the classical situation for the emergence of a revolutionary potential.²⁴ A desperate need for ideological solutions to the emerging crises arises, along with a more widespread recognition of the fact that state rule, taxation and regulation—far from offering such a solution—actually constitute the

带来解散统治阶级及其剥削工具——政府的不可抗拒潮流^{【26】}。

然而与马克思主义相悖，以上情况如要发生，将不意味着生产资料的社会所有制。实际上，正如已解释的，社会所有制不仅在经济上无效率；而且也与政府“消亡”的思想水火不容^{【27】}。因为倘若生产手段为集体所有，且现实地假设，关于如何利用这些生产手段，每个人想法并非（如奇迹般）不谋而合，那么生产要素的社会所有制，恰恰需要政府行动的延续，即需要强迫将某个人意愿凌驾于另一人意愿之上的机构。而政府消亡及随之结束剥削、迎来自由与空前经济繁荣，都意味着要建立一个只受私法规制的纯私有财产社

very problem that must be overcome. If in this situation of economic stagnation, crises, and ideological disillusion²⁵ a positive solution is offered in the form of a systematic and comprehensive libertarian philosophy coupled with its economic counterpart: Austrian economics; and if this ideology is propagated by an activist movement, then the prospects of igniting the revolutionary potential to activism become overwhelmingly positive and promising. Antistatist pressures will mount and bring about an irresistible tendency toward dismantling the power of the ruling class and the state as its instrument of exploitation.²⁶

If and insofar as this occurs, however, this will not mean social ownership of means of production, contrary to the Marxist model. In fact, social ownership is not only economically inefficient as has already been explained; it is incompatible with the idea that the state is “withering away.”²⁷ For if means of production are owned collectively, and if it is realistically assumed that not everyone’s ideas as to how to employ these means of production happen to coincide (as if by miracle), then it is precisely socially owned factors of production which require continued state actions, i.e., an institution coercively imposing one person’s will on another disagreeing one’s. Instead, the withering away of the state, and with this the end of exploitation and

会。

【23】这里应注意马克思与恩格斯，首先在《共产主义宣言》中，拥护资本主义的历史性进步特征，对其空前成就赞不绝口。确实，回顾宣言的相关段落，约瑟夫·A.熊彼特总结道：

“我反复强调，从未有人，尤其是布尔乔亚文明的现代辩护者，像（宣言）这样着墨；也从未有人，代表商业阶级，就布尔乔亚文明取得的成就，及它对人类的意义，从如此深邃、如此广博的理解中，进行凝炼概括。”

（“社会学与经济学中的《共产主义宣言》”载于《熊彼特文集》理查德·克莱曼编[纽约华盛顿港市：肯尼卡出版社，1951年]，第293页）

鉴于这个资本主义观点，马克思甚至为英国统治印度辩护，如当成历史的发展进步。参阅马克思对《纽约每日论坛报》的供稿，1853年6月25日、7月11日、8月8日（《马克思与恩格斯作品集》[东柏林：迪茨，1960年]，第9卷）。对帝国主义持相似立场的当代马克思主义，参阅比尔·沃伦《帝国主义：资本主义先锋》（伦敦：新左书局，1981

the beginning of liberty and unheard-of economic prosperity, means the establishment of a pure private property society regulated by nothing but private law.

23It may be noted here that Marx and Engels, foremost in their *Communist Manifesto*, championed the historically progressive character of capitalism and were full of praise for its unprecedented accomplishments. Indeed, reviewing the relevant passages of the *Manifesto* concludes Joseph A. Schumpeter,

Never, I repeat, and in particular by no modern defender of the bourgeois civilization has anything like this been penned, never has a brief been composed on behalf of the business class from so profound and so wide a comprehension of what its achievement is and what it means to humanity. (“The Communist Manifesto in Sociology and Economics,” in idem, *Essays of Joseph A. Schumpeter*, ed. Richard Clemence [Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1951], p. 293)

Given this view of capitalism, Marx went so far as to defend the British conquest of India, for example, as a historically progressive development. See Marx’s contributions to the *New York Daily Tribune*, of June 25, 1853, July 11, 1853, August 8, 1853 (Marx and Engels, *Werke* [East Berlin: Dietz, 1960], vol. 9). As a contemporary Marxist taking a similar stand on imperialism see Bill Warren, *Imperialism:*

年)。

【24】关于革命理论详见查尔斯·提利《从动员到革命》(马萨诸塞州雷丁:艾迪生·韦斯利,1978年);《当社会学遇到历史》(纽约:学术出版社,1981年)。

【25】对于“晚期资本主义”的当代的新马克思主义评价,以诞生于永久经济停滞、保守主义与社会民主主义(即美国词汇中的“自由派”)合法性权力枯竭的“新意识形态迷失”为特征,见尤尔根·哈贝马斯《新复杂性》(法兰克福/M.:苏尔坎普,1985年)、《合法性危机》(波士顿:灯塔出版社,1975年);C·奥费《资本主义国家的结构性问题》(法兰克福/M.:苏尔坎普,1972年)。

【26】对晚期资本主义的危机特征,以及革命自由阶级觉醒的奥地利-自由至上评价见罗斯巴德“左与右”、《为了新自由》第15章、《自由的伦理》第5部分。

【27】关于马克思主义理论的内在矛盾另阅汉斯·凯尔森《社会主义与国家》(维也纳,1965年)。

Pioneer of Capitalism (London: New Left Books, 1981) .

24See on the theory of revolution in particular Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978); idem, *As Sociology Meets History* (New York: Academic Press, 1981) .

25For a neo-Marxist assessment of the present era of “late capitalism” As characterized by “a new ideological disorientation” born out of permanent economic stagnation and the exhaustion of the legitimacy powers of conservatism and social-democratism, (i.e., “liberalism” in American terminology) see Jürgen Habermas, *Die Neue Unübersichtlichkeit* (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1985) ; also idem, *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975) ; C. Offe, *Strukturprobleme des kapitalistischen Staates* (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1972) .

26For an Austrian-libertarian assessment of the crisis-character of late capitalism and on the prospects for the rise of a revolutionary libertarian class consciousness see Rothbard, “Left and Right”; idem, *For a New Liberty*, chap. 15; idem, *The Ethics of Liberty* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1982) ,part V.

27On the internal inconsistencies of the Marxist theory of the state see also Hans Kelsen, *Sozialismus und Staat* (Vienna, 1965) .

